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Abstract 
Monetary policy has become a key component of economic policies. Modern monetary 
policy has been shaped by a substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research 
over the past few decades. The thesis focuses on three particular areas where the 
influences of monetary policy have become of great importance over the recent 
decades.  
While the 1st chapter sets out the backdrop, the 2nd chapter focuses on 
exchange rate pass through elasticities and their macroeconomic determinants. Pass 
through is a source of inflation through imports in open economies and has reportedly 
been declining in a number of countries since the 1980s for aggregate prices level. Low 
average and persistent inflation has been suggested as one of the main reasons for this 
decline. Pass through is influenced by the monetary policy regimes. We first estimate 
the pass through elasticities and verify the evidence of declining pass through across 
different monetary policy regimes for 39 countries over the period 1981 to 2010 by 
constructing some relevant indices. We find the evidence of declining pass through 
over the period. Secondly, we verify the important macroeconomic determinants by 
including some macroeconomic variables and monetary policy regimes. Our findings 
reaffirmed the importance of inflation in determining pass through elasticities and 
suggest that inflation targeting monetary policy regime and greater central bank 
autonomy reduce pass through elasticities. 
In the 3rd chapter, we first provide a classification of de facto monetary policy 
regimes for 124 countries, which includes 7 exchange rate regimes and 4 inflation 
targeting and monetary targeting regimes. The previous studies had only classified de 
facto exchange rate regimes and ignored the underlying monetary policy frameworks in 
their classifications exercises. However, the outcome of such classifications will not be 
accurate, as some of the identical exchange rate regimes will have different monetary 
policy frameworks, such as inflation targeting, which needs to be taken into account in 
any proper assessment of the impact of the regimes on growth and inflation. Secondly, 
we evaluate the regime performances on growth and inflation by using pooled mean 
group (PMG) estimation method instead of GMM. PMG is more suitable for panel 
analysis with a large number of time series observations (𝑇)  and the number of 
groups(𝑁). The findings suggest that monetary policy with nominal anchors is more 
conducive to growth. 
The 4th chapter focuses on the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in terms of both the quality and volume of financial development in 
eight Asian and south east Asian emerging economies for the period 2003 to 2012. We 
have estimated the cost and profit efficiencies of the banks in these countries for the 
first time to measure the quality of financial institutions. Broad money growth and bank 
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP have been used for the volume 
measures. The findings suggest the importance of both the volume and the quality of 
financial development for growth in these countries. 
The 5th and the final chapter concludes.   
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades monetary policy has played an important role in stabilizing 
output and inflation. The preference for monetary policy, as an option, has increased 
since the 1960s, partly because of the concerns over the limitations of fiscal policy and 
partly because of the fear that fiscal policy decisions are susceptible to political 
influences, making it difficult to achieve desirable outcomes using fiscal policy 
instruments. Among the policy variables, exchange rate is one of the fastest 
transmission channels for monetary policy. Typically, the monetary policy instrument 
is a financial market price (e.g., short term interest rates, bank credits etc.) directly set 
or closely controlled by the central bank (Hildebrand, 2006). The monetary policy 
instruments are interrelated and their deployment and effectiveness depend on various 
factors, such as exchange rate arrangements, monetary policy frameworks, controls and 
regulation over capital flows (Mishkin, 2007a; Walsh, 1998). Monetary policy regime 
has the ability to influence various aspects of an economy, such as growth, inflation 
and financial development. The thesis has focused on three areas where modern 
monetary policy has important roles to play.  
The mutually exclusive chapters of the thesis cover the broader area of applied 
macroeconomics. They are focused on the empirical issues related to exchange rate 
pass through, classification and performances of monetary policy regimes, and the 
implications of financial development on growth.  
1.2 Background 
There is a global decline in average inflation from 14% in the early 1980s to 4% by the 
early 21
st
 century (Rogoff, 2003). ‘Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon’ a famous statement by Milton Friedman has become a cliché. Anti-
inflationary fiscal and monetary policy played an important role in bringing down 
inflation in many countries over the past few decades. There has been a broad 
consensus that the choice of how to conduct monetary policy has important 
consequences for aggregate activity. A stream of empirical research beginning in the 
1980s and a considerable improvement in the underlying theoretical frameworks used 
for policy analysis have substantiated the fact that monetary policy significantly 
influences the short term course of real economy (Clarida et al., 1999). For a long time 
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macroeconomists have been acknowledging the important role of inflation expectations 
in the transmission process of wage and price inflation. They are, however, divided 
sharply over the role of monetary policy in controlling inflation expectation.  
The existence of strict monetary rules over the 19
th
 century left very little 
leeway for monetary policy. At the very onset, central banks gained their legitimacy by 
acting as the lenders of the last resort during the financial crises rather than by 
formulating monetary policy. The apparent irrelevance of monetary policy is brought 
out sharply by the work of leading economic historians such as Charles Goodhart 
(1987). Goodhart (1987) studied how the profit making central banks eventually 
transformed themselves into the modern public institutions. This transformation 
primarily took place during the 20
th
century. The roles of the central banks have been 
shaped by the financial crises, need for information and a lender of the last resort. 
Practicing monetary policy is an effective tool for conducting economic policy 
is a recent phenomenon. The scepticism regarding the ability of monetary policy to 
control inflation was dominant well into the 1970s.
1
 This scepticism was reflected in 
the deep division within the academic world over the supremacy and credibility of 
central banks to influence inflation expectations. The foundation of modern monetary 
policy was laid by the Keynesian and Monetary schools of thought during and after the 
Great Depression. Keynesian economists recognised the scope of monetary policy, 
whereas monetarist economists emphasised its limitations. While both schools are 
divided on the role of monetary policy, they are in consensus over the significance of 
monetary policy in policy making process. The reign of the Keynesians was undisputed 
until the rampant stagflation over the 1970s and early 80s and before the Monetarist 
critiques. In the midst of the confusion, created by the division between the Keynesian 
and Monetarist schools of thought, Rational expectations monetary theory examined 
the interrelationship between inflation psychology and monetary policy. Lucas (1976), 
and Lucas and Sargent (1981) theoretically demonstrated that inflation expectations can 
be controlled to maintain central bank’s desired lower rate of inflation if the central 
bank can credibly commit to noninflationary rules. Therefore, in a credible 
disinflationary monetary policy money growth, expected inflation and actual inflation 
                                                 
1
 Inflation was largely believed to be aggravated by the factors such as fiscal deficits, commodity price 
shocks, inflation psychology, aggressive labour unions and monopolistically competitive firms 
(Goodfriend, 2007).  
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could all have a coherent movement without any adverse impact on employment. The 
fundamental question is how long it takes a central bank to achieve credibility to pursue 
this goal.  
Some Keynesian economists like Tobin were pessimistic about the credibility of 
achieving low inflation and held the view that the response of inflationary expectations 
to any policy changes would be very slow.  In contrast, Monetarists were divided over 
how readily a central bank could acquire credibility for low inflation. In a seminal work 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) demonstrated the ‘time inconsistency problem’ of the 
optimal monetary policy. The problem suggests that a central bank free to choose 
discretionary monetary policy will always have an incentive to pursue expansionary 
monetary policy to reduce unemployment despite the promise of pursuing a low 
inflationary policy. The promise has to be secured by a credible commitment to focus 
only on the low inflation target. Monetary policy can influence growth over the short 
run, but the ability is very limited over the long run. The temptation to pursue growth 
and unemployment over the long run will create inconsistency as the rational agents 
will adjust the wage and the price on the basis of their expectations. As a consequence, 
the economy will end up with higher inflation.  
Therefore, credibility is regarded as one of the key factors for an effective 
monetary policy for reducing inflation and in improving the flexibility of monetary 
policy to stabilise employment over the business cycle (Goodfriend, 2007). Rogoff 
(1985) and Cukierman (1995) proposed the idea that independent central banks be 
governed by conservative central bankers. The reasoning paved the way for the two 
institutional revolutions that occurred over the period from the late 1980s until now. 
Institutional supports are designed to anchor inflation expectation and entrusted with 
the explicit mandate of price stability, such as inflation targeting.  
1.3 Motivation for the Research 
The monetary authorities of a number of industrialised countries were successful in 
battling inflation. Many industrialised countries started experiencing a period of 
relative price stability over the late 80s and the early 90s. Among a number of 
competing factors, many attribute the cause of low inflation to the adoption of credible 
monetary policy regimes aimed at influencing the inflation expectations of economic 
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agents.
2
 Some countries, such as Australia, Canada, the UK, Brazil, and Chile achieved 
this credibility through adopting formal inflation-targeting framework for monetary 
policy. However, countries like the US, Switzerland and also the European Union (EU) 
achieved this goal through a credible and persistent commitment to pursue low inflation 
(Bailliu et al., 2004).  
This low inflationary period has also coincided with several episodes of large 
exchange rate depreciations with much smaller impacts on consumer prices compared 
to the similar depreciations in the past. Prominent examples include the UK and 
Sweden after the 1992 European exchange rate mechanism crisis (ERM), and Brazil in 
1999 after the currency crisis. Event studies by Cunningham and Haldane (1999) of the 
1992 depreciation and 1996 appreciation in the UK, the 1992 depreciation in Sweden, 
and the 1999 depreciation in Brazil show a significant small pass-through of exchange 
rate changes to retail prices. In the UK, neither the 20% depreciation in 1992 nor the 
20% appreciation in 1996 caused retail price inflation to deviate significantly from the 
2.5% trend. The lack of response in the retail price is due a decline in exchange rate 
pass through (ERPT). Pioneering this view, the Taylor (2000) model demonstrates that 
the pricing power of the firms is reduced with low inflation and lower persistence of 
inflation, therefore, limiting their ability to pass through costs arising from exchange 
rate depreciations. Taylor (2000) emphasised the role of monetary policy regime and 
suggested that a change in the monetary policy was the primary cause of this declining 
pricing power of the firms. 
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A number of subsequent studies found evidence in support of Taylor’s (2000) 
proposition.
4
 These findings imply that credible monetary policy regimes with an 
intention and the commitment of low inflation will experience lower exchange rate pass 
through. This provides the basis for the second chapter of the thesis.
5
 Given the 
importance of the role of monetary policy regimes, in Chapter 3 we have conducted a 
classifications exercise of monetary policy regimes and evaluate the performances of 
                                                 
2
Globalisation has been cited as another contributing factor, which reduced inflation by increasing 
competitiveness.    
3
 The details will be discussed over the next sections.  
 
4
 For example, see McCarthy (1999), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004).  
 
5
 However, we have used the Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) natural classifications of exchange rate 
regimes, as well as inflation targeting (IT) regime, to observe the impact of monetary policy regimes on 
pass through elasticities.  This discussion has been elaborated in the first chapter.  
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these regimes with respect to growth and inflation. In the 4
th
 chapter we have carried 
out an empirical investigation on the role of financial development and economic 
growth, emphasising both the quality and volume measures of financial development.  
1.4 Structure and contributions of the thesis 
In the 2nd chapter we estimate the ERPT elasticities for 39 developed and developing 
countries over the period 1981 to 2010 across different monetary policy regimes and 
evaluate the impact of some macroeconomic variables on ERPT. The pass through 
elasticities into domestic inflation appear to have declined in many countries since the 
late 1980s. Taylor (2000) and the Bank of Canada (Monetary Policy report, 2000) have 
conjectured that anti-inflationary monetary policy may have changed the price setting 
behaviours of the firms. As mentioned previously, Taylor (2000) in a simple 
microeconomic staggered price-setting model, demonstrated the possibility that lower 
inflation has led to lower pricing power of the firms. His model indicates that observed 
changes in pricing power are due, in part, to the changes in expectation of the inflation 
persistence and cost movements. A simple explanation could be that the extent to 
which a firm tries to match an increase in costs or prices to other firms by increasing its 
own price, largely depends on how persistent the increase is expected to be. Lower and 
stable inflation is associated with lower inflation persistence, therefore, reducing the 
rise in the cost.  
Taylor’s (2000) hypothesis has been subjected to extensive empirical testing to 
find the linkage between ERPT of import or consumers prices and monetary policy 
regimes (for example, average and the variability of inflation, and average exchange 
rate depreciations and the variability of exchange rate changes). However, these studies 
are, mostly, concentrated on the developed countries. Very few studies examined this 
issue in the context of developing countries. The role of ERPT, in the context of 
developing countries, is much more important since many of these countries adopted 
flexible exchange rate regimes and abolished the capital controls. As a result, these 
countries have become much more susceptible to the exchange rate changes and 
imported inflationary pressure.  
Choudhri and Hakura (2001) verify Taylor’s (2000) proposition in the context 
of a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model with imperfect competition and 
staggered contracts. In the model they demonstrate that a low inflation regime reduces 
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ERPT because the pass through reflects the expected effect of monetary shocks on 
current and future costs, which in turn are compensated by low inflationary 
environment. The empirical verification of the model has been done on 71 countries 
over the period 1979 to 2000. In general, the macroeconomic determinants in most of 
the macro based ERPT studies are comprised of the effects of inflation, inflation 
volatility, exchange rate changes, exchange rate volatilities, size of the country (proxied 
by nominal GDP) and trade-openness (for example, Gagnon and Ihrig (2001), Campa 
and Goldberg (2002), Choudhri and Hakura (2006) among others). 
Nevertheless, there is a debate whether the apparent decline in ERPT is, truly, a 
macro or micro economic phenomenon. For example, Campa and Goldberg (2002) find 
that the main determinants of changes in pass through over time are microeconomic 
and related to the alteration of the trading basket from homogenous raw materials 
towards differentiated manufactured goods and services. Their study provides extensive 
cross country and industry level data on 25 OECD countries over the period of 1975 
through 1999. However, their finding has been subjected to various criticism and a 
number of studies substantiated that the decline in pricing power of the firms has 
helped keep inflation low in some countries, therefore, linked the decline in ERPT to 
the monetary policy regimes. ERPT analysis based on aggregate macro data is 
important from the context of monetary policy. Studying the implications of ERPT on 
consumer prices is essential to the effective monetary policy making. The effectiveness 
of the trade balance adjustment through expenditure switching also depends on the 
extent of ERPT, hence on the exchange rate policy.   
We extend the existing literature on ERPT by estimating pass through 
elasticities of consumer price index (CPI) across different monetary policy regimes for 
39 developed and developing countries over the period 1981 to 2010. We verify the 
evidence of declining pass through across the different monetary policy regimes. The 
policy regimes are determined on the basis of inflation. Furthermore, we assessed the 
important macroeconomic determinants of ERPT. In order to calculate the pass through 
coefficients, we have constructed trade-weighted exchange rates index (TWER) for 
each country using the weights of import share of the trading partners of each country 
to the percentage change of exchange rate. We have used the TWER instead of nominal 
effective exchange rates (NEER) for our analysis. TWER is more appropriate as the 
exchange rate pass through stems from the import prices. The foreign inflation indices 
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are also calculated by the weights of the importers shares and the percentage change of 
their producers’ price index (PPI). Different sub-sample periods for monetary policy 
regimes have been created with CUSUM test for breaks and according to the dates of 
the official adoption of inflation targeting regimes and other monetary policy regimes. 
Vector error correction model (VECM) has been used to calculate the pass through 
coefficients. In the second stage, we have included average and volatility of inflation, 
volatility of exchange rates, size of the economy, openness to identify what determines 
pass through elasticities for these countries. Additionally, we have used different 
exchange rate and monetary policy regimes and central banks autonomy index to 
observe their impacts on the pass through coefficients. Pooled OLS regression analysis 
has been used to evaluate the pass through determinants. 
The findings from cross-country ERPT analysis suggest a decline of pass 
through along with the inflation rates. Average short run (over a quarter) pass through 
elasticity is 24% and average long run (over a year) pass through elasticity is 35%. 
However, pass through elasticities have increased during the recent financial crisis, 
suggesting that a depreciation could have a larger impact during the crisis period. In the 
long run, ERPT has a positive relationship with average inflation. Greater central bank 
autonomy is found to be associated with the reduction of long run pass through 
elasticities. In the short run, low inflation volatility and Inflation Targeting (IT) regime 
reduces exchange rate pass through. Therefore, the finding suggests that credible 
monetary policy regimes indeed, have a role to play in reducing pass through 
elasticities over the last three decades. The findings also suggest that the inflation 
targeting regime has the ability to influence the short run ERPT, whereas central bank 
autonomy is helpful to reduce long run pass through.  
In the 3rd chapter of the thesis, we have conducted a de facto classification 
exercise of monetary policy regimes for 123 countries over the period 1970 to 2012. 
The chapter contributes to the existing literature by incorporating other monetary policy 
regimes in addition to exchange rate regimes and evaluating the impact of these 
regimes on growth and inflation by using PMG. Despite an extensive literature on de 
facto classification of exchange rate, no such effort has been made so far to classifying 
other monetary policy regimes, such as inflation targeting or monetary targeting 
regimes. The previous de facto exchange rate regimes classification studies ignored the 
underlying monetary policy frameworks when evaluating the impact of the regimes on 
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growth and inflation. However, the outcome of such classifications will not be accurate, 
as some of the identical exchange rate regimes will have different monetary policy 
frameworks and which needs to be taken into account in any proper assessment of the 
impact of the regimes on growth and inflation. We try to overcome the deficiencies of 
the previous studies.  
The literature on de facto and de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is 
quite extensive. Studies like Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Eichengreen and Frankel 
(1999), Hausmann (1999), and Mackinnon (2000) demonstrate that many countries 
officially have a flexible rate but that they intervene in the exchange rate markets so 
persistently that in practice the exchange rate is effectively fixed. On the contrary, the 
frequent and periodic devaluation of fixed exchange rates in inflation prone countries 
due to the monetary policy intervention renders the exchange rate more flexible than 
fixed. ‘Fear of floating’ phenomenon, demonstrated by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) 
explains how emerging economies often actively intervene in the exchange rate market 
to reduce the volatility of their exchange rate. Lack of credible monetary policy is one 
of the most important reasons for this occurrence.  In the absence of credible monetary 
policy, stabilisation of exchange rate provides a clear nominal anchor for inflation in 
these countries. High ERPT, the inability of emerging countries to borrow in their own 
currencies and risk of currency crisis are also some important reasons behind the 
exchange rates intervention. Therefore, the de jure classifications of exchange rates are 
often misleading and the classification of de facto regimes has become quite extensive. 
Recognising the deficiencies of the de jure exchange rate classifications, IMF 
official classification started taking into account the de facto classification from 1999. 
There are two approaches, mainly followed by the de facto classification of exchange 
rate regimes studies. One is the mixed de jure-de facto classification and the other one 
is pure de facto classification of exchange rate regimes (Tavlas et al., 2008).  Mixed de 
jure-de facto classification uses the reference of the IMF de jure classification to 
categorise similarities and differences. Ghosh et al. (1997), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, 
2004) are some examples of the mixed de jure-de facto approach to classifying 
exchange rate regimes. Pure de facto classifications are independent from the official 
classification and mainly follow tripartite system where a regime is classified either as 
pegged, intermediate or freely floating. Levy Yeyati et al. (2005), Shambaugh (2004), 
De Grauwe and Schnble (2005) are some examples of pure de facto classification.  
9 
 
Our classification of monetary policy regimes is defined by a number of 
specific classification criterion, which are based on exchange rate, policy interest rates 
and monetary growth. We classify seven exchange rate regimes and four inflation 
targeting and monetary targeting regimes. For classifying exchange rate regimes we 
have used volatility of exchange rates, volatility of changes of exchange rates, the ratio 
of the volatility of changes of exchange rates and reserves. Two of the inflation 
targeting regimes are classified on the basis of average inflation and policy interest 
rates, and two of the monetary targeting regimes are classified on the basis of both 
broad money and narrow money growth as well as using relevant policy rates. 45% of 
the time our classification compares to the Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) classification 
and 30% of the time to the IMF de facto classification. More than 10% of the regimes 
are classified as inflation targeting and monetary targeting regimes, which have been 
classified by some form of exchange rate regimes by the previous studies. With regards 
to growth and inflation, we have used pooled mean group estimation (PMG). PMG is 
more suitable here compare to the conventional generalised method of moments 
(GMM) estimation (which has previously been used by the other studies) due to large 
sample size (N) and time periods (T). Our findings suggest monetary policy with some 
form of nominal anchor is beneficial.  
In the 4th chapter, we assessed the impact of financial development on growth 
for eight south Asian countries over the period 2003 to 2014. We have used cost and 
profit efficiencies of 193 banks of these regions, for the first time, as the quality 
measure of the financial institutions. 
McKinnon (1973) suggests that financial market liberalisation allows financial 
deepening and reflects in an increasing use of financial intermediation by savers and 
investors. It also allows monetisation of the economy and ensures efficient flow of 
resources among people and institutions over time. The process enhances savings and 
reduces the constraints of capital accumulation, therefore, improves allocative 
efficiency of investment by transferring capital to more productive sectors. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between financial development and growth has been the 
subject of an extensive debate over the last two centuries. While many argue that 
finance is a strong contributor to growth (e.g., Baghehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1912; 
Hicks, 1969, Miller, 1998; Levine, 2005), some (e.g., Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988) 
argue on the limited capacity of financial intermediation on economic growth. 
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Robinson (1952) suggests that growth leads to financial development and Lucas (1988) 
demonstrates that finance is over stressed for explaining growth. 
One of the early cross country studies by Goldsmith (1969) shows that the size 
of the financial system positively contributes to economic growth, but unable to exert a 
significant relationship between financial structure and economic growth. King and 
Levine (1993) try to rectify the work of Goldsmith (1969) by enlarging the sample to 
77 countries and by introducing control factors. They used three growth indicators (real 
per capita growth, growth in capital accumulation and total productivity growth) and 
introduced new financial development measures (liquid liabilities over GDP, the ratio 
of bank credit to bank credit plus central bank domestic assets and the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP). Their findings suggest a strong positive relationship between 
each financial measure and the three growth indicators. The findings are robust to the 
alternative econometric specifications (such as GMM, OLS). However, King and 
Levine (1993) focused only on the banking sectors of the economy and have not 
addressed the causality issue. The concern also relates to the measurement of financial 
development in terms of quality.   
Some argue that a mere expansion of credit need not indicate a qualitative 
improvement of intermediaries’ abilities to channel funds from savers to borrowers 
(Hasan et al., 2009). Therefore, Hasan et al. (2009) suggest a more direct measure of 
the quality of financial institution, thereby addressing the sub-optimal empirical proxies 
for theoretical counterparts raised by Levine (2005).  Their study on 11 European 
Union (EU) countries over the period of 1996 to 2004 tests whether better banking 
efficiency, estimated at firms’ level, significantly spurs economic growth. They argue 
that this relative measure of bank performance gauges the quality of financial 
institutions better than the quantity of funds intermediation. The quantity of financial 
development has been measured by bank credit volume relative to GDP. In order to 
measure bank efficiency, they used the data of, approximately, 7000 banks of 11 EU 
countries over the period 1996 to 2004. To assess the quality more directly, they 
measure a bank’s relative efficiency in converting input into a production set while 
maximising profits, using fixed effects panel frontier of a translog production function 
developed by Greene (2005). The findings from the Generalised Method of Moments 
estimation (GMM) of panel data suggest that the individual profit efficiency effects of 
financial quality, as well as the interaction between the banking quality and volume on 
11 
 
regional growth are positive and significant. A 1% increase in Banks’ ability to convert 
inputs into financial services spurs regional growth in total by almost 0.06%. The 
quality effect is stronger than the quantity effects. A 1% increase in profit efficiency of 
banks has more than four times the effect on growth that a relative increase in lending 
volumes does. However, the study by Hasan et al. (2009) only focused on the mature 
EU economies.  
We extend this literature by addressing this issue to gauge the effect of quality 
of financial institutions on economic growth for 8 developing countries of south and 
south-east Asia over the period 2003 to 2014. Similar to Hasan et al. (2009) we have 
calculated banking efficiency for this country to measure the quality of financial 
development. Broad money to GDP ratio and volume of bank credit to the private 
sector has been used for the quantitative measure of financial development. Our 
findings from the GMM estimations suggest that both quality and quantity are 
important for economic growth in these regions. Therefore, this chapter provides new 
evidence on the complementarities and importance of both quality and volume of 
financial development in the developing countries. 
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Chapter Two: Exchange Rate Pass Through and the Macroeconomic 
Determinants  
2.1 Introduction 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, all major industrialised countries have, 
at least officially, adopted flexible exchange rate regimes at one time or another. 
Despite optimism, the demise of the Bretton Woods system marked the beginning of a 
period of more than two decades of exchange rate volatility, high inflation, low growth 
and trade conflicts. The transmission of exchange rate movements to domestic prices, 
known as exchange rate pass through (ERPT), has become an important policy concern 
ever since.
6
 ERPT is directly related to domestic inflation. Petursson (2009) for 
example, finds ERPT to be a significant explanatory factor in accounting for cross-
country variations in inflation volatility.
7
 However, a growing body of empirical 
research reports a declining trend in ERPT since the late 1980s due to a low and stable 
inflationary environment in many countries. The evidence from these empirical 
verifications suggest that domestic inflation also influences ERPT and has therefore 
contributed toward the apparent decline in pass through elasticities in many countries.  
There are various determining factors of pass through elasticities. Pricing to 
market, originally proposed by Krugman (1986) and Dornbusch (1987), suggests that 
exporters adjust their prices to the prevailing prices of their export markets. Foreign 
exporters’ decisions to cut their export prices or profit margins (instead of increasing 
the price) following a depreciation of the importer’s currency depend on how 
permanent any changes in costs are. Any temporary changes in costs will be absorbed 
in the profit margin, whilst a permanent change will be passed on to import prices. The 
choice of invoicing also determines the extent of pass through. Exporters can invoice in 
their own home currency (producer currency pricing – PCP), in the currency of their 
importer (local currency pricing - LCP), or in a third-party currency (vehicle currency 
pricing – VCP). When exporters set prices in LCP, they do not fluctuate as frequently 
as exchange rates, at least in the short run. Invoicing in LCP, therefore, reduces pass 
through.  
                                                 
6
 Exchange rate pass through refers to the degree to which a variation in exchange rate influences 
international trade prices and, through them, other domestic prices.  
7
 The other two are credible monetary policy and exchange rate risk premium.   
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Goldberg and Tille (2008) find that exporters consider the competitive structure 
of the import market in currency-invoicing decisions. This is cited as a ‘herding’ 
strategy. The price is set in a currency that is going to keep demand for the product 
relatively stable despite exchange rate fluctuations. Cross border production can also 
lead to lower pass through elasticities. If the production process is distributed in a 
number of countries, then the cost of the final goods does not rely on a single currency. 
It is less likely that all the currencies will move at the same time. Thus, retail prices do 
not reflect any changes in the exchange rate (Bodnar, et al., 2002; Hegji, 2003).  
Many studies since the early 1980s assumed pass through to be a micro, rather 
than a macro, phenomenon. Micro-oriented studies mostly focused on disaggregated 
firm or industry level data and import prices (for example; Woo, 1984; Feenstra, 1989; 
Gron and Swenson, 1996; Goldberg and Verboven, 2001; Frankel et al., 2006). The 
new open economy macroeconomics provided the theoretical basis for empirical 
macroeconomic research on ERPT (e.g. Obstfeld, 2002). The staggered pricing model 
of Taylor (2000) generated further interest. Macro studies of pass through focused on 
import or consumer prices in more aggregated data (McCarthy, 1999; Pollard and 
Coughlin, 2005; Campa and Goldberg, 2005, 2006; Marazzi et al., 2005; Gagnon and 
Ihrig, 2001, 2006; Edwards, 2006). Their analysis mainly focused on the US and other 
major industrialised countries. One of the main focuses of macroeconomic explanation 
is the role of the credible and transparent monetary policy regime.   
A number of studies since the early 1990s have provided evidence of declining 
ERPT (for example McCarthy, 1999; Marazzi et al., 2005; Gagnon and Ihrig, 2001, 
2006; Edwards, 2006). Large depreciations in many countries are no longer 
accompanied by an increase in import prices or consumer prices. A number of 
empirical studies attribute slow pass through to the success of monetary policy in 
achieving low and stable inflation in many countries (Cunningham and Haldane, 1999; 
McCarthy, 1999; Gagnon and Ihrig, 2001, 2004; Taylor, 2000; Chowdhury and 
Hakura, 2006; Gagnon et al., 2007; Frankel et al., 2005). Both aggregate and industry 
level studies indicate that the response of prices to changes in exchange rate 
components or other costs are quite low. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007), for 
example, find that the pass through of changes in exporter’s costs to the retail price of 
imported beer is only 7% in the US. Devereux and Engel (2001) find that the currency-
invoicing choice is in fact endogenous to the monetary stability of a country. Exporters 
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generally wish to set prices in the currency of a country that has the most stable 
economic situations. 
McCarthy (1999) presents time series evidence on nine OECD countries, 
showing a decline in exchange rate pass through over the period 1983-1998 compared 
to 1976-1982. Analysing the empirical evidence, Mishkin (2008) suggests that low pass 
through to import prices is not necessarily a prerequisite for low pass through to 
consumer prices. Even if import prices react strongly to exchange rates, an appropriate 
monetary policy stance that is sufficiently reactive to inflation can insulate consumer 
prices from the effects of any shock associated with exchange rates. Taylor (2000) also 
demonstrates this view in a model within a staggered price setting, arguing that the 
recent decline in pass through to aggregate prices is due to the success of the low 
inflationary environment in many countries over the last few decades. He shows the 
causal link between inflation and pass through in a model based on the staggered price 
setting and imperfect competition, where firms set their prices in a forward manner and 
the prices respond more to the permanent cost increase. Perceived temporary cost 
changes do not play any role in the pricing decisions. Regimes with higher inflation are 
usually associated with more persistent cost increases. Unsurprisingly, pass through 
would be higher in those regimes. Hence, a credible low inflationary regime will 
experience lower pass through.  
Sustained decline in ERPT is gradually becoming a feature of small developing 
countries and the incidence is quite pervasive in some countries throughout the 1990s. 
Many of these countries also have successfully reduced inflation. Nonetheless, 
empirical verification is relatively scarce for these countries. Empirical studies such as 
Choudhri and Hakura (2006), Borensztein and De Gregorio (1999), Goldfajn and 
Werlang (2000), Barhoumi (2005) and Frankel et al. (2005) are notable in this respect. 
For example, empirical analysis by Choudhri and Hakura (2006) for 71 countries find 
strong evidence that the relationship between average inflation and pass through 
elasticities is robust and positive over the period 1979 to 2000. Therefore, the 
dependence of exchange rate pass through on the inflation regime should be considered 
in designing monetary policy rules. 
 The current study extends the existing literature on exchange rate pass in two 
ways. Firstly, we assess the evidence of declining exchange rate pass through for 39 
countries over the period 1981 to 2010 across different monetary policy regimes. These 
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countries are a combination of developed and developing countries, spread across 
continents. We have calculated a trade-weighted exchange rates index (TWER) for 
each country by using the weight of import share from the trading partners of each 
country to the percentage change in exchange rate. We have used the TWER instead of 
nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) for our analysis. TWER is more appropriate 
as the pass through transfers from importers. The foreign inflation indices are also 
calculated by the weights of importer’s shares and the percentage change of their 
producers’ price index (PPI). We focus our analysis on pass through to consumer prices 
as it is more pertinent to monetary policy and other macroeconomic issues. There are 
three sub-sample periods for most of the countries. Independent break tests, along with 
official inflation targeting dates by central banks, have been used to find the 
appropriate breaks for each country over the sample period and to select each 
subsample period to represent different monetary policy regimes.
8
 In order to address 
endogeneity, a vector error correction model (VECM) has been used for pass through 
analysis. 
 Secondly, we evaluate the macroeconomic factors behind the pass through 
elasticities using a pooled OLS regression model. We verify Taylor’s (2000) 
proposition to find if inflation has any impact on pass through. We also observed if 
there is an impact of actual de facto monetary policy regime and central bank autonomy 
on pass through elasticities. The exchange rate regimes classified by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002) and inflation targeting regimes adopted by many countries are used for 
the monetary policy regimes. In addition to these variables, we have also examined the 
relative strength of the volatility of inflation and exchange rate, size and openness in 
explaining the variability of pass through elasticities in different countries. To the best 
of our knowledge, no existing empirical studies attempts to assess the impact of central 
bank autonomy or choice of monetary policy regime on pass through elasticities.   
Findings from the pass through analysis across different countries suggest a 
decline in many countries over the last few decades. The findings are particularly 
applicable to those countries that have been successful in reducing inflation, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil and some Asian and eastern European 
countries. Average long run pass through elasticities declined by almost 26 percentage 
points (50% to 24%) from the 1980s to 1990s. Average inflation and volatility of 
                                                 
8
  Cumulative sum  of  squares of  recursive  residual (CUSUM  of  squares)  has  been  used  for the  
independent  break  test. 
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inflation also declined substantially (by 1 and 4 percentage points respectively). 
However despite this, pass through seems to have increased over the last decade by 
around 11 percentage points. A number of countries experienced high pass through 
over the last decade; India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, the UK and a number of 
other countries saw increased pass through in recent periods. 
Analysis from the second stage suggests that both average inflation and 
volatility of inflation are positively related to pass through elasticities. Adoption of IT 
has a significant negative impact on short run pass through elasticity. Exchange rate 
regimes with crawling pegs experience larger pass through elasticities compared to 
managed floats. Central bank autonomy has a positive influence. Thus, our findings are 
relevant to Taylor’s (2000) proposition. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
literature review. 2.3 provides description of the sample countries. 2.4 provides the 
methodology and findings. Section 2.5 concludes the study.  
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2.2 Literature Review 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the exchange rate has become the 
center of macroeconomic policy debates for open economies. Nominal exchange rates 
are often used as a way of bringing down inflation in an open economy. Petursson 
(2009) finds that exchange rate pass through is a significant variable in accounting for 
cross-country variations in inflation volatility. On the other hand, a relatively new 
stream of research suggests that low and stable inflation in many countries is one of the 
significant factors accounting for declining pass through elasticities (Taylor, 2000). A 
number of studies have attempted to verify the incidence of declining pass through 
observed in many countries, linking pass through elasticities with macroeconomic 
factors and monetary policy.   
Following the demise of the Bretton Woods system, newly adopted floating 
exchange rate regimes in many countries were considered to be a major component of 
external adjustments and transmission of inflation into domestic economies (Goldberg 
and Knetter, 1996). The causal link between exchange rates and inflation happened to 
exacerbate the problem of soft money countries and reduce the burden of hard money 
countries. The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) first recognised this ‘vicious and virtuous 
circle’.9 Since then, the exchange rate has become an important determining policy 
factor for open economies.  
Much of the early research on exchange rate pass through is focused on the US 
and other industrialised countries (for example, Prakkan, 1978; Frankel, 1980; Woo, 
1984; Hooper and Mann; 1989, Moffet; 1989, Kim; 1991; Yang, 1991). The focus has 
moved to industrial organisation models, where the role is played by market structures 
and the price discriminating opportunity by exporting firms for determining import 
prices (Cortinhas, 2007). An easy and comprehensive way to understand the ERPT is 
by Krugman’s (1986) pricing to market (PTM) analysis.  
                                                 
9
Bank for International Settlements, Forty-Sixth Annual Report, 1st April 1975-31st March 1976, pp. 30-
32; Paul Lewis, "The Weak Get Weaker With Floating Rates," New York Times (October 10, 1976); and 
David King, "The Performance of Exchange Rates in the Recent Period of Floating: Exchange Rates and 
Relative Rates of Inflation" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May 1976; processed).  
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Krugman (1986) was one of the first to describe the phenomenon of foreign 
firms adjusting their export prices to specific markets as PTM and formalised the idea 
of the pricing behaviour of markets with exchange rate movements. PTM suggests that 
in an imperfect market structure, firms deliberately set different prices in different 
countries, according to the local competitive conditions and market structure.
10
 In static 
form, PTM depends on the demand elasticity faced by the foreign firms, market share 
in the importing countries, substitutability of the imported goods and transportation, 
marketing and distribution costs. The dynamic effects of PTM are largely related to 
price stickiness in an imperfectly competitive market framework. In order to maintain 
their market reputation, any unexpected small rise in a firm’s marginal cost of 
importing will not be passed on to consumers, as long as the changes are perceived to 
be temporary. The theory of pricing to market has since become the source of a number 
of empirical verifications, mostly using disaggregated industry level data.
11
 
ERPT studies in the 1970s and 1980s mostly emphasized different industrial 
organization, the role of market segmentation and price discrimination across 
geographically distinct markets (Campa and Goldberg, 2002). The traditional literature 
on exchange rate pass through focuses on import price pass through and argues that 
pass through is essentially a micro-economic phenomenon, therefore emphasizing the 
role of market power and price discrimination in the international market (Choudhri 
and Hakura (2006); Richardson (1978); Woo (1984); Knetter (1989); Marston (1990); 
Kasa (1992); and Gagnon and Knetter (1995)). Findings from these studies suggest that 
there are significant and non-transitory differences in pass through elasticities due to 
imperfect substitution between goods or due to the presence of segmented markets.  
One of the early studies by Woo (1984) on pass through from exchange rates 
and import price fluctuations to domestic producers and consumer prices over the 
period 1975 to 1983 for the US market, identifies four channels through which the 
exchange rate can have an impact on the price level. The first is the prices of imported 
consumer goods, which directly affect the consumer price index. The second is the 
prices of imported inputs, which directly affect costs of production. However, the 
degree of pass through in these two channels depends on whether the foreign price is 
constant and how significant the pass through is on import prices. The third is 
                                                 
10
 Krugman’s (1986) analytical framework is based on the Haberler (1949) and Dornbusch (1985) 
supply-demand model of the price implications of the exchange rate.  
11
 See Appendix 2.1 for a brief analysis of the Krugman (1986) model. For a detailed analysis, see 
Krugman (1986).   
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aggregate demand via the trade multiplier; exchange rate movements change the 
current account position, which in turn affects aggregate demand. The fourth is the 
prices of trading partners, which affect the prices of domestically produced competing 
goods. The evidence from import pricing supports the view that foreign manufacturers 
price their products specific to US demand and cost conditions with some adjustment 
(approximately 40 percent by the Federal Reserve index and 70 percent by the import-
share index) for exchange rate changes. 
 
Another study by Gagnon and Knetter (1995) of German, Japanese, and the US 
automobile exports to seven industrial-country destinations suggests that for most 
destination countries in their sample, PTM is greater in the long run than in the short 
run, a feature consistent with invoicing in the exporter’s currency. However, the pattern 
is reversed for the US and Canada, which essentially suggests the presence of a 
segmented market. Price differentials across destination markets for the same category 
of automobile are often related to exchange rate movements and these differentials can 
persist for many years. Their finding also suggests that there is a significant and 
persistent markup adjustment in Japanese automobile exports in contrast to German and 
US exports. Japanese automobile exports tend to be in the low priced end of the auto 
market for most of the sample.  
 
Since the late 1980s, declining exchange rate pass through has become a 
concurrent phenomenon with declining average inflation and ERPT research started to 
focus more on macroeconomic analysis (e.g. Kim, 1998; Dellmo, 1996; McCarthy, 
1999; Cunningham and Haldane, 1999; Marazzi et al., 2005; Ihrig et al., 2006). Event 
studies by Cunningham and Haldane (1999) found that the depreciation of the UK and 
Sweden in 1992 and the depreciation of Brazil in 1999 experienced a small pass 
through of exchange rate changes to retail prices. In the case of the UK, neither the 
20% depreciation in 1992, nor the 20% appreciation in 1996 caused retail price 
inflation to deviate significantly from its 2.5% trend. The depreciation in Brazil in 1999 
generated a much smaller pass through than any other depreciation during previous 
periods (when the rate of inflation was also much higher). In each of these cases, the 
exchange rate pass through has not been immediate, nor has it been complete. 
 Findings from a number of studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggest 
that low and stable inflation has had a direct impact on declining pass through 
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elasticities in many countries over the last few decades. One explanation that has been 
offered is a reduction in pricing power of firms (Taylor, 2000). According to Taylor 
(2000), low, stable and persistent inflation observed in many countries are the main 
reasons behind the reduction in pricing power of firms, whereas previously it had been 
presumed that low pass through is one of the reasons for declining inflation rates. In 
support of this view, McCarthy (1999) finds that much of the decline in inflation over 
this period apparently comes from more permanent factors such as the success of 
central banks in reducing inflation and inflation expectations in these countries. Using a 
VAR model of the distribution chain, McCarthy (1999) examines the impacts of ERPT 
and import price fluctuations on domestic producer and consumer prices in nine 
industrialised countries over the period 1976 to 1998. The study finds evidence of a 
significant decline in ERPT. However, the results from impulse response and variance 
decomposition suggest that the effect of exchange rate and import price fluctuations on 
domestic producer and consumer prices are quite modest in most of the countries. 
Barhoumi and Jouini (2008), using a structural breaks and cointegration approach, 
demonstrate that changes in monetary policy regimes in these countries caused a shift 
towards a low inflation environment and low ERPT.  
The causal link between low inflation and ERPT has been persuasively 
illustrated by Taylor (2000), who demonstrates that the decline in exchange rate pass 
through is a direct consequence of the decline in pricing power of firms. He 
demonstrates that the pricing power of firms is endogenous to the low inflation 
environment in many countries. The analysis is based on the role of price stickiness, 
which is explained by a simple microeconomic model of price setting.
12
 Taylor argues 
that the observed change in pricing power is partly due to the change in expectations of 
inflation persistence, therefore due to the changes in costs of the firms. The extent to 
which a firm tries to match an increase in cost or price with other firms by increasing 
its own price depends on how persistent the increase of cost is expected to be. Inflation 
is less persistent when it is low and stable. Therefore, the role of monetary policy is 
significant to the extent that it is responsible for delivering low and stable inflation. 
Taylor’s (2000) proposition has been the subject of an extensive number of 
empirical verifications. For example, Campa and Goldberg (2002) seek to assess 
                                                 
12
 Based on the Akerlof and Yellen,1991; Bergen and Feenstra, 1998; Goodfriend and King, 1997; Gust, 
1997, Kiely, 1997; King and Wolman, 1999; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997.   
21 
 
whether the decline in ERPT is a macro phenomenon (as suggested by Taylor), or a 
micro phenomenon, with an OLS analysis of a log linear model for 25 OECD countries 
over the period 1975 to 1999. They assess the reasons for cross-country variations in, 
and the decline in, import price pass through over the period. However, their findings 
suggest that inflation is not of first order importance for low and declining pass through 
in these OECD countries. ERPT or producer currency pricing across these countries is 
incomplete. The average import price pass through across the OECD is 60% in the 
short run and 75% over the long run. Pass through is lowest in the US followed by 
Germany. They find that size of the country is not significant for pass through 
elasticities. Findings from their disaggregated industry level data on manufacturing, 
raw materials and food import prices also suggest the evidence of partial pass through. 
Most importantly, they observed that the decline in pass through in aggregate import 
prices is mainly due to a change in the composition of import bundles rather than 
inflation. A shift of import composition towards manufacturing products from raw 
materials has contributed significantly to the decline in pass through in these OECD 
countries. Therefore, Campa and Goldberg’s (2002) study finds limited statistical merit 
in Taylor’s argument. As a result, they view the 1980s and 1990s decline of ERPT, as a 
largely micro, rather than macro, phenomenon.  
Campa and Goldberg’s (2002) finding has subsequently been disputed by a 
number of studies. Whilst Marazzi et al. (2005) reaffirmed the evidence of a sustained 
decline of pass through in US import prices of core goods in their rolling regression 
analysis, they do however find that the decline in ERPT due to the compositional 
change in imports of the OECD countries (suggested by Campa and Goldberg, 2002) 
can only explain about one third of the pass through decline. Average pass through has 
declined by 30% over the last three decades since the 1980s. Interestingly, 1997 stands 
out as a moment in time throughout their robustness checks, after which the decline in 
pass-through gained momentum. They speculate that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
may have begun the process of decline in the US, given that a substantial portion of 
imports are from these Asian countries. Their empirical evidence also suggests that 
China’s surging exports to the US has increased competitiveness and is therefore also 
partly responsible for reducing pass-through elasticities.  
Gagnon and Ihrig (2001) also find the evidence of declining pass through into 
consumer prices across eleven industrialised countries over the period 1971 to 2010. 
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Declining pass through is more noticeable, particularly in inflation targeting countries. 
While they have found a statistically significant correlation between low pass through 
and inflation variability, the effort to link the declining pass-through evidence with 
changes in monetary policy behaviour remained inconclusive, largely due to the poor 
estimates of policy behaviour. A subsequent study by Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) also 
finds evidence of declining pass through in 18 out of 20 industrialised countries from 
1971 to 2000. Their finding supports Taylor’s (2000) proposition and suggests that 
monetary policy effectively reduces ERPT by emphasizing more on inflation control. 
They attempt to formally derive the linkage between monetary policy and exchange 
rate pass through to consumer prices by estimating a forward-looking Taylor-type 
monetary policy rule for these countries, and correlated the components of these policy 
rules with estimated pass-through elasticities.  
Another study by Ihrig et al. (2006) examines the exchange rate pass through to 
import and consumer prices in G7 countries. Their empirical analysis used an algorithm 
developed by Hendry and Krolzing (2001) for selecting the appropriate specification of 
control and lagged dependent variables, and a rolling estimation method. The decline is 
significant for more than half of the countries over the period 1990-2004 compared to 
1975-1989. Their rolling estimates of import-price pass-through in industrialised 
countries gathered more evidence that the Asian crisis may be a watershed event for 
declining import price pass-through in the 1990s.  
If ERPT has a strong positive relationship with inflation, as suggested by a 
number of empirical studies, it is highly plausible that there will be a negative 
correlation between ERPT and the inflation targeting regime (IT). A number of studies 
try to verify whether or not an inflation targeting regime has a significant impact on 
pass through elasticity. For example, Edwards (2006) tries to verify if the adoption of 
inflation targeting has any significant impact on pass through in Israel and 6 other 
developing countries across Asia and Latin America over the period 1985 to 2005. His 
finding suggests a decline in import, consumer and producer price pass through for all 
of the countries after the adoption of IT. The decline in CPI pass through is quite 
significant for all of the countries except Korea. Apparently, Korea already had 2% CPI 
pass through, which is substantially low, even before the adoption of IT. The decline in 
the short-run CPI pass through is quite striking in Brazil after the adoption of IT, where 
it has declined by 66%. Chile, Israel and Mexico also had a substantial decline in 
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exchange rate pass through. The findings suggest that for these countries, adoption of 
IT played a significant role in reducing pass through elasticities. Furthermore, he finds 
that IT helps to reduce unexpected shocks by making monetary policy more transparent 
and predictable in these countries. 
The study of ERPT is more important for developing countries for various 
reasons. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) demonstrated that high ERPT to 
consumer prices is one of the main reasons for exchange rate intervention in many 
developing countries. Aside from exerting an impact on domestic inflation, rapid pass 
through to consumer prices limits the ability of exchange rates to adjust to international 
relative prices and therefore, reduces its potential for expenditure switching effects. The 
sequence of financial crisis over the 1990s forced many developing countries to 
officially adopt floating exchange rate regimes. Therefore, the importance of ERPT in 
policy making has become more relevant than ever before. The phenomenon of low 
and incomplete pass through is also increasingly evident in small open developing 
countries. Nonetheless, empirical evidence from developing countries is relatively 
scarce (Frankel et al., 2005). 
Chowdhury and Hakura (2001) study exchange rate pass through on consumer 
prices for 71 developed and developing countries over the period 1971 to 2000. 
Verification of Taylor’s (2000) proposition is one of the main motivations of their 
study. Findings from their OLS analysis suggest that there is a significant positive 
relationship between ERPT and inflation. Pass through varies from 4% in the short run 
to 16% in the long run amongst the low inflationary countries, whilst it varies from 9% 
in the short run and 35% in the long run in the countries with moderate inflation. 
Average pass through among the high inflationary countries varies from 22% in the 
short run to 56% in the long run. Among the impacts of average inflation, inflation 
volatility, exchange rate volatility and openness on pass through elasticities, average 
inflation is found to be the most significant determinant of exchange rate pass through. 
A similar study by Cazorzi, Hahn and Sanchez (2007) on 12 emerging markets also 
finds a strong correlation between pass through and average inflation. Their finding, 
however, suggests that ERPT does not vary significantly across Asian and other 
developed countries. 
Pass through elasticities in developing countries are important for various 
reasons. It plays an important role in selecting optimal exchange rate regime. 
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Hausmann et al. (2001) find that high pass through reduces the ability of a country to 
borrow in its own currency. Therefore, a common policy option in the developing 
countries is to limit the flexibility of exchange rates. Relatively high pass through in 
developing countries is cited as the main reason for the exchange rate management 
policies and ‘fear of floating’ stance (Frankel et al., 2005). It is also an important 
determinant for trade balances.  
Regarding the implication of optimal monetary policy on exchange rate pass 
through, Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) illustrate that an inward-looking policy on 
domestic price stabilisation is not optimal when foreign firms’ mark-ups are exposed to 
currency fluctuations. Such a policy increases exchange rate volatility. Foreign 
exporters react by setting higher prices in the domestic market. The relative strength of 
an expenditure switching policy depends on exchange rate pass through. Pricing to 
market reduces the response of domestic prices to currency depreciation, thus the 
equilibrium exchange rate response becomes magnified (Betts and Devereux, 2000). 
Betts and Devereux (2000) find that PTM affects the international transmission of 
macroeconomic shocks. Without PTM, monetary disturbances will tend to generate 
high positive co-movements of consumption but large negative co-movements of 
output across countries. In the presence of PTM, this ordering gets reversed; PTM 
reduces the co-movements in consumption across borders. On the other hand, the 
elimination of the expenditure switching effects of the exchange rate under PTM 
enhances the co-movement of output across borders. They find that PTM has 
significant welfare implications. In the presence of PTM, Monetary policy can be a 
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ instrument; a domestic monetary expansion tends to increase 
home welfare in the case of PTM, but at the same time reduces foreign welfare. 
2.2.1 The Underlying Theory  
The underlying theory of our analysis is based on Taylor’s (2000) explanation of how 
ERPT can be related to domestic anti-inflationary monetary policy. The decision 
making process of the management of a firm in setting the price is complex and time 
consuming.
13
 In an imperfectly competitive market, firms usually perceive that they 
have some market power, therefore the price is a decision variable unlike in a perfectly 
competitive market where the price is given. The perceived market power of a firm 
depends on various factors. For example, the degree of substitutability of the product in 
                                                 
13
 See Levy et al., 1997 for empirical evidence on the firms’ decision making process.  
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the market, the utility function of consumers and on the reaction of other firms to a 
change in the cost condition.  
 
Suppose that a firm selling a product that is differentiated from others in the 
market. Consumer’s utility functions value this difference. Assume that the demand 
curve faced by a firm is linear in the difference between the firm’s own price for its 
product and the average price for the other differentiated product in the market. 
Equation (2.1) shows a linear representation of the firm’s demand curve. 
   
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 − 𝛽(𝑥𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)                                                     (2.1) 
 
Here, 𝑦𝑡 is production, 𝑥𝑡 is the price of the goods, and 𝑝𝑡 is the average price of 
other differentiated goods. 𝜀𝑡 is a random shift in demand. Let 𝑐𝑡 be the marginal cost 
to produce the item. The firm sets its price once in every four periods. Thus, the 
average price level is a four period average of recent prices, 𝑥𝑡, set by the four groups 
of firms.   
 𝑝𝑡     =
(𝑥𝑡 +  𝑥𝑡−1 +  𝑥𝑡−2 + 𝑥𝑡−3)
4⁄                                             (2.2)                         
  
Under the assumption represented in equation (2.2), the firm’s expected profit for the 
four periods when the price set in period t is given by equation (2.3). 
∑ 𝐸𝑡
3
𝑖=0
(𝑥𝑡𝑦𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡+𝑖𝑦𝑡+𝑖)                                             (2.3) 
Here, 𝑥𝑡 applies in period t through t+3, so that 𝑦𝑡+𝑖 depends on 𝑥𝑡 rather than 
𝑥𝑡+𝑖, where i = 1, 2, and 3. The term 𝐸𝑡 is the conditional expectations operator based 
on the information at period t. A firm maximises its profit by taking marginal cost and 
average price of the other firms as given. Substituting equation (2.1) and (2.3) and 
differentiating with respect to 𝑥𝑡 results in the solution for the optimal price, 
represented in equation (2.4).  
𝑥𝑡 = 0.125 ∑ 𝐸𝑡
3
𝑖=0
𝐶𝑡+𝑖 + 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑡+𝑖 + 𝐸𝑡𝜀𝑡+𝑖 /𝛽           (2.4) 
 
Equation (2.4) provides the price setting equation in a standard staggered price 
setting model (Taylor, 1980). Several points can be made from equation (2.4). Firstly, 
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the amount by which a firm matches an increase in marginal cost with an increase in its 
own price depends on how permanent that marginal cost increase is. Similarly, the 
extent to which an increase in the price at other firms will lead to an increase in the 
firm's own price will depend on how permanent that increase in other firms’ prices is 
expected to be. However, in neither case does the extent of this pass-through depend on 
the slope of the linear demand curve (which depends on  𝛽). The effect of an increase 
in marginal cost on the price depends on how permanent the increase in marginal cost 
is. Suppose, marginal cost follows a simple first order auto regressive distribution such 
as  
𝑐𝑡 = 𝜌𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                              (2.5) 
In this case the matching or pass-through coefficient will be the equation (2.6).   
 
                   0.125(1 + 𝜌 + 𝜌2 + 𝜌3)                                                              (2.6)                              
 
Thus, lower 𝜌 means less persistent cost, which will reduce the size of the pass-through 
coefficient. This smaller amount of matching to the price can be viewed as a loss of 
pricing power. This holds for the other firms as well. Less persistent increases in the 
price of firms leads to low pass-through, again a characteristic of reduced pricing 
power of firms. 
 
The analysis implies that the observed market or pricing power depends to a 
large extent on the expectations of future cost and price movements. If an increase in 
cost is expected to be permanent or last for a long time, then the increase will be 
matched to a great extent in the price. An exchange rate depreciation will increase the 
cost of imports. The firm will pass through less of the depreciation in the form of a 
higher price if the depreciation is perceived to be temporary.  
The persistence of such cost changes is likely to be related to the persistence of 
aggregate inflation. In a macroeconomic environment with a great deal of price 
stability, an increase in (nominal) marginal cost will be less persistent than in an 
environment with little aggregate price stability. The same will happen for price 
increases due to a depreciation. An economy with low inflation, close to the average of 
its trading partner, will be unlikely to experience a persistent nominal depreciation, 
otherwise the real exchange rate would be out of line for an extended period. Therefore, 
economies characterised by low inflation are most likely to experience low pass 
through. Furthermore, any depreciation is less likely to be passed on the retail price in a 
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low inflationary environment.  Therefore, monetary policy has an active role to play in 
this situation as long as long it is responsible for delivering low and stable inflation.   
   
2.3 The Sample 
2.3.1 The country sample 
Our analysis includes quarterly data from 39 countries over the period 1981 to 2010. 
The countries are selected to represent a combination of developed and developing 
countries.  They also represent diverse sets of countries and can be divided into seven 
groups. Table 2.1 below lists all the countries according to country groups. 
Table 2.1: Different country groups in the sample 
Emerging  
Market 
Economies 
Inflation 
Targeting 
countries  
Euro 
Member  
OECD 
Members  
Brazil  
Chile  
Czech republic  
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia  
Malaysia 
Mexico  
Morocco 
Pakistan  
Philippines  
Poland  
Turkey 
Tunisia  
 
 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Czech-Republic 
Chile  
Colombia 
Hungary 
Mexico  
Iceland  
Israel 
South Korea  
The Philippines  
New Zealand  
UK 
France  
Greece  
Germany  
Finland  
Italy  
Spain  
Ireland  
Cyprus  
Australia  
Chile  
Denmark  
France  
Finland 
Germany  
Greece  
Hungary 
Iceland  
Israel  
Italy  
Japan  
South 
Korea  
Mexico  
Poland  
Spain  
UK 
Small Open 
Economies  
(SOEs) 
Asian and 
African 
Countries  
Latin 
American  
Countries  
Iceland 
Singapore  
Hong Kong  
Tunisia 
Hong-Kong  
India  
Indonesia  
Israel  
Japan  
Malaysia 
Pakistan  
The Philippines 
Singapore  
Algeria  
Morocco 
Nigeria  
Tunisia   
 
Argentina  
Brazil  
Colombia  
Chile  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
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14 of the 39 countries represent emerging market economies (classified according to 
the FTSE and S&P classification).
14
 The four small open economies each have a 
population below 5 million. 14 of these countries have adopted inflation targeting as 
the formal monetary policy framework. 17 countries are OECD members; 8 have 
joined the Euro. In terms of continents, there are 9 Asian, 4 African, 6 Latin American, 
2 Australian, and 14 European countries.  
2.3.2 The data and the sample periods 
Sample periods vary from country to country, depending on the availability of data. 
The quarterly data for 35 countries is from 1981 to 2010. For the remaining 4 countries, 
it starts at different points in the early 1990s. Quarterly GDP or industrial production 
index data are not available for these 4 countries from the earlier periods.
15
 Table 2.2 
provides a list of the countries according to their sample and sub-sample periods, which 
have been used for the estimation of ERPT and other analysis. We have also divided 
the sub-sample periods into 3 decades for further analysis of ERPT.  
The IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database has been used as the 
main source of data. However, we have constructed the foreign price indices (FPI) and 
the trade weighted exchange rate indices (TWER) for each country for the analysis. 
The foreign price indices have been constructed using the relevant weights of 
importer’s trading share in a country’s bilateral trade and adding those weights to the 
percentage change in producers or consumers’ price indices of the trading partners. For 
TWER, we have used the same weights constructed for FPI to the exchange rate 
changes of the trading partners. Exchange rate pass through emanates from the import’s 
prices. Therefore, this importer’s trade weighted exchange rate indices would be more 
appropriate to measure pass through elasticities.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 As of 31 December 2010, S&P classified 19 countries as emerging markets.  
 
15
 The countries are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil and Iceland. 
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Table 2.2 Sample and sub-sample periods of the countries 
 
1st Decade of the sample  2nd Decade of the sample  3rd decade of the sample  
Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year Country Year 
Cyprus 
1981-
1988 
Italy 
1981-
1990 
Argentin
a 
1990-
2001 
Ireland 
1989-
1999 
Algeria 
2003-
2010 
Hungary 
2001- 
2010 
Australia 
1981-
1992 
Japan 
1981-
1990 
Australia 
1993-
2002 
Israel 
1992-
2000 
Argentina 
2002-
2010 
Iceland 
2002- 
2010 
Canada 
1981-
1990 
Malaysia 
1981-
1990 
Brazil 
1990-
1999 
Italy 
1991-
1998 
Australia 
2003-
2010 
Iceland 
2002- 
2010 
Chile 
1981-
1990 
Mexico 
1981-
1991 
Canada 
1991-
2001 
Japan 
1991-
1998 
Brazil 
2000-
2010 
India 
2000- 
2010 
Colombi
a 
1982-
1990 
Morocco 
1981-
1989 
Chile 
1991-
1999 
Malaysia 
1991-
1998 
Canada 
2002-
2010 
Indonesia 
1999- 
2010 
Denmark 
1981-
1988 
New 
Zealand 
1981-
1988 
Colombia 
1991-
2000 
Mexico 
1992-
1999 
Chile 
2000-
2010 
Ireland 
2000- 
2010 
Fiji 
1981-
1988 
Nigeria 
1982-
1989 
Cyprus 
1989-
1998 
Morocco 
1990-
1999 
Colombia 
2001-
2010 
Israel 
2001- 
2010 
Finland 
1981-
1992 
Pakistan 
1981-
1991 
Czech 
Republic 
1994-
1998 
New 
Zealand 
1989-
1997 
Cyprus 
1999-
2010 
Italy 
1999- 
2010 
France 
1981-
1989 
Philippin
es 
1981-
1990 
Denmark 
1989-
1999 
Nicaragu
a 
1994-
2001 
Czech 
Republic 
1999-
2010 
Japan 
1998- 
2010 
Germany 
1981-
1990 
Poland 
1982-
1991 
Fiji 
1989-
1999 
Nigeria 
1990-
1999 
Denmark 
2000-
2010 
Malaysia 
1999- 
2010 
Greece 
1981-
1990 
Singapor
e 
1981-
1989 
Finland 
1993-
1998 
Pakistan 
1992-
2000 
Fiji 
2000-
2010 
Mexico 
2000- 
2010 
Hong 
Kong 
1981-
1989 
Korea 
1981-
1990 
France 
1990-
1999 
Philippin
es 
1990-
2001 
Finland 
1999-
2010 
Morocco 
2000- 
2010 
Hungary 
1981-
1990 
Spain 
1981-
1991 
Germany 
1991-
1998 
Poland 
1992-
1999 
France 
2000-
2010 
New 
Zealand 
1998- 
2010 
India 
1981-
1992 
Tunisia 
1982-
1989 
Greece 
1991-
2001 
Singapor
e 
1990-
1998 
Germany 
1999-
2010 
Nicaragua 
2002- 
2010 
Indonesia 
1981-
1988 
Turkey 
1981-
1991 
Hong 
Kong 
1990-
1999 
Korea 
1991-
1998 
Greece 
2002-
2010 
Nigeria 
2000- 
2010 
Ireland 
1981-
1988 
UK 
1981-
1993 
Hungary 
1991-
2001 
Spain 
1992-
1999 
Hong Kong 
2000-
2010 
Pakistan 
2001- 
2010 
Israel 1981-1991 Iceland 
1997-
2001 
Tunisia 
1990-
2000 
Korea 
1999-
2010 
Philippines 
2002- 
2010 
 
India 
1993-
1999 
Turkey 
1992-
1999 
Spain 
1999-
2010 
Poland 
2000- 
2010 
Indonesia 
1990-
1998 
UK 
1994-
2001 
Tunisia 
2001-
2010 
Singapore 
1999- 
2010 
  Turkey 
2000-
2010 
UK 
2002- 
2010 
Note: Sub-sample periods are divided on the basis of CUSUM-sq and the official adoption of inflation targeting and 
other monetary policy regimes. These periods have been used to estimate ERPT.    
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2.4 Methodology and Findings 
2.4.1: 1
st
 stage regression analysis 
Existing empirical studies on ERPT differ in terms of estimation techniques to calculate 
exchange rate pass through. Many of the studies use single equation models or system 
equations for each specific country, or set up single equation models for a larger set of 
countries (e.g. Campa and Goldberg, 2002, 2005; Chowdhury and Hakura, 2001 and 
Mihaljek et al., 2000). Similarly, a number of empirical studies, such as McCarthy 
(2000 and 2003) and Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2007), have applied the cointegration and vector 
autoregressive methodology for estimating ERPT.   
The variables in the model are endogenous as there is feedback between pass 
through elasticities and inflation. To address the endogeneity issue in this study, we 
have adopted a vector error correction methodology (VECM). Equation 2.7 introduces 
the baseline Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) from which the VECM can be 
constructed. Equation 2.7 is a standard reduced-form VAR model representation. 
      (2.7) 
Here, represents the vector of endogenous variables, c is a vector of 
constants, denotes matrices of autoregressive coefficients and is a vector of white 
noise processes. We have also used the CUSUM-Squares test to test for breaks in the 
data. For inflation targeting countries, we have also observed the trend in inflation. 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (PP) tests have been used for 
unit root tests.  
Cointegration tests have been done using the Johansen (1991) maximum 
likelihood procedure. The procedure is based on a VECM specification and represented 
in the form of equation (2.8).  
  (2.8) 
Here,  is the first difference lag operator, is a K×1 random vector of time 
series variables, which is integrated of order 1 (I(1)), is a k×1 vector of constants, Г𝑖 
are (k × k) matrices of parameters, 𝜉𝑡 is a sequence of zero-mean p dimensional white 
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noise vectors, and П is a (k × k) matrix of parameters, the rank of which contains 
information about the long-run relationships of the variables. If the П matrix has 
reduced rank 0<r<k, it can be expressed as П =αβ'; this implies that there is 
cointegration among the variables and β is the cointegrating vector. П would have full 
rank if the variables are stationary in levels. The maximum eigenvalue and trace tests 
have been used for the cointegration rank test. The asymptotic critical values are 
provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999).  
2.4.1.1 Findings from the first stage regression 
We have estimated ERPT for the entire sample period, as well as for each of the sub-
sample periods in each country, in order to observe the differences in ERPT in different 
countries. The empirical analysis of ERPT considers the way in which changes in the 
nominal exchange rate affect domestic prices. Most empirical studies on ERPT 
estimated variants of the generic equation of an open economy Phillips curve 
represented by equation (2.9).
 16
 We have also utilised equation (2.9) for our estimation 
of pass through elasticities.   
(2.9)
 
Here, cpi is the consumer price index, twer is trade weighted exchange rate 
index which we have constructed specifically for this study, gdp is gross domestic 
product, fpi is trade weighted foreign producers price index constructed for the study 
and  is the error correction term. All of the variables are in natural logarithm form. 
Here, cpi is used to proxy the domestic price level; twer has been used instead of the 
nominal effective exchange rate, lag of gdp is used to measure the output gap as well as 
inflationary pressure in the economy and fpi is used to measure domestic inflation of 
trading partners. Short run ERPT is measured by the pass through coefficients over the 
first quarter and long run ERPT is measured by the pass through coefficients over a 
year (by adding the short run pass through of each quarter).  
                                                 
16
 See for example, Campa Goldberg, 2002, 2006; Chowdhury and Hakura, 2006; Gagnon and Ihrig, 
2001, 2004).  
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As mentioned previously, breaks in the data have been primarily selected by 
CUSUM-squares. For IT countries, the year of IT adoption is used for selecting the 
breaks. The first break dates for most of the countries start from 1981 and last until the 
late 1980s or early 1990s. A number of countries experienced economic downfalls 
during the Mexican Peso crisis, Asian financial crisis, Russian Ruble crisis and dot-
com bubble over the 1990s. Quite naturally, structural breaks have been found over 
these periods for many countries. The final break dates for most of the countries fall 
between the late 1990s or early 2000s and lasted up until 2010.
17
 Table 2.2 shows all 
the subsample periods of the 39 countries.  
All the variables are found to be I (1) in the DF, ADF and PP tests. The 
cointegration tests suggest one or more cointegrating relationship for all of the 
countries, across the sub-sample periods. Therefore, VECM has been deemed 
appropriate for the analysis. Lag length for the VECM is selected by LR, AIC and 
SBIC.
18
 
2.4.1.2: Cross country analysis of pass through elasticities 
A large variation in pass through elasticities has been observed across different 
countries over the period 1981 to 2010. As expected, long run ERPT is usually higher 
than short run ERPT for most of the periods. Average short run ERPT for the whole 
sample period is 17% and average long run ERPT is almost 52%. Average inflation is 
10%, whilst volatility of inflation is 8% amongst all the countries over this period. 
However, ERPT is significantly different across countries and also over the different 
subsample periods. Table 2.3 provides a synopsis of average and volatility of inflation 
and short and long run pass through elasticities across the groups of countries.
19 
 
                                                 
17
 Table 2.1A in appendix 2.1 listed the pass through elasticities of all the countries across different 
regimes. 
18
 Unit root test results and VECM analyses for 39 countries across 100 subsample periods are available 
upon request.  
19
 Average quarterly inflation is measured by annualised change in CPI inflation rates. Inflation volatility 
is measured by the standard deviation of inflation rates. 
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Table 2.3: Inflation and pass through elasticities across the country groups 
Category  Average 
Inflation   
Inflation 
Volatility  
Short Run  
Pass 
Through 
Long Run 
Pass Through  
All 
Countries 
1980s 18% 17% 6.6% 50% 
1990s 8% 4% 20% 24% 
2000s 5.2% 3.35% 22% 35% 
OECD (1981-2010) 7% 10% 15% 20% 
EMEs(1981-2010) 15% 21% 23.95% 35% 
SOEs(1981-2010) 4% 3% 4.9% 26% 
Latin America 
Countries  
16% 14.51% 10% 60% 
African Countries  4% 4% 6% 65% 
 
Euro  
Members  
Before 
Euro  
3.27% 3% 63% 28% 
After 
Euro 
2.5% 1.25% 3.4% 27% 
Asian Countries 
(1981-2010) 
9% 12% 14% 63.50% 
IT 
Countries  
Before 
IT 
21% 14% 28% 55% 
After 
IT 
6% 3% 6.6% 20% 
Note: The table reports quarterly average inflation and ERPT for different country groups. Inflation is defined as 
quarterly changes in CPI and inflation volatility as the standard deviation of inflation. Both expressed as % changes. 
Long and short run ERPTs are calculated using equation (2.9).  
 
The highest long run ERPT, observed over the 1980s, is almost 50%, which 
also corresponds to the period of highest average inflation (18%) and inflation volatility 
(17%). Average inflation and inflation volatility is highest in the 1980s. However, both 
average inflation and inflation volatility dropped quite significantly over the 1990s 
compared to the 1980s (10 percentage points and 13 percentage points respectively). 
Long run ERPT has declined by 26% percentage points during this period. However, 
pass through elasticities have increased over the late 2000s. Average long run ERPT 
has increased by 11 percentage points over the last decade. This is likely due to the 
recent financial crisis.  
Average inflation and inflation volatilities are quite high across Latin American 
countries (almost 16% and 15% respectively). However, emerging countries have the 
highest average inflation volatility, which is almost 21%. Among the 14 EMEs, 
Mexico, Poland, and Turkey have the highest inflation rates over the whole sample 
periods. Average short and long run ERPT for these countries are also higher, 24% and 
35% respectively. These countries have been through a number of transition periods 
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and economic upheavals over the 1980s and 1990s, therefore high inflation volatility is 
not very surprising. 
The OECD, Asian and Euro member countries have relatively low average and 
volatile inflation rates. Among OECD countries, Israel has one of the highest average 
and volatile inflation, 41% and 93% respectively. This average estimation is dominated 
over the period 1981-1991, when Israel experienced excessively high inflation and 
average and volatility of inflation were more than 100%. Average long run pass 
through elasticity is the highest in the African countries followed by the Asian and 
Latin American countries. 
There are 14 IT countries and 8 Euro members in the sample.
20
 Aside from 
Mexico and Indonesia, most of the break dates for the rest of the countries are in 
accordance with the year of IT adoption. Both ERPT and inflation declined 
significantly amongst the IT countries and members of the Euro after adopting IT and 
the Euro. After the adoption of IT, the average inflation rate for IT countries has 
declined by 15% and the volatility of inflation by 11%. Both the long and the short run 
ERPT has also declined, by 35% and 21% respectively. Average inflation, inflation 
volatility, and ERPT have declined for Euro members as well. However, the changes 
are less dramatic compared to IT countries.  
For the Euro countries, average short run pass through elasticity is higher than 
the average long run pass through elasticity. In the short run, when prices are rigid, 
import price pass-through into the producer’s currency can be higher. However when 
prices adjust over the long run, pass-through elasticities can drop significantly. This is 
probably one of the main reasons why average short run elasticities are higher in some 
Euro countries. 
As mentioned previously, average short and long run ERPT have been 
increased during the 2000s, compared to the previous decade (almost 2% and 11%, 
respectively), despite a drop in inflation. A number of countries over this sample period 
experienced significantly higher pass through compare to previous periods. Pass 
through elasticities over this period have increased significantly in India, Pakistan, 
Czech Republic, Singapore, Israel, Ireland and the UK. Inflation volatilities are found 
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 Table 2.1 provides the names of the 14 IT countries and the dates when they have adopted IT.  
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to have increased for most of these countries. The recent financial crisis might have a 
significant impact for this increase in ERPT.  
For the UK, long run pass through has increased over the recent decades. Figure 
2.1 is a linear plot of the import price index (IMI), TWER and CPI for the UK over the 
period 1981 to 2010. Both IMI and CPI are on an increasing trend, whilst TWER 
(which is a proxy of NEER estimated for this study) dropped quite sharply over the 
period 2007 to 2010. This might be a plausible explanation as to why some countries 
have experienced higher pass through during the recent financial turmoil. 
Figure: 2.1 CPI, IMI and TWER for the UK from 1981-2010 
 
2.4.2 The macroeconomic determinants of ERPT 
The estimated ERPT coefficients have been used for the second stage analysis to 
evaluate if there is a significant relationship between ERPT and other macroeconomic 
variables. The variables used for the second stage regressions are average inflation, 
inflation volatilities, exchange rate volatilities, central bank autonomy indices, country 
sizes, openness, monetary policy regimes and dummies for the three decades over the 
sample period. The following sub-sections contain the descriptions of the 
macroeconomic variables for our 2
nd
 stage analysis.  
Average inflation and Inflation volatility: Average inflation and inflation volatility 
has been measured by the mean and the standard deviation of inflation over the period 
1981 to 2010. Taylor (2000) illustrates that higher average inflation induces higher 
inflation persistence, which increases the expected cost perceived by firms. Hence, 
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countries with high inflation should experience high pass through elasticities. However, 
the effect of inflation volatility is ambiguous. Inflation volatility will not have any 
significant impact on exchange rate pass through if the market reputation is important. 
This is particularly relevant for large and competitive markets. 
Exchange rate volatility: Baxter and Stockman (1988) and Flood and Rose (1995) 
show that high exchange rate volatility under floating exchange rates is not necessarily 
reflected in high volatility of other macroeconomic variables. Krugman (1989), Froot 
and Klemperer (1989) and Taylor (2000) demonstrate that a given change in the 
exchange rate is likely to be absorbed in import prices, in an environment where such 
fluctuations are common and transitory. If a change in the exchange rate is perceived to 
be temporary, it is more likely that firms will not consider it in their pricing decision. 
Thus, the expected volatility should have a negative effect on pass through elasticities. 
Devereux and Engel (2002) show that a combination of local currency pricing, 
heterogeneity in international price-settings and goods distribution, and expectation 
biases in international financial markets may combine to produce very high exchange 
rate volatility, without the implications of this volatility on other macroeconomic 
aggregates. 
Central bank autonomy: Central banks autonomies have been measured by the 
central bank autonomy index (CBI) of Cukeirman-Webb-Neyapti (1992). The original 
paper of Cukierman et al. (1992) calculates the CBI index up to 1989. However, Polillo 
and Guillen (2005) updated the CBI index further until 2004. We have approximated 
the CBI index up to 2010, assuming that it remains unchanged for a number of years; 
hence will be misleading for our analysis. Central bank’s autonomy is an important 
indicator for inflation performance and monetary independence of a country. 
Theoretical work in the early 1980s, notably Barro and Gordon (1983) demonstrate that 
inflation would be sub-optimally high when unanticipated monetary policy reduces the 
rate of unemployment at the expense of high inflation. Rogoff (1985) suggests that 
dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation, of the type described by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), makes it apparent that the independent 
central banks are much more likely to reduce inflation. While the theoretical benefit of 
CBI appears to be well accepted, the findings from empirical studies are inconclusive 
(Crowe and Meade, 2007). Acemoglu et al. (2008) find that these indices are not a 
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good representation of the central bank independence for the countries with weak 
political constraint.
21
  
Trade openness: Trade openness is measured by the ratio of exports and imports to 
GDP of a country, more specifically, 
𝑋+𝑀
𝑌
. A number of empirical studies suggest that 
more active and open economies should experience less inflation, therefore, less pass 
through. Romer (1993) demonstrates that greater trade openness enhances negative 
terms of trade shocks resulting from domestic output expansions, in turn reducing the 
central bank’s incentive to engage in inflationary policymaking. 22  Thus, the 
relationship between openness and ERPT can be negative since the countries with low 
inflation tend to have low pass through. Lane (1997) suggests that greater trade 
openness reduces potential output gains from unexpected inflation in non-tradable 
sectors characterized by imperfect competition and sticky prices. Thus, it reduces the 
incentives of central banks to pursue expansionary policy. On the contrary, Daniels and 
Van Hoose (2005) find that higher pass through increases the sacrifice ratio. Their 
theoretical model predicts that higher ERPT either enhances the positive impact or 
reduces the negative impacts from greater openness on the sacrifice ratio. However, the 
overall impact is ambiguous, considering the competing effects of the main 
characteristics of an economy, particularly ERPT. Ball (2006) argues that there is no 
clear evidence that globalisation has any impact in the process of inflation 
determination in the US.  
Size of the economy: A larger economy has a larger market share of domestic import 
substituting goods and a higher ratio of domestic to foreign firms. Thus, demand is 
more elastic for foreign producers, which implies that local currency pricing should be 
more prevalent in a large country (Krugman, 1986; Dornbusch, 1986). Therefore, the 
larger the size of a country, the lower should be the pass through. 
                                                 
21
 Their political economic model of policy distortions suggests that the policy reform may not be 
effective when constraints are so weak that reform can be undermined. The second important lesson from 
the model is that with multiple policy instruments, reform may lead to a seesaw effect, whereby effective 
or partially effective reform in one dimension leads to more-intensive use of other distortionary 
instruments. 
22
 Using a Barro-Gordon type model, Romer (1993) argues that openness restricts a government’s 
incentive to engage in an unanticipated inflation driven by depreciation. Following Rogoff (1985), he 
argues that since the negative effects of real depreciation are larger in more open economies, the benefits 
from unanticipated monetary expansion decreases in relation to the degree of openness. More open 
economies, in the absence of an induced pre-commitment of monetary policy, tend to have lower 
inflation rates. His cross country analysis finds a robust negative link between openness and inflation. 
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Exchange rate regime: Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) classification of exchange rate 
regime has been used to assess the impact of the pass through elasticities across 
different exchange rate regimes. The radical classification exercise by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002) is conducted on 153 countries over the period 1946 to 2001. Their 
coarse classification includes six categories and fine classification includes fifteen 
categories of exchange rate regimes. We have used the coarse classification for our 
analysis, which has six categories of exchange rate regimes.  
Romer (1993) argues that the choice of exchange rate regime is not an 
important determinant of inflation. However, Frankel (1999) finds that fixing the 
exchange rate has the advantage of providing an observable commitment by the 
monetary policy authority. Ghosh et al. (1997) find that a pegged exchange rate is 
associated with low inflation. Using a panel data set of a number of developed and 
developing countries over the period 1973 to 1998 and Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) 
classification, Alfaro (2002) finds a significant negative relationship between fixed 
exchange rate regimes and inflation, which is also robust to the inclusion of other 
control variables. Thus, in the short run, a fixed exchange rate can work as a 
commitment mechanism, therefore can reduce inflation. However, Hussein et al. 
(2004) find that countries appear to have benefits from flexible exchange rate regimes 
as they become richer and more financially developed. For relatively poor countries, 
with little access to international capital markets, pegged exchange rate regimes work 
better by delivering low inflation and high exchange rate regime durability. However, 
for emerging countries, their finding suggests no systematic effects of exchange rate 
regimes on inflation or growth. The basic argument is that as the fixed exchange rate 
acts as a nominal anchor, the monetary authority ties down the price of traded goods, 
which eventually creates downward pressure on other prices. More open economies are 
more efficient with the mechanism of pegging exchange rates, as this could tie down 
more prices. Another major advantage of fixed exchange rate is that it reduces the 
transaction costs and exchange rate risk, which to a large extent restricts trade in the 
developing countries. However, the stated benefits from any fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, largely, depend on the credibility of the regime.
23
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 The regime needs to be supported by sound macroeconomic policies to reduce the threats of 
speculative attacks on the currency.  
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2.4.2.1: Descriptive statistics and findings from the cross-country variables 
Table 2.4 lists the pair-wise correlation between the variables used for the second stage 
regression analysis. The correlation between average inflation and long run pass 
through is almost 26%, showing the highest correlation amongst all the variables. On 
the other hand, Central Bank (CB) autonomy is negatively correlated with both short 
and long run ERPT. As expected, IT is also negatively correlated with both the short 
and long run ERPT, as well as with inflation and exchange rate volatility. Openness is 
negatively correlated with both of the pass through elasticities and also with average 
and volatility of inflation. However, size (measured by GDP of a country compare to 
the world GDP) shows a positive correlation with both the short and long run ERPT.  
Table 2.4: Correlation between the explanatory variables and exchange rate pass 
through 
 𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜 Size 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑇_𝑠 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑇_𝑙 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 1 
 
0.853 
 
0.045 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.094 -0.125 0.07 0.2580 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟 0.853 1 0.038 -0.014 -0.062 -0.069 0.019 0.164 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙  
-0.045 -0.038 1 -0.013 0.058 -0.038 0.103 -0.016 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜  -0.007 -.0133 -.0132 1 -0.081 0.009 -0.007 -0.042 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 -0.094 -.062 .058 -0.081 1 -0.248 0.094 0.1288 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 -0.115 -0.069 -0.038 0.009 -0.249 1 -0.0551 
 
-0.179 
 
𝐼𝑇 -0.123 -0.082 -0.091 -0.045 -0.056 0.059 -0.0236 -0.087 
Note: Here Inf avg is average inflation, inf var is inflation volatility, exvol is the volatility of exchange rates after de 
trending the rates, Cbauto is the central bank autonomy, Size is the GDP size of a country compare to the world 
GDP, openness is the ratio of export-import to GDP, IT is inflation targeting countries, Erpt_s is the short run pass 
through and Erpt_l is the long run pass through coefficients estimated by equation (2.3) for the subsample periods of 
table 2.2 across 39 countries.  
2.4.2.2 Findings from the second stage regression analysis 
We have regressed the estimated short and long run ERPT on a number of variables 
such as average inflation, inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility, central bank 
autonomy, size and openness. Dummies have been used for the different exchange rate 
and inflation targeting regimes, in order to observe the impact of these regimes on 
ERPT. Time dummies for each decade since the 1980s have been used to observe if the 
ERPT elasticities varies over the three decades covering our sample periods. The 
estimated regressions are in the form of equation (2.10).  
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𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑠 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1  𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑖𝑠 +  𝑏2  𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑠 +  𝑏3  𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑠 +  𝑏4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠
+ 𝑏5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏6𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑠 +  𝑏8 ∑ 𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑠
3
𝑖=1
+  𝑏9 ∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑠
5
𝑖=1
+  𝑏9  𝐼𝑇 𝑖𝑠
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑠                                                                                                         (2.10) 
where, 𝑖 is the country and 𝑠 is the sub-sample period. 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑇 is the estimated 
exchange rate pass through coefficient from the previous analysis, 𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 is average 
inflation, 𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟  is the volatility of inflation measured by its standard deviation, 
𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 is the volatility of exchange rates (which is measured by the standard deviation 
of de-trended exchange rates), 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is defined as  
(𝑋+𝑀)
𝑌
  , which is the ratio of 
exports and imports to GDP , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is measured by the ratio of GDP of each country to 
the world GDP, 𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜 is CBI index to measure central bank independence and 𝐼𝑇 is 
dummy for inflation targeting countries.
24
  
The exchange rate has been classified according to the Reinhart and Rogoff (2000) 
classification. Here:  
𝐸𝑅1= 1 if pegged exchange rate regime, 0 otherwise  
𝐸𝑅2= 1 if crawling peg exchange rate regime, 0 otherwise  
𝐸𝑅3= 1 if managed floating exchange rate regime, 0 otherwise  
𝐸𝑅4= 1 if freely floating exchange rate regime, 0 otherwise  
𝐸𝑅5= 1 if freely falling exchange rate regime, 0 otherwise  
Time dummies are formulated to represents the 3 decades covering the sample period 
1981 to 2010 where:  
𝑇𝐷1= 1 if 1980s, 0 otherwise ,    𝑇𝐷2= 1 if 1990s, 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝐷3= 1 if 2000s, 0 otherwise 
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 Cukierman Webb-Neyapati (CBI) index has been measured by the index developed by Cukierman et 
al. (1992). However, the index is constructed up to 1989. Polillo and Guillen (2005) updated the CBI 
index further until 2000. We approximated the updated CBI index up to 2010 assuming that CBI index 
for a country remains unchanged for a number of years, hence does not get updated very frequently.    
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Estimation results for long run ERPT 
We have used pooled OLS regression analysis, with and without dummies, to 
observe if there are any significant variations in our findings. We have started our 
analysis with the long run ERPT. Table 2.5 displays the estimation results of long run 
pass through with and without dummies. Estimation result with dummies using long-
run ERPT shows a significant positive relationship with average inflation. An 1% 
increase in average inflation increases ERPT by 1.7%. Inflation volatility has a 
significant negative association with long run ERPT. However, exchange rate volatility 
does not have any impact on the long run ERPT.   
Size has a significant positive relationship with long run ERPT. Openness has a 
negative relationship (somehow consistent with Romer (1993) prediction) which is, 
however, not found to be statistically significant. Studies like Chowdhury and Hakura 
(2001) and Campa and Goldberg (2002) also find an insignificant relationship between 
openness and ERPT. Central bank autonomy has a highly significant negative 
relationship with long run ERPT. A 1% increase in central bank autonomy reduces the 
pass through elasticity by 1%. On the other hand, IT regimes are not significantly 
associated with long run ERPT. A crawling pegged exchange rate regime is found to be 
positively related to long run pass through elasticities. The remainders of the exchange 
rate regimes do not exhibit any significant relationship with the estimated long run 
ERPT. The relationship between long run ERPT and the dummies for decades is not 
significant.  
Table 2.5 also presents the analysis without the dummies. The findings without 
the dummies are fairly comparable to the findings with the dummies. While average 
inflation is positively related to pass through, inflation volatility is negatively related. 
CB autonomy also exhibits a significant negative relationship with long run ERPT. 
However, like the previous findings, the IT regime does not have any significant 
relationship with long run ERPT.  
Estimation results for short run ERPT 
Table 2.6 provides the results from regression analysis with and without the dummies 
for short run pass through. The findings are comparable to the previous analysis of the 
long run elasticities. However, there are some contrasts between the long and short run 
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ERPT analysis. Average inflation does not exhibit any significant association to the 
short run ERPT. However, there is a significant positive association between inflation 
volatility and short run ERPT. Contrary to the long run results, the IT regime is found 
to be negatively related to short run ERPT while CB autonomy does not exhibit a 
significant relationship. Pass through elasticities are higher over the 𝑇𝐷3  periods 
compare to 𝑇𝐷2, indicating that short run elasticities have increased over the recent 
decade. Crawling pegged and managed float exchange rate regimes are found to be 
positively associated with the pass through elasticities. 
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Table 2.5: Long run ERPT results 
Long run ERPT with the dummies 
Long run ERPT 
without  the dummies 
Regressors Coefficient Coefficient 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.0139*** 
(0.000) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 
-0.003 
(0.690) 
-0.0004 
(0.473) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
-0.057 
(-0.390) 
-0.072* 
(0.315) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
5.096* 
(0.100) 
3.489 
(0.400) 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜 
-0.011*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
𝐼𝑡 
-0.266 
(0.191) 
-0.201 
(0.280) 
𝐸𝑅2 
0.413* 
(0.074) 
 
𝐸𝑅3 
0.138 
(0.558) 
 
𝐸𝑅4 
0.032 
(0.901) 
 
𝐸𝑅5 
0.226 
(0.384) 
 
𝑇𝐷2 
-0.079 
(0.571) 
 
𝑇𝐷3 
0.250 
(0.139) 
 
Constant 
0.068* 
(0.058) 
0.367*** 
(0.001) 
𝑅2 0.221 0.136 
Note: p values are in the parenthesis. *** indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant  
at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors have been used for the analysis  
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Table: 2.6 Short run ERPT results  
Short run ERPT with the 
dummies 
Short run ERPT 
without  the dummies 
Regressors Coefficient Coefficient 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑔 
 
-0.010 
(0.341) 
-0.002 
(0.274) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟 
0.005* 
(0.094) 
0.002** 
(0.027) 
𝐸𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 
-0.002** 
(0.027) 
-0.001** 
(0.041) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
-0.028 
(0.651) 
-0.042 
(0.558) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
2.600 
(0.452) 
1.058 
(0.736) 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜 
-0.005 
(0.226) 
 
-0.003 
(0.276) 
 
𝐼𝑡 
-0.484*** 
(0.010) 
-0.363** 
(0.029) 
𝐸𝑅2 
0.476* 
(0.065) 
 
𝐸𝑅3 
0.428** 
(0.030) 
 
𝐸𝑅4 
0.143 
(0.518) 
 
𝐸𝑅5 
0.812 
(0.280) 
 
𝑇𝐷2 
0.312* 
(0.067) 
0.276* 
(0.095) 
𝑇𝐷3 
0.454* 
(0.087) 
0.316 
(1.43) 
Constant 
-0.328 
(0.140) 
0.243* 
(0.138) 
𝑅2 0.137 0.101 
Note: p values are in the parenthesis. *** indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant  
at 5% level and * indicates significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors have been used for the analysis  
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Overall, the findings from the 2
nd
 stage ERPT analysis present some contrasts between 
the findings from short and long run ERPT analysis. The short run ERPT analysis only 
represents an impact over a quarter, therefore it possesses a little less merit compared to 
the long run ERPT, which captures the impact over a year. Average inflation has a 
significant impact on long run ERPT, whilst inflation volatility plays a significant role 
in the short run ERPT. The volatility of the exchange rate is also found to be significant 
for short run ERPT. The findings indicate that if average inflation is sufficiently low in 
the long run, inflation volatility or exchange rate volatility will not have any impact on 
long run pass through ERPT. The dummy variables representing the decades were also 
significant only for the short run ERPT analysis, indicating that the increase of ERPT 
by the end of the last decade might be a temporary phenomenon.  
CB autonomy plays a significant role in reducing long-run ERPT, but the adoption of 
an IT regime plays a significant role in reducing short-run pass through elasticities. 
Inflation targeting is a short to medium term policy strategy with the mandate for 
reducing inflation. Central bank autonomy is a vital prerequisite for an effective 
inflation targeting regime. The main reason for the negative association between CB 
autonomy and long run ERPT is that greater CB autonomy reduces inflation 
significantly. For example, Alesina and Summers (1993) finds that monetary discipline 
associated with central bank independence reduces the level and variability of inflation. 
According to Cukierman et al. (1992) “making the central bank an agency with the 
mandate and reputation for maintaining price stability is a means by which a 
government can choose the strength of commitment to price stability”.25 There is a 
significant correlation between high inflation and the lack of central bank 
independence.
26
  
  
 
                                                 
25
 Cukierman, A., S, Webb., and Neyapti, B .( 1992). ‘Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and 
its Effect on Policy Outcomes,’ World Bank Economic Review,Vol.( 6), pp. 353–98. 
26
 The CBI index we have used for our analysis is a de facto central bank independence index which 
combines a number of indicators such as legal independence, turnover ratios of the central bank 
governors etc. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
In this study we have estimated exchange rate pass through elasticities and assessed the 
impacts of several macroeconomic variables on pass through for 39 countries over the 
period 1981 to 2010. In the first step, we try to estimate pass through elasticities for 
each of the 39 countries over the sample period as well as for 2 to 5 subsample periods, 
depending on data availability and regime shifts of the countries. The subsample 
periods are selected on the basis of inflation and represent different monetary policy 
regimes. CUSUM-squares tests and dates of the formal adoption of monetary policy 
regimes have been used for the selection of breaks. We have constructed trade 
weighted exchange rate indices, which we have called TWER, and foreign inflation 
price indices, which we have called FPI, for the analysis. TWER has been used to 
proxy nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) and FPI has been used to proxy the 
inflation of the trading partners from which a country imports.  
In the second step, we have used the estimated pass through elasticities for a 
panel estimation to evaluate the impact of various macroeconomic factors on the 
elasticities. The macroeconomic factors are average inflation, inflation volatility, 
openness, size of the economy, different monetary policy regimes represented by 
various exchange rates and inflation targeting regime. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) 
classification of exchange rate regimes has been used for the analysis.  
Declining ERPT has become a feature in many countries since the late 1980s. A 
number of empirical studies find evidence supporting the declining pass through in a 
number of countries over the recent decades. Taylor (2000) demonstrates that 
maintaining low and stable inflation has induced the process of low ERPT. Therefore, 
the success of declining pass thorough has been attributed to the conducting of credible 
monetary policy. However, the issue remains, to some extent, unresolved. A few 
studies claim the decline in pass through as a micro rather than macroeconomic 
phenomenon. For example, Campa and Goldberg (2005) find that shifting imports from 
homogenous raw materials towards differentiated manufactured goods and services is 
the main reason for the declining ERPT in OECD countries, rather than 
macroeconomic factors. Marazzi and Sheets (2007) find that soaring Chinese imports 
reduced ERPT in the US. Nevertheless, evidence from an increasing number of 
empirical studies suggest that macroeconomic factors are the main reasons behind the 
declining pass through observed in many countries and find that a transparent and 
47 
 
stable monetary policy regime is the main driving force as long as it is conducive to a 
low inflationary regime. Our study, therefore, tries to have a fresh look on this issue.  
We have also found evidence of declining pass through in many countries. 
There is a strong relationship between ERPT and average inflation. However, the 
decline in pass through is not entirely common for all the subsample periods. Pass 
through elasticities in some of the countries, including OECD countries, has increased 
significantly during the late 2000s. Countries like, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Singapore, the UK experienced an increase in pass through elasticities over 
the recent financial crisis. 
The evidence of declining pass through is quite strong, particularly for Latin 
American countries. In many countries pass through elasticities have been declining. 
The decline is more pronounced, particularly, after the Asian financial crisis. OECD 
countries have the lowest pass through among all country groups. The adoption of an 
IT regime (by fourteen countries in the sample) has shown a remarkable decline in 
ERPT. Long run ERPT reduced by almost 35% in these countries. Eight other Euro 
member countries also experienced a decline in ERPT and average inflation. 
Higher average inflation induces higher long and short run ERPT. Volatility of 
inflation is negatively related to long run pass through but positively related to the short 
run pass through elasticities. Adoption of inflation targeting is found to be effective in 
reducing short run pass through, whilst central bank autonomy is effective in reducing 
long run pass through. Crawling peg and managed floats, two of the intermediate 
regimes, are found to have a significant positive association with short run pass 
through. Overall, the evidence from our study is consistent with Taylor’s (2000) 
proposition that lower pass through is associated with lower inflation. Therefore, 
credibility of the monetary policy and the role of Central Banks are crucial. An 
important corollary of this proposition is that low pass through will persist as long as 
monetary authorities continue to successfully anchor inflation expectations and affirm 
that their response will be aggressive to any adverse inflationary shocks.  
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Appendix 2.1 
 
 
Static framework of Krugman’s (1986) model:  
 
This is static in the sense that neither the actual nor the expected duration of the 
exchange rate change affects the extent of pricing to market. Krugman’s framework 
sets out a supply and demand model of the price implications of exchange rates. Let us 
imagine the world comprises two countries, namely the US and European Union (EU); 
and two currencies, the dollar and the euro. The equilibrium condition can be described 
by two conditions. Let 𝑝 be the dollar price of some importable and 𝑝∗ is the EU price, 
𝑒 is the exchange rate of the euro per US dollar. Let 𝑠(𝑝) and 𝑠∗(𝑝∗) be the supply 
from the US and EU respectively and 𝐷(𝑝)  and 𝐷∗(𝑝∗)  are the demands. The 
equilibrium can be described by two equations. First the world market clearing implies 
that: 
 
       𝑠(𝑝) + 𝑠∗(𝑝∗) − 𝐷(𝑝) − 𝐷∗(𝑝∗) =0                  (2A.1) 
Second, the law of one price implies that   𝑝∗ = 𝑒𝑝. The elasticity of the EU price with 
respect to exchange rate is  
                     𝑑(𝑠 − 𝐷)/𝑑𝑝
𝑑(𝑠 − 𝐷 + 𝑠∗ − 𝐷∗)/𝑑𝑝⁄    (2A.2) 
Therefore, the extent to which the import price will fall ‘too little’ depends on the US 
share in the response of the world excess demand to price. However, to explain the 
divergence of the prices between the US and the EC, transaction costs can be used, 
even though there is the substantial restriction of assuming an upward sloping 
transaction cost function.  
                              𝑝∗= 𝑒𝑝 − 𝑡                             (2A.3) 
Here, t is the marginal transportation cost, and is increasing in the volume of the US 
imports. 
                        𝑡 = 𝑡(𝐷 − 𝑆)                                                                        (2𝐴. 4)   
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Equation (2A.2) and (2A.4) implies that a rise in the dollar would be accompanied by a 
fall in the US price, and thus a rise in the US imports. However, the rise in imports will 
be associated with a rise in the marginal transportation costs, therefore this will widen 
the price gap between the two regions. Apart from transportation costs, marketing and 
distribution costs are also relevant.   
The effects of demand elasticity and market share can be explained in a Cournot 
market structure which can be represented in the following equations. The basic rule of 
Cournot competition is that a firm will face a constant perceived elasticity of demand 
equal to 𝐸/𝑠. Here, 𝐸 is the market elasticity and s is the market share. There are two 
suppliers in the market, the US based firm and other is a foreign firm based in the EU. 
Let s be the market share of the US firm in the domestic market and 𝑠∗ is the market 
share of the EU firm which is basically (1 − 𝑠). The pricing rules of the US and the EU 
firm are represented by equations (2A.5) and (2A.6) respectively.   
      𝑃 =
𝑐𝐸
𝐸 − 𝑠
                                                                   (2𝐴. 5) 
   𝑃∗ =
𝑐∗𝐸
𝑒(𝐸 − 𝑠∗)
                                                            (2𝐴. 6) 
In equilibrium, market shares will be such that these two pricing rules coincide. The 
equations imply that the higher is the import market share in the US, the lower would 
be the elasticity of demand perceived by the EU firm, thus the higher would be the 
price for any given marginal cost. Similarly, elasticity of demand for the domestic firm 
will be higher. Now, if the exchange rate ‘e’ appreciates, the EU firm’s pricing 
schedule will shift down proportionately to this change. However, its actual price will 
not fall as the market shares will rise and the perceived elasticity of demand will fall. 
Algebraically, this can be explained by taking the logs of both (2A.5) and (2A.6).  
ln(𝑃) = ln(𝑐𝐸) − ln(𝐸 − 𝑆)                                    (2𝐴. 7) 
or      ln(𝑃) = ln(𝑐∗𝐸) − ln(𝑒) − ln(𝐸 − 𝑠∗)                                   (2𝐴. 8) 
Differentiating and substituting we get for the change in the US share of output and for 
the change in the price respectively in equation (2A.9) and (2A.10):  
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𝑑𝑠 =  −
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑒)[(𝐸 − 𝑠∗ )(𝐸 − 𝑠)]
[(𝐸 − 𝑠∗ ) + (𝐸 − 𝑠)]
                          (2𝐴. 9) 
 
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑝)  = −
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑒)(𝐸 − 𝑠∗)
[(𝐸 − 𝑠) − (𝐸 − 𝑠∗)]
                             (2𝐴. 10) 
     The equation implies that the elasticity of the price with respect to the exchange rate 
will be less than one. However, this result is based on two unrealistic assumptions. The 
first assumption is the perfect substitutability of the domestic and the foreign firm’s 
production. The second assumption is that the competition is assumed to be Cournot, as 
Bertrand competition will lead to a collapse of either imports or domestic production in 
the case of perfect substitutability. The dynamic form overcomes both of these 
shortcomings.  In the dynamic form of the same model, import prices will fall less than 
proportionately to the exchange rate change if the change is either unanticipated or 
expected to reverse.  
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Appendix 2.2 
 
Table 2.2A: Pass Through Elasticities 
Country Year Short run pass through elasticities Long run pass through elasticities 
Algeria 1995-2002 0.0109 -0.2725* 
Algeria 1995-2010 -0.0042 -0.356* 
Algeria 2003-2010 -0.0325* -2.815* 
Argentina 1990-2001 -0.6216* -0.1229* 
Argentina 1990-2010 -0.0612* -0.6089 
Argentina 2002-2010 -3.5879* -0.5609* 
Australia 1981-1992 0.4271 -0.5150* 
Australia 1981-2010 0.1132* -0.5545* 
Australia 1993-2002 0.5786* 0.6242* 
Australia 2003-2010 -0.43 0.203* 
Brazil 1990-1999 -2.611** -0.7888* 
Brazil 1990-2010 -0.378* 0.03076 
Brazil 2000-2010 -0.376* -0.2753* 
Canada 1981-1990 -0.0324 -0.0642* 
Canada 1981-2010 0.1212 0.2476* 
Canada 1991-2001 0.0493 -0.1135* 
Canada 2002-2010 -0.1607 -0.0505* 
Chilli 1981-1990 -0.32966 -0.396* 
Chilli 1981-2010 0.10082** -0.3372* 
Chilli 1991-1999 0.3992 -0.5070* 
Chilli 2000-2010 -1.4849* -0.2853* 
Colombia 1982-1990 -0.3822* -0.1654 
Colombia 1982-2010 0.0065 -0.996* 
Colombia 1991-2000 0.2852 0.4791* 
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Table 2.2A: Pass Through Elasticities (Continued) 
Country Year Short run pass through elasticities Long run pass through elasticities 
Colombia 2001-2010 0.27383* 0.984* 
Cyprus 1981-1988 0.3586915 -0.1997* 
Cyprus 1981-2010 -0.261539* -0.29119* 
Cyprus 1989-1998 0.3586 -0.1997* 
Cyprus 1999-2010 -0.265477* -0.26905* 
Czech 
Republic 
1994-1998 -1.70336* -0.57167* 
Czech 
Republic 
1994-2010 -2.5006* -0.1581829* 
Czech 
Republic 
1999-2010 -0.3138* -2.338254* 
Denmark 1981-1988 0.3178 -0.35981* 
Denmark 1981-2010 0.01586 0.034221 
Denmark 1989-1999 0.0726 -0.14037* 
Denmark 2000-2010 0.3148* 0.2546* 
Fiji 1981-1988 -0.093 -0.6354* 
Fiji 1981-2010 -0.1416 -0.14158 
Fiji 1989-1999 -0.0715 -0.67799* 
Fiji 2000-2010 -0.2386 -0.7224* 
Finland 1981-1992 0.11784 0.43555* 
Finland 1981-2010 -0.2232 -0.03754 
Finland 1993-1998 -0.18961 -0.40634* 
Singapore 1981-1989 -1.0792* 0.36157* 
Singapore 1981-2010 0.073 0.17435* 
Singapore 1990-1998 0.278 0.182198* 
Singapore 1999-2010 -0.039* -0.7974* 
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Table 2.2A: Pass Through Elasticities (Continued) 
Country Year 
Short run pass through 
elasticities 
Long run pass through 
elasticities 
Korea 1981-1990 1.17* 0.3188* 
Korea 1981-2010 -0.0441 -1.1134* 
Korea 1991-1998 0.479 -0.349076* 
Korea 1999-2010 0.339 -0.13471* 
Spain 1981-1991 -0.2448* -0.8019* 
Spain 1981-2010 -0.5929* 0.00252 
Spain 1992-1999 -0.849 -0.001 
Spain 1999-2010 -0.257 -0.003 
Tunisia 1982-1989 1.207 0.380* 
Tunisia 1982-2010 -0.047 0.0519* 
Tunisia 1990-2000 0.947 0.01426 
Tunisia 2001-2010 -0.018 -0.11274 
Turkey 1981-1991 0.070 -0.911* 
Turkey 1981-2010 0.01 -0.696* 
Turkey 1992-1999 -0.0237* -1.460* 
Turkey 2000-2010 -0.254 -0.85* 
UK 1981-1993 0.240 -0.0030* 
UK 1981-2010 -0.0017 0.266* 
UK 1994-2001 -0.0217 0.031* 
UK 2002-2010 -0.9764* -0.701* 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level and ***indicates significant at 10% level  
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Chapter Three: A Classification of Monetary Policy Regimes and the 
Implications on Growth and Inflation   
3.1. Introduction 
The choice of appropriate monetary policy regime, particularly for developing 
countries, has long been at the center of the debate in international economics. The 
steady increase in both magnitude and variability of international capital flows has 
intensified the debate over the past few decades, as each of the major currency crises in 
the 1990s in some way involved a fixed exchange rate and sudden reversal of capital 
inflows. As a consequence, a large number of empirical studies have attempted to 
evaluate the performance of alternative exchange rate policies in terms of growth, 
trade, inflation, business cycle and commodity price behaviour (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2004).
27
 
Official classification of exchange rate regime however, often fails to describe 
the actual practice by the monetary authorities, which implies a significant gap between 
de facto and de jure regimes.
28
 As a result, Ghosh et al. (1997), Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) amongst others, attempted to 
rectify the deficiencies of de jure classifications. There are also drawbacks with 
evaluating economic performance on the basis of de facto regimes. Exchange rate 
regimes are at the same time characterised by both weak and strong monetary policy 
frameworks. A free or managed float regime may have an inflation targeting or 
monetary targeting framework. Therefore, evaluating performance solely on the basis 
of exchange rate regime would be misleading, as the performance is not only the 
contribution of the exchange rate regime but also the contribution of the underlying 
monetary policy framework. 
A distinctive study by Bailliu et al. (2003) focused on the monetary policy 
framework applied along with the exchange rate regimes. They argue that an exchange 
rate anchor is simultaneously a monetary anchor and also that intermediate and floating 
                                                 
27
 See also Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). 
28
 The de jure classification is defined as the official classification of the regime by the country. In 
contrast, the de facto classification is defined with reference to a range of economic and institutional 
variables and outcomes.   
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regimes might be associated with either weak or strong monetary policy frameworks. 
Therefore, the impact of these weak and strong monetary policy frameworks will 
reflect upon the relationship between the regimes and growth. 
While a number of studies have tried to improve the de jure classification of 
exchange rate regimes, this has not been the case for alternative monetary policy 
regimes. De facto classifications for inflation targeting (IT) or monetary targeting (MT) 
regimes are just as important as de facto classifications of exchange rate regimes. Even 
though Bailliu et al.’s classification (2003) attempts to incorporate the underlying 
monetary policy framework by classifying exchange rate regimes on the basis of 
monetary policy anchors, their classification has not explicitly considered other 
monetary policy regimes. The present study refines the classification scheme by taking 
into account different monetary policy frameworks and tries to evaluate regime 
performance in terms of growth and inflation.   
The literature on de jure and de facto classification of exchange rate regimes is 
quite substantial. For example, Calvo and Reinhart (2001,2002), Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2003), Frankel (1999), Hausmann (1999) and Mackinnon (2001) demonstrate 
that many countries officially have a flexible rate, but they intervene in the exchange 
rate markets so persistently that in practice the exchange rate is effectively fixed. 
Conversely, the frequent and periodic devaluation of fixed exchange rates in inflation 
prone countries due to poor monetary policy often renders the exchange rate more 
flexible than fixed. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) showed that emerging economies often 
actively intervene in the exchange rate market so as to reduce the volatility of their 
exchange rate. This is popularly referred to as the ‘fear of floating’ and a number of 
explanations have attempted to clarify the phenomenon. One is the lack of credible 
monetary policy (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). In such countries, stabilising the exchange 
rate provides a clear nominal anchor for prices. Other explanations include that (i) 
exchange rate volatility is thought to be detrimental for international trade as most of 
the trade is invoiced in a foreign currency, (ii) the pass through from exchange rate 
movements to inflation is higher in emerging countries than in developed countries, and 
(iii) the inability of emerging countries to borrow in their own currency leads to the 
liability being denominated in foreign currencies and the subsequent exchange rate 
risks borne by the country issuing the debt (Hausmann et al., 1999). 
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As a result, it is misleading to classify the exchange rate regime by its 
‘official’ de jure status and the literature reports efforts to classify exchange rate 
regimes on a de facto basis.
29
 Such  de facto classifications attempt to correct the 
deficiencies in the de jure classifications (Tavlas et al., 2008). In recognition, IMF 
official classifications have, since 1999, started to take into account these deficiencies. 
Studies vary on the basis of the variables and methods used to classify the exchange 
rate regime in the sense that they compare their classifications with IMF de 
jure classifications, some incorporate a mixture of de jure and de facto classifications. 
For example, Ghosh et al. (1997), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, 2004) are examples 
of the mixed de jure - de facto approach to classifying exchange rate regimes. Pure de 
facto classifications of exchange rate regimes can be compared with de 
jure classifications, but the former mostly use a tripartite system where the regime is 
classified as either pegged, intermediate or freely floating (for example, see Levy 
Yeyati et al. (2005), Shambaugh (2004) or De Grauwe and Schneble (2005)). 
  There is also a range of methodologies used in de facto classification 
approaches. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, 2004); Bailliu et al. (2003) and 
Ghosh et al. (2002) applied statistical algorithms to the changes and variances in 
nominal exchange rates. In some ways, the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) approach, 
which studies 156 countries over the period 1946 to 2001, is considered as one of the 
more radical revisions to the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes. Using data 
from the parallel exchange rate markets alongside official exchange rates, they 
categorise a regime as freely floating if annual inflation exceeds 40%. To avoid the 
impact of short run fluctuations of the exchange rate, they compute the probability of 
the monthly change in the nominal exchange rate within a specified band over a rolling 
five-year period. If the probability that the exchange rate will stay within a specified 
band is 80% or more, the regime is classified as either of the suitable categories of their 
classification. Their ‘coarse’ classification of regimes has as many as 7 categories and 
their ‘fine’ classification has 15 categories. 
Algorithms used by most of the other de facto approaches to classifying 
exchange rate regimes make use of a range of statistical algorithms and measures of 
                                                 
29
 For detailed analysis, see Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1997, 2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, 2004), 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2001, 2003), Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2003), Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005). 
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exchange rate variance (for example: Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy Yeyati, 2005; 
Bailliu et al., 2001, 2003). Additionally, Levy Yeyati et al. (2005) also incorporate the 
volatility of international reserves as a classification variable. One of the shortcomings 
of using the volatility of exchange rates, or volatility of changes in exchange rates or 
reserves is that taking the volatility will only give a partial representation. As argued by 
Hausmann et al. (2001), the exchange rate in one country may be more volatile, 
because of the fact that it is subjected to larger external shocks, despite significant 
intervention by the authorities to keep it stable. The variance of reserves might also not 
be a good indicator, as reserves can be very stable due to the absence of shocks, even in 
a country that would intervene heavily if a shock warrants it. Besides that, there are 
many other factors that affect the reserves in a developing country. Therefore, 
Haussmann et al. (2001) argue that the relative volatility of the change in exchange 
rates to the change in reserves (RVER) is a better variable to use for classifying 
exchange rate regimes. The measure of volatility itself is another issue. Using the 
standard deviation to measure the volatility of exchange rates is vulnerable to any large 
depreciation or appreciation of the exchange rate. To address this problem, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) and Levy Yeyati (2005) used mean absolute deviations of exchange 
rates to measure the volatility. 
The current study extends the literature by classifying alternative yearly de facto 
monetary policy regimes based on some classification criteria for 124 countries over 
the period 1970 to 2012. Unlike other de facto classification studies, we have explicitly 
classified all the monetary policy regimes along with the exchange rate regimes. The 
classification exercise covers seven exchange rate regimes and four inflation targeting 
and monetary targeting regimes, which have also included converging episodes of the 
both regimes. For the classification of exchange rate regimes, we used volatility of 
exchange rates, volatility of changes in exchange rates, volatility of reserves and also 
the relative volatility of exchange rate to reserves (RVER). To reduce the influence of 
outliers in the exchange rate regime classifications, we used the standard deviation and 
eliminated the largest 10% of deviations from the mean. Inflation targeting and 
monetary targeting regimes are classified on the basis of changes in inflation rates and 
policy rates, and changes in both broad and narrow money and the policy rates, 
respectively. If a regime satisfies multiple categories, we attempt to classify the regime 
on the basis of the policy which is more obvious and likely to be pursued by the 
monetary authority during that particular period or periods. For example, if an 
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intermediate exchange rate regime is classified as an inflation targeting or monetary 
targeting regime, the regime is classified as an inflation targeting regime, otherwise it is 
classified on the basis of its exchange rate policy. Secondly, we try to assess the impact 
of the monetary policy regimes on growth and inflation using Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimation developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1997) rather than widely 
used Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach used in the previous studies. 
PMG is more appropriate than GMM for panel data sets with both large number of 
countries and time periods as the asymptotic properties of the long run panel is 
different. Unlike GMM, it is an intermediate estimator which involves both pooling and 
averaging and allows the intercepts, short run coefficients and error variance to differ 
across countries. There are also other advantages for the choice of the PMG procedure. 
It allows for short-run heterogeneous dynamics but imposes a long-run homogeneous 
relationship for countries in the sample.  
More than 10% of the regimes are classified as either some sort of inflation or 
monetary targeting regime, which previous studies classified as some kind of exchange 
rate regime. 45% of the time our classification compared to the Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
(2004) classification and 33% of the time with the IMF de facto classification. Our 
findings suggest a less pronounced move away from intermediate exchange rate 
regimes. Results from the panel estimation suggest that monetary policy regimes with 
nominal anchors are better for both economic growth and inflation. Among the 
exchange rate regimes, our findings suggest that fixed regimes are better compared to 
other exchange rate regimes for both industrialised and non-industrialised countries. 
Inflation targeting regimes have a more positive impact on non-industrialised countries 
compared to industrialised countries. Overall, our findings suggest that monetary policy 
regimes with nominal anchors exert a positive influence for both groups of countries.
30
 
We find that inflation is significantly lower and growth is significantly higher for 
regimes with some form of nominal anchors. Inflation is modest for industrialised and 
non-industrialised countries under inflation targeting, monetary targeting and fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Therefore, the findings suggest that the presence of some form 
of monetary policy anchor is beneficial for economic growth and inflation. 
                                                 
30
 A nominal anchor for monetary policy is a single variable or device which the central bank uses to pin 
down expectations of private agents about the nominal price level or its path or about what the Bank 
might do with respect to achieving that path (Krugman, 2003) 
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The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an 
extensive literature review on the classification and performance of all the monetary 
policy regimes. Section 3.3 provides the methodology for classifying the regimes and 
the justifications. Section 3.4 describes the findings from the regime classifications. 
The classifications have been utilised further to evaluate the impact of the regime on 
growth and inflation. Section 3.5 provides the methodology for this 2
nd
 stage analysis 
of regime performance, while section 3.6 discusses the findings from the 2
nd
 stage 
regression analysis. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2: Literature Review 
The appropriate choice of monetary policy regime is a recurrent issue. The wave of 
financial crises in developing countries over the 1990s made this issue more relevant 
than ever before. Early empirical studies of alternative exchange rate regime 
performance focused on the comparison of unconditional variances of nominal and real 
exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system and the aftermath (Tavlas et al., 2008). 
Studies like Stockman and Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), or Flood and 
Rose (1995) find that the demise of Bretton Woods was characterised by increased 
volatility of real exchange rates. However, they failed to detect any significant 
difference in macroeconomic performance between fixed and floating exchange rates. 
While trying to assess the volatility of macroeconomic variables under the two regimes, 
Baxter and Stockman (1989) find little evidence of systematic differences in the 
behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption or international 
production. Flood and Rose (1995) find that the unconditional volatilities of 
macroeconomic variables such as industrial production, money, consumer prices and 
interest rates did not change much across regime. There is, however, one thing common 
among the studies mentioned above: their analysis is based on official classifications of 
the exchange rate regime.  
The findings from above studies generated inconsistency by suggesting that key 
macroeconomic variables, rather than real exchange rates, are invariant to the choice of 
exchange rate regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
2005). Furthermore, currency and financial crises during the 1990s renewed interest in 
the debate surrounding the choice of appropriate monetary policy and exchange rate 
regime for small open economies and, in particular, emerging countries. Many blamed 
soft pegs for the currency and banking crisis during the 1990s (Goldstein and Peterson, 
1999). Unsurprisingly, supporters of this view advocated that emerging markets should 
allow their currency to float in order to avoid future crisis. Following this advocacy, 
policymakers of many countries officially indicated their preferences for flexible 
exchange rates. 
A dramatic change in the IMF official report of 1999 reflects these changes, 
suggesting only 5 countries adopted exchange rates with an 18% horizontal band, 
whereas 49 countries adopted independently floating exchange rates and 25 countries 
adopted managed floating with no intervention. However, findings by many studies 
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later suggest that there are discrepancies between the actual and official exchange rate 
regimes. Theoretical studies such as Frankel (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and 
Hausmann et al. (2001) had already substantiated the reasons for a country to deviate 
from the official exchange rate. A number of empirical studies attempted to verify that 
countries with different exchange rate regimes show remarkable differences regarding 
the way they intervene in the foreign exchange markets. Empirical studies like 
Haussmann et al. (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002), or Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) find that many emerging countries tend to hold large amount of international 
reserves. Consequently, intervention in the foreign exchange market is also very 
frequent in these countries. 
3.2.1 Fear of floating phenomena 
Why might a country prefer to smooth exchange rate flexibility? The fear of floating 
phenomenon, pioneered by the analysis of Calvo (1999), Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 
2002), delves deeper into this issue. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) studied 39 
countries between 1970 and 1999 and found that many countries, irrespective of 
economic status, are very reluctant to allow large swings in their exchange rates. On an 
average, the probability that an exchange rate change is within the moderate ± 2.50% 
band is over 79% for free floaters.
31
 Moderate to large monthly fluctuations are found 
to be rare for managed floaters. On average, there is an 88% probability that monthly 
changes of exchange rates for managed floaters are confined within the narrow band of 
2.50%. Low exchange rate flexibility is the result of deliberate policy interventions. 
Furthermore, international reserves and interest rates are more volatile for these 
countries. Technically, interest rate movements are a by-product of a combination of 
exchange rate stabilisation through domestic open market operations and a lack of 
credibility. They demonstrate why a lack of credibility of the monetary authority leads 
to fear of floating with high international reserves and interest rate volatility, within the 
framework of a pro cyclical monetary policy. These countries have a high risk 
premium. Therefore, smoothing exchange rate fluctuations is an attractive alternative to 
reduce the variance of real outcomes. In a stylised model, the authors demonstrate how 
offsetting the risk premium shocks and reducing exchange rate fluctuations can limit 
unnecessary variations in inflation. 
                                                 
31
 Significantly above the benchmark countries of Australia, Japan and US. 
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In the context of an inflation targeting country, Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 
2002) demonstrated that a larger variance of nominal interest rates lowers the 
credibility of the monetary authority and increases risk premium shocks. Therefore, a 
greater commitment to inflation targeting by the authority will lead to the choice of a 
reduction in the variance of exchange rates changes. As a result, inflation targeting by 
many emerging countries can also explain the fear of floating phenomenon. 
In order to provide an explanation for exchange rate interventions, Hausmann et 
al. (2001) find that many countries which classified their regime as floating show 
strikingly different volatilities in the movement of exchange rates relative to that of 
reserves or interest rates. They developed a model which explains that exchange rate 
intervention is the optimal choice of a central bank that attempts to minimise a standard 
loss function where domestic firms are credit-constrained and incomplete market 
structure limits the ability to avoid currency mismatch. 
32
 Thus, the model suggests that 
the difference in the way countries’ floats are related to their different levels of 
exchange rate pass through and their ability to avoid any currency mismatches. They 
find a very strong robust relationship between the pattern of exchange rate flexibility 
and the ability for international borrowing in own currency.
33
 The finding suggests 
exchange rate flexibility will be lower if the ability to borrow in own currency is low.
34
  
3.2.2 Classification of de facto exchange rate regimes 
As a consequence of the dubious nature of official exchange rate regimes, classification 
of de facto exchange rate regimes has rapidly become one of the new standards of 
research (Genberg and Swoboda, 2004). De facto regime classification attempts to 
rectify the deficiencies of de jure classification. Studies differ in terms of their 
methodologies and the variables used to classify the regimes. These classifications 
depend on a number of judgmental issues on variables such as the choice of the 
reference currency, changes in reserves and interest rates in the decision making 
                                                 
32
 Aghion et al. (1999, 2000) and Bacchetta (2001) suggest that monetary policy becomes complicated 
when firms hold a large fraction of their debt in foreign currency. This is due to the fact that while a 
reduction in interest rates can have expansionary effects through credit channels, the depreciation 
brought by the interest rate reduction can be contractionary through a balance sheet channel. Hence, the 
central bank will prefer less exchange rate flexibility with the increase in the importance of foreign 
currency debt. 
33
 The relationship between ERPT and exchange rate flexibility was not statistically significant. They 
suspect that this might be due to measurement errors in calculating the pass through index.  
34
 Which is likely to be the case with most developing countries.  
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process. In their survey, Tavlas et al. (2008) categorised these exchange rate 
classifications into two different groups: 
A) Mixed de jure - de facto classification approach: in this category, self-declared 
regimes are adjusted by the devisers of anomalies on the basis of factors like 
judgments, statistical algorithms, and developments in parallel markets. IMF 
classifications are used as a reference in order to compare the findings of the new de 
facto regimes.  
B) Pure de facto approach: assignment of these regimes are purely independent from 
the IMF classification. 
Maintaining the same line of analysis as Tavlas et al. (2008), we present a brief 
literature review below. 
A) Mixed de jure - de facto classification approach 
While trying to assess the impact of exchange rate flexibility on inflation and growth, 
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1997) rearranged the de jure pegged grouping between the 
frequent and infrequent adjusters in 136 countries over the period 1960 to1990. A 
regime is classified as pegged if the authority changes the value of the pegged currency 
within a particular year. However, they placed de jure intermediate and floating 
regimes in a single de jure group, therefore this is a partial classification. IMF official 
reports also started to include the de facto classification after recognising the 
deficiencies of the de jure classification. Based on exchange rate and reserve 
movements, studies by IMF (1999, 2003) and Bubula (2002) amended the self-declared 
regimes for 190 countries between 1990 and 2001. When the de jure regime was a peg, 
but the currency underwent frequent devaluations within a very short period of time, 
the regime has been classified as managed float. Evidence of intervention, for 
alternating the long-term trend in the exchange rate movements, is used to distinguish 
between managed floating and independently floating regimes. From 1999, this de 
facto classification replaced the IMF reports on de jure classifications. 
Statistical algorithms have been used quite extensively in de 
facto classifications. The algorithms varied from simple probability estimations in 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) study to cluster analysis in the study of Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) and multinomial logit or probit models by some other studies. The 
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natural classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, revised in 2004) is probably one of 
the most cited revisions of de jure classifications. They performed this exercise on 
monthly data for 153 countries over the period 1946 to 2001. Their classification also 
takes into account dual or parallel market rates and divides the classification between 
fine and coarse.
35
 Their fine classification covers as many as 15 categories of exchange 
rate arrangement and coarse classification covers 7 categories. They treated the 
countries with official dual or multiple rates and active parallel markets separately. The 
authors then calculated the probabilities of monthly exchange rates in order to assess 
the flexibility of the regimes. If the probability of monthly exchange rate changes for a 
regime to stay within ± 1% is 80% or more, the regime is classified as a de facto peg 
or de-facto crawling peg. The same procedure has been followed in order to classify the 
regimes with different horizontal bands. Those regimes with a greater than 5% 
horizontal band are categorised as a managed or free float. To distinguish between the 
two regimes, a statistical test is used to gauge the degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
They defined a freely falling regime if the 12-month rate of inflation exceeded 40%.
36
 
A regime is classified as hyperfloat, a sub-species of freely falling, if the inflation rate 
is 50% or more. 
Bailliu et al. (2003), adopting Ghosh et al.’s (1997) tripartite scheme as the 
official classification, classified de facto exchange rate regimes for 60 countries over 
the period 1973 to 1998. They developed a two-step hybrid mechanical rule which 
classifies exchange rate regimes in terms of their observed flexibility and takes into 
account external shocks and revaluations. In the first step, they classified countries as 
having a pegged regime based on the de jure classification.
37
 They also classified 
regimes as pegged where exchange rate volatility is less than 0.45 percentage points 
over a given year. This threshold is broadly consistent with the IMF official 
                                                 
35
 They find that post World War II every country relied at least once on capital controls or multiple 
exchange rate systems. Therefore, failing to look at the market-determined exchange rates often gives the 
false picture of underlying monetary policy and the ability of the economy to adjust imbalances.  
36
Six months if an exchange rate crisis was accompanied by a transition from a fixed or quasi fixed 
regime to a managed or independently floating regime. 
37
 The literature has identified a bias for declaring exchange rate arrangements as being more flexible 
than they actually are and not vice versa. The bias is thought to result from the fact that it is difficult for a 
country that publicly declares it is pegging the exchange rate to cheat on the exchange rate commitment, 
given the fixity of the nominal target.  
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classification.
38
 In contrast to Levy Yeyati et al. (2005) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000), 
their method identifies intermediate and flexible regimes on the the basis of observed 
exchange rate volatility, without taking any account of international reserves. In order 
to control for external shocks, which they have assumed occur mainly due to the terms 
of trade or capital account shocks, they regrouped countries into industrialised and 
several groups of emerging countries based on geographic location. The rationale 
behind this is to create groups of countries that are more likely to share common 
characteristics and be influenced by the same common shocks. They developed 
exchange rate flexibility indices for each country based on the degree of exchange rate 
volatility relative to the group average for each year. Countries with a flexibility index 
greater than one are considered to be flexible and the rest are considered to be 
intermediate regimes. 
B) Pure de facto classifications of the exchange rate regimes:  
Shambaugh (2004) divided the regimes into pegged and non-pegged, based on the 
movements of exchange rate regimes within a pre-specified band. Using data from 155 
countries over the period 1973-2000, a currency is classified as pegged in a particular 
year if the volatility of the exchange rate is within ±2% against the base currency. Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) used cluster analysis to construct a three-way 
classification of pegs, intermediates and float regimes over the period 1947 to 2000 for 
185 countries.
39
 They used the volatility of exchange rates, volatility of the change in 
exchange rates and the volatility of reserves for the specification of the exchange rate 
regimes. 
There are disagreements between the de facto regime classifications. The 
disagreements are broadly based on three components: (1) data series (the reference 
currency or currencies and parallel markets rate), (2) statistical methodologies and (3), 
the thresholds for categorising exchange rate regimes. Table 3.1 below presents the 
correlation between the four de facto classifications. Ghosh et al. (1997) has the highest 
correlation with the IMF classification. 
  
                                                 
38
Most of the de jure fixed arrangements of the IMF exhibit less than 0.45 percentage points exchange 
rate volatility.  
39
 Cluster analysis is a class of statistical techniques that can be applied to data that exhibits natural 
groupings.   
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Table 3.1: Pair wise correlations among de facto coding schemes (1990-99) 
Classification IMF  GGW LY-S  R-R 
IMF 1.00 
(100) 
   
GGW 0.60 
(55) 
1.00 
(100) 
  
LY-S 0.28 
(41) 
0.13 
(35) 
1.00 
(100) 
 
R-R 0.33 
(55) 
0.34 
(35) 
0.41 
(45) 
1.00 
(100) 
Source: Frankel (2004); frequency of outright coincidence (%) in parenthesis. GGW= Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf. LY-
S= Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger. R-R= Reinhart and Rogoff 
 
3.2.3 Reliability of the regime classifications 
There are some drawbacks of de facto classifications. A fundamental problem is the use 
of backward information. Whilst the stated regime, in principle, conveys information 
about future policy intentions, observed actions necessarily pertain to the past 
(Ghosh et al., 2002). Most of this de facto coding is based on the assessments of 
exchange rate movements and volatility of reserves. However, the exchange rate or 
reserve volatilities alone will often not be good indicators of exchange rate flexibility. 
Stability of the nominal exchange rate could either reflect the absence of any shock or 
active intervention for smoothing out these shocks from exchange rate fluctuations. 
Only the latter criterion is relevant for the classification of de facto exchange rate 
regimes. More generally, countries have different structures and are subject to different 
shocks. Hence, it is difficult to infer the underlying practice purely from the observed 
exchange rate movement. 
Coding which uses short frequencies may also be susceptible to the problem of 
a large one-time swings in exchange rates. Classifications like Levy Yeyati et al. 
(2005) and Bailliu et al. (2003) are particularly susceptible to this problem; Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) used a five-year rolling window and mean absolute deviations as a 
measure of exchange rate volatility to overcome the problem of outliers. 
Some studies have used other policy variables, such as the change in gross 
reserves, in order to measure intervention. However, these variables also have some 
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serious drawbacks. There are many reasons why the international reserves of a country 
might show unintentional volatility. The movements of international reserves are 
influenced by a number of factors, particularly in emerging markets. Such movements 
might be due to the servicing of foreign debt or payments for bulky purchases such as 
oil imports or aircraft, which have little to do with intentional foreign exchange 
intervention but do result in large movements of reserves. As the use of forward 
markets, swaps, non-deliverable forwards and a variety of other off-balance sheet 
instruments by central banks have become more common, gross reserves, even if 
reported accurately, become ever less revealing. The objective of building 
classifications purely on the basis of policy instruments is another drawback of de 
facto classifications. As Levy Yeyatti et al. (2005) pointed out, this introduces the 
problem of endogeneity. For example, countries with high exchange rate pass through 
and with an inflation targeting objective are likely to prefer a stable exchange rate, even 
though the primary goal is not to intervene in the exchange rate markets. Thus, they 
reassessed the suspicion of Calvo and Reinhart (2000) regarding fear of floating by 
many inflation-targeting countries. For the aforementioned reasons, studies like 
Hausmann et al. (2001) used the relative volatility of exchange rates and reserves to 
verify the extent of intervention in foreign exchange markets by the floaters. 
3.2.4 Performance of exchange rate regimes in terms of growth and inflation 
There is no clear evidence for any particular regime to be growth enhancing. On the 
contrary, there is a consensus that fixed exchange rate regimes show better performance 
with regard to inflation control. Where growth is concerned, it has been argued that a 
more flexible exchange rate policy can enhance economic growth, as a flexible 
exchange rate acts as a shock absorber and will enable economies with nominal 
rigidities to absorb and adapt to economic shocks more easily (Bailliu et al., 2003). 
Studies such as Bailliu et al. (2001) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) find a 
significant relationship between economic growth and the exchange rate regime. 
Bailliu et al. (2001), in their study of 25 emerging countries from 1973 to 1998, 
find that flexible exchange rate arrangements are associated with higher growth. 
Similar findings have been confirmed by Levy Yeyati et al. (2001) for developing 
countries. However, their findings suggest that the exchange rate regime does not have 
any significant impact on growth in industralised countries. The subsequent study by 
Bailliu et al. (2003) is critical of the previous studies for not considering the underlying 
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monetary policy framework for the corresponding exchange rate regimes. They argue 
that both the intermediate and flexible regimes may include some form of weak or 
strong monetary policy frameworks. Therefore, failure to account for this discrepancy 
may result in an inaccurate assessment of the impacts of alternative exchange rate 
regimes on growth. Using a GMM framework on a panel of 60 countries over the 
period 1973 to 1998, they find that exchange rate regimes characterised by monetary 
policy anchors exert a positive influence on growth. Their findings also suggest that 
intermediate and flexible regimes without any nominal anchors are detrimental for 
growth. On the contrary, Ghosh et al. (1997) find no systematic differences in growth 
rates across exchange rate regimes in a sample of 136 countries during the period 1960 
to 1989.  
Unlike growth, there is a widespread consensus that pegged regimes more or 
less act as an anti-inflationary device in the short run. The findings of Ghosh et al. 
(1997), for 136 countries over the period 1960 to 1990, suggest that by imposing 
greater central bank discipline and a lower growth rate of residual velocity, fixed 
exchange rate regimes experience low and less volatile inflation compared to the other 
regimes. The study by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) supports similar findings. 
A subsequent study by Ghosh et al. (2002), using three de jure and a detailed 6 ways 
classification supports the earlier findings that inflation is lower under pegged 
exchange rates, reflecting both lower money growth and greater confidence in the 
currency. 
Using the natural classification of exchange rate regimes by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), Husain et al. (2005) find that the macroeconomic performance of 
alternative exchange rate regimes mainly depends on the maturity of the economy and 
institutions of a country. Developing countries, which have less exposure to 
international markets, appear to benefit from regimes with a strong exchange rate and 
monetary policy commitment. For these countries, the harder the commitment to a 
stable exchange rate, the lower the inflation rate without any sacrifice to economic 
growth. In the same way, more flexible regimes are associated with higher inflation 
without any concomitant reward to economic growth.  On the contrary, their findings 
for advanced economies suggest that flexible regimes are correlated with low inflation 
and high growth. 
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An issue yet to be addressed, pointed out by Tavlas et al. (2008), is that the 
major research agenda for the future in this area involves the need for a more thorough 
investigation of the degree of monetary policy independence without relying on the 
movements in exchange rates. A natural objective of these de facto classification 
exercises is to evaluate macroeconomic performance of the regimes. However, the 
evaluation will not be complete if the study does not consider the underlying monetary 
policy framework of any particular regime i.e. consideration of inflation targeting or 
monetary targeting should be of equal importance for the performance evaluation. 
Sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 provide a brief overview of these two regimes. 
3.2.5 Monetary targeting regimes 
 Monetary targeting was a popular policy choice over the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Influenced by the monetarist school of thought, most OECD countries began adopting, 
with varying degrees of conviction, some form of intermediate money and credit targets 
over this period. The idea was mainly to control the intermediate targets rather than an 
ultimate policy goal like inflation.
40
 Estrella and Mishkin (1996) suggest that there are 
three possible roles for monetary aggregates in monetary policy: it can act as 1) an 
information variable, 2) an indicator of policy actions and 3) an instrument in a policy 
rule. This policy allows the central bank to independently choose the appropriate 
inflation rate (Mishkin, 1999). Monetary targeting can also act as a nominal anchor. It 
can increase accountability and remove the time inconsistency trap. 
Monetary targeting regimes were not a success story for the U.S, U.K and 
Canada, and a major disadvantage was the lack of stable relationship between monetary 
aggregates and the price level. According to Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), the central 
banks of these countries never adhered to strict, ironclad rules for monetary growth and 
in some cases monetary targeting was not pursued in a serious manner. However, there 
were various discrepancies. Mishkin (1999) finds that the US, Canada and the UK 
engaged in substantial game playing in which they targeted multiple aggregates, 
allowed the base to drift, did not announce targets on the basis of the schedule, and 
often overshot their targets without reversing, the reasons of which remained obscure. 
                                                 
40
 It was widely believed that intermediate targets are easy to control, as the lag between policy actions 
and inflation is larger than the lag between policy actions and monetary growth. Moreover, monetary 
target is perceived by policy makers to be more directly manageable.  
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As a result, monetary targeting in these three countries never proved to be successful in 
controlling inflation. According to Mishkin (1999), there are two interpretations for 
this. Firstly, that monetary policy was never pursued in a serious manner in these 
countries and secondly, the growing instability of the relationship between monetary 
aggregates and the goal variables such as inflation. Estrella and Mishkin (1996) find 
that for the US, the problem with monetary aggregates as a guide to monetary policy is 
the frequent shift in velocity, which altered the relationship between money growth and 
nominal income. As a consequence, all three countries formally abandoned monetary 
targeting regimes by the early 1980s. 
However, the success of this regime in controlling inflation in Switzerland and 
Germany is one of the main reasons why monetary targeting still has some strong 
advocates today and is apparently the official policy regime of the European Central 
Bank (ECB). The targeting regimes for these countries are very far from a Friedman-
type monetary targeting rule where monetary aggregates are kept on a constant growth 
path, which is the primary focus of monetary policy. One of the secrets of the success 
of German monetary policy is that the authority often did not feel bound by the 
monetarist orthodoxy as far as its technical details were concerned (Issing, 1997). In 
fact, monetary targeting in both countries should have been viewed as a method of 
communicating a strategy of monetary policy that focuses on long run considerations 
and the control of inflation (Mishkin, 1999; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992). There are 
certain factors behind the success of the regimes in both of these countries. According 
to Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), Mishkin and Posen (1997) and Mishkin (1999), the 
main reason is a featured numerical inflation goal to set the target ranges. At the same 
time, far from being rigid, monetary policy was in fact quite flexible in practice. 50% 
of the time, the target ranges were missed, often because the monetary authorities were 
concerned with other objectives such as output or exchange rates. The Bundesbank had 
demonstrated its flexibility by allowing the short-term inflation goal to vary and 
converge slowly to the long run goal. Transparency was another important reason. 
Through publications and frequent speeches by officials, monetary authorities 
successfully demonstrated a strong commitment to public communication. 
According to Mishkin (1999), there are two key lessons from the experiences of 
these two countries. First, targeting regimes can withhold inflation in the long run 
without adherence to a rigid policy rule. Second, the key reason for the success of 
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monetary targeting, despite frequent target misses, is that the objectives of monetary 
policy were stated clearly and both authorities were actively engaged in communicating 
the strategy of monetary policy to the public, which in turn enhanced the transparency 
and accountability of the central banks. 
3.2.6 Inflation targeting regimes 
Form the late 1980s, many countries started to adopt inflation targeting to overcome the 
shortcomings of intermediate targets such as exchange rate or monetary targets. 
Starting with the reserve bank of New Zealand, so far 30 countries have adopted 
inflation targeting as their official monetary policy framework over the past two 
decades. In many countries, the spread of inflation targeting has been prompted by 
exchange rate crises. The main idea is to anchor inflationary expectations by 
committing to a particular inflation target. The key aspect that separates inflation 
targeting from other monetary policies is the public announcement of a numerical 
target. By making the target explicit, inflation targeting provides a nominal anchor. The 
three main features of inflation targeting that distinguishes this strategy from other 
monetary policy strategies are 1) the central bank’s commitment to a unique numerical 
target (either level or range) of annual inflation, 2) the inflation forecast over some 
horizon: the de facto intermediate target and 3) the emphasis on public communication, 
transparency and accountability. An inflation targeting central bank publishes regular 
monetary policy reports that incorporate the bank’s forecast of inflation and other 
variables, analysis behind the forecast and motivation for the decision. The emphasis 
on transparency is based on the insight that the monetary policy’s action and 
announcement has significant consequences on private sector expectations.  
Undertaking inflation targeting involves a gradual disinflationary period 
towards a low stable rate before the official adoption of the regime. Even though, there 
are some basic general frameworks, the policy framework and implementation of 
inflation targeting can differ substantially. There are also several economic trade-offs, 
such as output volatility and unemployment. Therefore, inflation targeting countries are 
flexible in terms of pursuing the targeted rates (Roger, 2010). Also, there are some 
important differences between inflation targeting countries regarding the role of 
exchange rate in the policy framework (Shimizu et al., 2009). The exchange rate has a 
more prominent place in the inflation targeting framework, particularly for emerging 
countries. Even though the interest rate is the primary policy tool, reserve requirements 
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or foreign exchange market intervention are also used by some countries as 
supplementary instruments. 
3.2.7 Performance of inflation targeting regime in terms of growth and inflation 
Advocates of inflation targeting monetary policy, such as Bernanke et al. (1999), 
suggest that the policy promotes price stability and reduces inflation persistence. 
However, experiences differ from country to country (Ball, 2006). Evidently, inflation 
targeting regimes are more successful in developing countries than their developed 
counterparts (Ball and Sheridan, 2003; Goncalvez and Salles, 2008). A study by Roger 
and Stone (2005) suggests that inflation targeting is associated with an overall 
improvement of economic performance. On the contrary, experiences with developed 
countries are mixed. The preferences of policy makers are shifted more towards the 
aversion of inflation rather than output volatility. Therefore, many expect that the 
outcome would result in higher output volatility (Cecchetti and Ehrman, 1999). 
Studies like Cecchetti and Ehrman (1999), Neuman and Von Hagan (2002) and 
Hu (2003) used a pure difference in difference approach to measure the effects of IT. 
The findings of these studies generally suggest that IT reduces the mean and variance 
of inflation. However, the results regarding the variance of output are mixed. Cecchetti 
and Ehrman (1999), studying a sample of 24 non inflation targeting and 9 inflation 
targeting countries over the period 1985 to 1997, find that aversion to inflation 
variability has increased since the 1990s, irrespective of monetary policy regime. 
However, the reduction in inflation volatility is modest among inflation targeting 
countries compared to non inflation targeting countries. Using a similar approach, Ball 
and Sheridan (2003) compared the performance of all the OECD inflation targeting 
countries with 13 non-inflation targeting countries over the 1990s. They find an 
insignificant and weak effect on average inflation of inflation targeting countries. The 
apparent success of the inflation targeting countries simply reflects a reversion to mean 
inflation. That means, inflation falls faster in countries with a high initial level of 
inflation. Since most of the inflation targeting countries usually started from a relatively 
high level of inflation, the greater declining rate actually reflects the general declining 
trend of the rest of the world. 
A subsequent study by Goncalvez and Salles (2008) used a similar approach 
and found that inflation targeting had a substantial effect on the reduction of inflation in 
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36 emerging economies. Inflation had been reduced by 2.5 percentage points and 
volatility of the annual growth rate was reduced by 1.4 percentage points in these 
countries. The study suggests that monetary policy targeting inflation has a much 
stronger impact in developing countries compared to developed countries. However, 
Ball (2010) argues that in Goncalvez and Salles’s (2008) study, 5 of the non inflation 
targeting countries including Argentina and Bulgaria, had pegged exchange rate 
regimes and hard pegs increase output volatility. Therefore, the finding that inflation 
targeting reduces output volatility compared to hard pegged regimes is ambiguous.  
The study of Ball and Sheridan (2003) has also been criticised by Vega and 
Winkelried (2005), who argue that the former study might have suffered from sample 
selection bias. Any inflation targeting countries with poor performance before the 
adoption of an inflation targeting policy should be compared with equally poor 
performing non-inflation targeting countries, otherwise the comparison would be 
biased and misleading. Using a propensity score matching technique for cross country 
data of a treatment sample of 23 inflation targeting and 86 non inflation targeting 
countries, their central finding supports the idea that the adoption of inflation targeting, 
either in soft or explicit form, delivers the theoretically promised outcome of low 
inflation (around a fixed target or within a target range) as well as low inflation 
volatility. Inflation targeting countries have lower long-term inflation rates, ranging 
from 2.6% to 4%, with lower long term inflation volatilities ranging from 1.5% to 
2.0%. Their findings also confirm that the adoption of an inflation targeting policy 
contributed to a reduction in inflation persistence across developing countries. Lin and 
Ye (2007, 2009), taking the same approach, find that an inflation targeting regime has 
impacts in the non-industrialised countries but not in the industrialised countries. 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), using quarterly data for 21 advanced and 
emerging inflation targeting countries along with 13 non-inflation targeting 
industrialised countries from 1989 to 2004, adopted an instrumental variable approach 
to compare and evaluate the performance of inflation targeting and non-inflation 
targeting countries. They find that emerging inflation targeting countries outperformed 
the industrialised inflation targeting countries in terms of reducing average inflation 
rates as well as both inflation and output volatilities. Inflation volatility in industrialised 
inflation targeting countries was twice the size of the volatility in the industrialised 
non-inflation targeting countries. However, inflation targeting countries have lower 
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inflation persistence. Despite achieving some favourable improvements, their findings 
do not suggest that the inflation targeting countries outperformed the control group of 
non-inflation targeting countries in terms of improved monetary policy. Their findings 
imply that some industrialised countries have been able to obtain a strong nominal 
anchor without resorting to inflation targeting monetary policy framework. 
Nevertheless, gains from inflation targeting seem to be quite significant in emerging 
countries. One of the drawbacks of their analysis is the use of lagged inflation targeting 
dummy as an instrument. Ball (2010) argues that if an inflation targeting dummy is 
affected by other variables affecting inflation, then the lagged inflation targeting 
dummy will also be guilty of the same charge.  
Nevertheless, findings by a number of other studies also suggest that the 
performance of inflation targeting is better in emerging countries compare to developed 
countries. Surveying a number of studies, Walsh (2009) concludes that the achievement 
of an inflation targeting regime is significant in developing countries compared to their 
developed counterparts. Goncalves and Salles (2008) pointed out that central banks in 
advanced countries are likely to have higher credibility and expertise than those in 
emerging countries. Thus, the policymakers of advanced countries already have an 
advantage compared to those of emerging countries and as a result have very little to 
gain from this policy framework. Therefore, an inflation targeting regime is much more 
effective in providing discipline to the monetary policy of emerging countries, 
therefore overall gain is also much more significant for this group. 
3.2.8 Endogeneity of the Regime Choice  
Monetary policy regimes are endogenous to various factors. However, the endogeneity 
of the regimes does not have an impact on our classification exercise as the 
classification exercise is mainly ex-post by nature. There are three main competing 
approaches to explaining the choice of exchange rate regime. These are i) the optimal 
currency area (OCA) theory which relates to the choice of regime to a country’s trade 
links, size, openness and the characteristics of the shocks the economy is subjected to 
(Mundell, 1961);  ii) the financial view, which highlights the consequences of 
international financial integration; and iii) and the political view, which regards the use 
of a peg (or, more generally, an exchange rate anchor) as a “policy crutch” for the lack 
of (nominal and institutional) credibility of the governments. 
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Rather than considering all of the three aspects together, most of the empirical 
studies on the determinants of regime choice focused on either one of these aspects. For 
example, the study by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) focused on the implication of 
the optimal currency area theory. They find that the theory of optimal currency areas 
help to explain the patterns of exchange rate variability and interventions across 21 
industrialised countries over the period 1963 to 1992. The study by Levy-Yeyati et al. 
(2010), using Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) classification of exchange rate regimes, 
provides a comprehensive study on all of the contending hypotheses for regimes 
endogeneity. They find that when all factors are considered jointly, the choice of 
exchange rate regime can be traced back to a few simple determinants that include a 
combination of trade, financial and political variables. The means by which countries 
choose their exchange rate regime in response to these basic determinants have not 
changed substantially over the last two decades. They find that size of a country, 
openness, terms of trade shocks, financial developments and political stability are 
important factors for regime choice. Weak governments appear to be less prone to 
implement and sustain pegs, however the finding is not strongly applicable for 
developed countries. 
 
3.2.9 Contribution of the current study 
The current work extends previous studies by conducting the de 
facto classification of all the monetary policy regimes for 123 countries over the period 
1970 to 2012, and also comparing the regimes’ performances in terms of growth and 
inflation. We argue that classifying exchange rate regimes without reference to the 
underlying monetary policy framework would be misleading. For example, consider 
the Euro and the European Central Bank (ECB). Almost all exchange rate classification 
studies classify the countries within the Euro area as operating fixed exchange rate 
regimes. However, this does not acknowledge the Euro-wide setting of monetary policy 
by the ECB. Monetary policy within the Euro area is not similar to the monetary policy 
of countries within the CFA Franc zone that operate fixed (or pegged) exchange rate 
regimes. Treating both groups of countries in the same way and ignoring the monetary 
policy frameworks would be misleading. 
As mentioned previously, Bailliu et al. (2003) focused on applying the 
monetary-policy framework along with the exchange-rate regime. However, there are 
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some drawbacks. The study does not, when it arises, explain how to resolve a conflict 
between exchange rate and monetary policy anchors. They have not explicitly 
identified other monetary policy regimes such as inflation and monetary targeting. The 
countries with implicit monetary policy targeting are also not taken into account and 
considered as non-anchoring countries. 
The current study attempts to improve the de facto classification of monetary 
policy regimes (Exchange rate regimes, IT regimes and MT regimes) for a sample of 
123 countries. In order to classify exchange rate regimes, we have used the volatility of 
exchange rates, volatility of changes in exchange rates and the volatility ratio of the 
changes in exchange rates to changes in reserves (RVER). Instead of using normal 
standard deviations, we measure the volatility of exchange rates by the movements of 
exchange rates around the mean, eliminating the largest 10% outliers from the mean 
(both positive and negative) in order to reduce the problem of outliers. For each country 
the appropriate anchor currency is chosen by checking the parity with a number of 
currencies and choosing the reference currency with the highest parity. The reference 
currencies are the US Dollar, British Pound, German Mark (pre 1999), French Franc 
(pre 1999), Euro, Indian Rupee, Japanese Yen, SDR and NEER. A further sub-
category, termed as ‘freely falling’ is included in the analysis if the rate of inflation is 
20 % or more in any country with a freely floating or managed floating exchange rate 
regimes. 
De facto classifications of the other monetary policy regimes are equally 
important as de facto classifications of exchange rate regimes. More than 10% of the 
regimes are classified as de facto inflation targeting and monetary targeting regimes, 
which were considered as some type of exchange rate regimes by the previous studies. 
The de facto inflation targeting regimes have been classified on the basis of inflation 
rates, changes in inflation rates and policy interest rates. Most of the inflation targeting 
countries have a medium term goal to achieve the targeted rate. Therefore, for the de 
jure inflation targeting countries, we have not classified the regime as de facto inflation 
targeting if the particular country failed to achieve the targeted rate for two or more 
consecutive periods. Only 22% of the time the de jure inflation targeting regime was 
not consistent enough to be classified as a de facto inflation targeting regime, whereas 
nearly 60% of the time these countries missed their targets. There are several reasons 
why an IT country may not achieve the target range. The main argument is based on the 
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constrained discretionary nature of the inflation targeting regime. It gives the policy 
makers of IT countries considerable leeway for responding to economic shocks and 
financial crises. Many IT countries during the recent financial crisis tried to address 
other issues. Therefore, the action to prioritise other economic goals such as growth and 
unemployment is deliberate. 
We have also developed a classification criterion for non-inflation targeting 
countries in order to identify some of the periods as de facto inflation targeting 
countries. For industrialised countries, if the inflation rate is ≤ 2.5% with a lower 
volatility for three or more consecutive periods and volatility of the interest rate is ≥ 
1%, we have classified the regime as de facto inflation targeting. The episodes are 
followed by a converging targeting period when inflation is falling constantly and the 
rate of change is negative with a volatility of policy rates ≥ 1.  Notable countries are the 
US, ECB, Germany and Switzerland. For many years, US monetary policy has been 
consistent with an implicit goal of price stability to maintain the target of growth and 
unemployment. Monetary policy in Germany and Switzerland is quite successful in 
achieving low inflation rates. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) suggested that monetary 
policy in Germany and Switzerland might best be thought of as a hybrid of inflation 
and monetary targeting, with a strategy closer to inflation targeting than monetary 
targeting in Friedman’s sense. Price stability is also an overriding goal for the ECB. For 
non-industrialised countries, if the inflation rate is ≤ 3% with a lower volatility and the 
volatility of the policy rate is ≥ 1%, the period has been classified as de facto inflation 
targeting. 
  We have identified some regimes for 11 countries over the period 1991 to 2012 
as de facto monetary targeting regimes. Such regimes have been classified on the basis 
of changes in broad money, narrow money and the interest rate. If the growth rate of 
both broad and narrow money is ≤ 10% and the variability of the interest rate is ≥ 1%, 
we have identified the regime as monetary targeting. There are few episodes where a 
regime falls into both categories. We have classified those regimes based on the 
appropriate monetary policy criteria.
41
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  Table A3. 6 in Appendix 3.2 provides a list of all the regimes we have classified in our study and table 
A3.5 explains the coding of the regimes.  
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The performance of alternative exchange rate regimes and contribution of the 
current study 
Based on our de facto classification, we attempt to evaluate the impact of the regimes 
on growth and inflation. Studies like Bailliu et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2002) used 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators to address the problem of 
endogeneity. However, one of the problems of using GMM in a panel with large N and 
large T is that the asymptotics are different from large N and small T. The Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM estimators, which pool individual groups and only allow the 
intercepts to differ across groups is not consistent for this type of panel. Thus, instead 
of using GMM, we have applied pooled mean group estimation (PMG) suggested by 
Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1997, 1999) for dynamic panels to evaluate the performance. 
Since it involves pooling and averaging, PMG is an intermediate estimator between 
dynamic fixed effects (DFE) and mean group estimation. PMG allows short run 
coefficients, the speed of adjustment and error variances to differ across groups but 
imposes homogeneity in long run coefficients. This method has been used in growth 
studies for a number of years (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). We deemed the method 
to be appropriate for our panel data set of 123 countries over the period 1980 to 2012 
and for the first time we attempt to use this method to evaluate regime performance.   
The findings from the PMG estimations suggest that fixed exchange rate 
regimes are more growth enhancing for both industrialised and developing countries. 
IT regime has greater positive influence in developing countries compared to 
industrialised countries (where the regime has not outperformed the other regimes). For 
both groups of countries, monetary policy regimes with some sort of nominal anchors 
are more growth enhancing. Inflation is lower for both groups of countries over the 
inflation and monetary targeting regimes. Additionally, fixed exchange rate regimes 
have the lowest inflation. Inflation is significantly lower and growth is significantly 
higher for the regimes with nominal anchors for both groups of countries. Our findings, 
therefore, suggest that the presence of some form of monetary policy anchor is 
beneficial for economic performance. 
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3.3: Methodology 
3.3.1 Classification criteria for monetary policy regimes 
Monetary policy has evolved significantly over the last few decades. In a survey of 94 
central banks, Fry (2000) find that only 4 central banks had either an explicit or actual 
target for monetary policy, however this has grown to 40 by 1998. The survey reveals 
that 74% of the central banks consider transparency a vital or very important 
component of their monetary policy framework. Securing credibility is the main reason 
for adopting explicit targets like inflation targeting or monetary targeting regimes (Fry, 
2000). Bernanke and Mishkin (1999) observed that central banks occasionally conduct 
monetary policy on pure discretionary strategy; they never adhere to strict, ironclad 
rules. They observed that a common strategy for most of the central banks resembles a 
hybrid of rules and discretion. Based on this strategy, central banks attempt to apply 
rules to its medium term and long term policies, while at the same time retains 
flexibility or discretion to respond to the existing economic conditions in the short 
term.
42
 
Empirical evidence during the monetary targeting regimes suggests that many 
central banks deviated from the targeted path. More than half of the time inflation 
targeting regimes across countries also failed to obtain the targeted rate of inflation 
(Roger, 2010). However, a major advantage of an inflation targeting policy framework 
is that it combines two distinct elements of rules and discretion, which includes a 
precise numerical target for inflation in the medium term and a response to economic 
shocks in the short term. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to verify if these deviations 
are consistent with the publicly declared policy. 
The following sub sections provide the statistical algorithms for classifying 
monetary policy regimes and also explain the criteria for regime classification. We used 
statistical algorithms to categorise the monetary policy regimes. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
show the statistical algorithms. The period for yearly classifications includes monthly 
data from 1970 to 2012 for 123 countries. The sources of data are International 
Financial statistics (IFS), World Development Indicators (WDI) and various central 
banks websites. 
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 Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) find their observation challenges the simple view that pure rules and 
pure discretion are the only policy strategies available.   
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3.3.1.1 Algorithms for exchange rate classifications 
The yearly exchange rate classification is done by the time series of several measures 
of exchange rate flexibility from monthly data and three years rolling window. Three 
classification variables are used for the yearly classification of exchange rate regimes; 
i) Volatility of exchange rate, ii) Volatility of change in exchange rate, iii) Ratio of the 
volatilities of change in both exchange rates and reserves (RVER). Six regimes have 
been classified on the basis of these criteria. The seventh regime, ‘freely falling’ has 
been classified for a managed float or free float regime, if the inflation rate is 20% or 
more. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarise the algorithms for the exchange rate regime 
classifications.  
If the volatility of the exchange rate is > 5 %, depending on the RVER, the 
regime is defined as managed float or free float. The reason is that RVER will not 
exceed 33 % most of the time for any exchange rate regime within ±5% flexibility band 
accompanied by a 10% volatility of change in reserves (the justification for 10% 
reserve volatility is discussed below).
43
 A ≤ 50 % threshold has been determined in 
order to distinguish between managed floating and free floating regimes (≥ 50%). Any 
regime in these categories with high inflation (inflation rate of 20% or more) has been 
categorised as a freely falling exchange rate regime. However, pegged regimes with a ≤ 
20% inflation rate have not been classified as freely falling. The reference currency has 
been chosen on the basis of the highest correlation across a number of currencies such 
as the US dollar, the UK pound, German mark, SDR, NEER, Japanese yen and Indian 
rupee. For example, the Indian rupee has been selected as the reference currency for 
Nepal based on the highest level of correlation between these two currencies. 
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To minimise the problem of outliers, the volatility of exchange rate regimes has been defined by the 
movement of the exchange rates within 80% of the distribution.  
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Table 3.2: Algorithms for exchange rate regimes classification 
Exchange 
Rate target 
Volatility of 
Exchange rate 
Classification algorithms   for 
Exchange rate regimes  (ER) 
RVER (Volatility of 
change in Exchange 
rate to international 
Reserve) 
Hard peg/ fixed 
1%≤ 
 
ER1%≤ 
Volatility* of  ER≤3% 
≤ 33% 
 
Soft peg stable 
 
>1% but 2.25%≤ 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER ≤5% 
 
≤ 33% 
 
Soft peg 
converging 
 
>2.25% but 3%≤ 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER ≤7% 
 
≤ 33% 
 
Soft peg 
converging in 
a wider band 
 
>3% but ≤ 5% 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER 
≤10% 
 
≤ 33% 
 
Managed 
exchange rate 
(with no pre-
specific bands) 
 
>5% with higher 
volatility of 
Reserve 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER >5% 
 
<50% 
 
Floating with 
very less 
intervention 
 
>5% with lower 
volatility of 
Reserve 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER >5% 
 
≥50% 
 
Floating rates 
with inflation 
rates ≥ 20% 
 
Volatility high 
with higher 
inflation 
 
ER within the band and 
Volatility of change in ER >5% 
 
≥50% 
 
*To avoid the impact of sudden drastic appreciation or depreciation of exchange rates, we exclude 20% of the 
extreme outliers from the mean.  
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Justification for the exchange rate regime algorithms 
Volatility of exchange rates and volatility of change in exchange rates have 
been used quite extensively in the exchange rate classification literature. However, only 
the volatility of exchange rates or volatility of changes of exchange rates would give 
partial information to define exchange rate regimes. The level of reserves across 
countries differs substantially (Haussmann et al., 2001). To control exchange rate 
movements, a country need to have large reserve as a backup. Thus, Levy-Yeyati et al. 
(2005) used volatility of international reserves as an additional variable for 
classification. An important drawback of isolating the volatility of changes in reserves 
or volatility of exchange rates is that both of them are vulnerable to external economic 
shocks and therefore can be misleading. However, the relative volatility of change in 
exchange rates and international reserves could be a better alternative for flexibility of 
the exchange rates. In extreme cases of fixed exchange rates, the ratio would approach 
zero and grow larger if exchange rate volatility increases compare to that of reserves. 
The threshold volatility of reserves is 10%. We view this as a suitable benchmark to 
compare the flexibility of exchange rates, as most industrialised floaters keep the stock 
of reserves below 10 % of their M2 money supply (Hausmann et al. (2001). 
The usual standard deviation measures of exchange rate volatility could be 
misleading as it becomes vulnerable to the presence of any outliers. Previous studies 
take various measures to overcome this issue. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
used mean absolute deviations to minimise the impact of outliers. Levy Yeyati et al. 
(2005) used the average of the absolute monthly percentage change of nominal 
exchange rate over a calendar year. We measure the volatility of exchange rate by 
excluding the 20% outlying observations. This will reduce the divergence from the 
mean and minimise the problem of outliers as well as give an accurate measure of the 
dispersion of exchange rates. 
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Table 3.3: Other Exchange rate arrangements 
No separate legal  tender  
 
Currency  Union / Monetary Union  
Adoption of a single currency and common central bank by a group of countries. The 
use of standard instruments of monetary policy is consigned and exercised solely by the 
central monetary authority (Tavlas et al., 2008).  
 
Currency Board  
Issues notes and coins convertible on demand under all circumstances, at a fixed rate of 
exchange, against a foreign anchor currency (Humpage and McIntire, 1995). It has no 
discretionary monetary power and cannot extend credit.  
 
Dollarization or Euroisation   
Country officially adopts foreign currency as legal tender and local currency 
completely replaced by foreign currency.  
 
 
3.3.1.2 Inflation and monetary targeting regimes 
Table 3.4 summarises the algorithms we have used for the yearly classification of 
inflation and monetary targeting regimes. We follow the definition of Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) for our classification of inflation targeting regime. The targeted 
rates are adjusted downward during the convergence period, typically over a calendar 
year. During a stable targeting period, inflation targets are fixed at a constant level or 
range for an indefinite period. We defined a converging IT regime if the rate of change 
of inflation is negative and the inflation rate is higher but falling gradually compared to 
the pre-targeting periods, and the volatility of the policy rate is ≥1% for two or more 
consecutive periods and the inflation rate settles at a lower stable rate after that for 
three or more consecutive years. Reference inflation rates or ranges for inflation 
targeting countries depend on the formal rates. 
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Monetary targeting regimes are defined on the basis of the growth rates of both 
narrow and broad money. A regime is defined as de facto monetary targeting if the 
volatility of monetary growth rate is ≤10% and the rate of change is ≤5%, and the 
volatility of change in policy rates is ≥1%. 10% growth rate is decided on the basis of 
empirical evidence of monetary growth target pursued by many monetary targeting 
countries over the 1980s.
44
 
Justification for the inflation targeting and monetary targeting regime criteria  
Typically, an inflation targeting regime has a pre-targeting disinflationary 
period. The regime shifts to a formal inflation targeting regime once the inflation rate 
settles down at a lower stable rate, typically around 3% (Roger, 2010). Roger (2010) 
demonstrates that high income countries typically start the process of disinflation at a 
rate of around 6% whilst emerging countries start at a higher rate, around 8%.  
The average inflation for industrialised inflation targeting countries is around 
2.2% and for developing countries 3% (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Roger et 
al., 2009). We have used these rates for the benchmark inflation to classify de facto 
inflation targeting regimes. Inflation targeting rates for the de jure inflation targeting 
countries also depend on the various levels of official inflation targeting range over the 
period 1989 to 2012. A country has not been classified as having a de facto inflation 
targeting regime if the target is missed over two or more consecutive periods. The 
reason behind this is that almost all inflation targeting countries share a medium term 
horizon of almost two years. An inflation targeting policy framework grants more 
flexibility. The targets are typically defined as a medium term goal due to the lag 
effects of 2 to 3 years. This strategy also allows addressing other objectives such as 
smoothing output fluctuations, growth and unemployment. Therefore, an inflation 
targeting policy framework provides a rule-like framework, which allows the central 
bank the discretion to respond to shocks.   
There is a mismatch between theory and practice in terms of targeting inflation. 
Ideally, on the basis of theory, inflation should be zero (according to the New 
Keynesian paradigm), or negative (according to the Friedman rule). However, in 
practice the inflation target cannot be zero. Part of the reason is purely statistical. 
Measured inflation tends to overstate actual inflation by around 0.5 percentage points. 
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  Table A2.1 and A2.2 summarised the inflation targeting dates. 
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It has been argued that the cost of disinflation is greater than the cost of inflation. 
Hence, targeting a positive rate of inflation reduces the probability of inflation hitting a 
zero lower bound on nominal rates. 
Table 3.4: Algorithms for inflation and monetary targeting regime classification 
Regimes  
 
Criteria  
 
Inflation Targeting: Stable  
 
Inflation rate ≤2.5% (For inflation targeting countries 
official inflation rates are used as a reference). 
Inflation rate ≤3% for developing country (also 
depends on the targeted inflation rate).
45
 
 
Inflation Targeting: 
Converging  
 
Inflation rate >3%*, change of inflation ≤0, 
volatility≥1% and inflation is stable at a lower rate for 
a few consecutive years.  
 
Monetary targets: Stable  
 
Growth rate of both narrow and broad measure of 
money ≤10%, and standard deviation ≤5%. Volatility 
of policy interest rate ≥1%. **  
 
Monetary targets: Converging  
 
Rate of change in the growth rates of narrow and 
broad money ≤0 or falling. Volatility of policy 
interest rate ≥1% and is stable at a lower rate for a 
few consecutive years.  
 
Others  
Monetary or Exchange rate 
policy with multiple targets  
 
The episodes which are not in any of the pre specified 
targeting groups, therefore covers a whole range of 
intermediate exchange rate regimes. 
*Both the growth rates of broad money and narrow money have been used for monetary growth  
**Volatility of inflation and interest rates are measured by the standard deviation of levels and changes respectively.  
 
The average monetary growth target during the late 1970s and 1980s was 
around 10% by the US and many other industrialised countries.
46
 Hence, the 10% target 
rate has been adopted for the monetary targeting countries. Since there is a lack of 
                                                 
45 Table A3.1 in Appendix 3.1 summarises the inflation rate for the de facto inflation targeting countries 
during the converging and stable inflation targeting period. The official inflation rate has been used for 
the de jure inflation targeting countries. 
 
46
 See, for example Friedman (1988) for detailed analysis.  
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evidence regarding the official monetary targets and data availability of the benchmark 
monetary aggregates, we used the growth rate of both broad and narrow money as the 
references. 
 
3.3.1.3 Regimes that fall into both monetary and inflation targeting regimes 
The main goal of nominal targeting was to achieve lower and stable inflation 
and maintain stable nominal income over the late 1970s and 1980s (Mishkin, 2002). 
Therefore, a lower level of inflation indicates a deliberate action of the monetary 
authority. A regime has been classified as a de facto inflation targeting regime if it 
qualifies at the same time as both a monetary targeting and inflation targeting regime. 
Monetary targeting involves adopting a target of monetary growth every year. It 
is based on the assumption that controlling money growth allows control over inflation 
and nominal income.
47
 The reference supply of money for a monetary target varies over 
time and differs across countries. Nevertheless, the target usually refers to slightly 
broader aggregates than base money.
48
 One of the main benefits of monetary targeting 
is that the data on money supply is usually more available and more quickly accessible 
than other data, which provides early information on the short term inflation outlook. 
Also, the nominal money supply is perceived to be more directly controllable than 
inflation itself.  
 
                                                 
47
 The origin of this assumption is a popular identity by Irving Fisher known as ‘the quantity equation’ or 
‘the equation of exchanges’. According to this identity the value of all economic transactions (more 
generally all nominal income generated in an economy) has to be paid with money. It implies that money 
in circulation times money velocity must be equivalent to nominal income. Because of the neutrality of 
money in the long run, change in the nominal money stock has no impact on change in real output but 
can have an impact on inflation as long as money velocity is constant. 
48
 The broader aggregates refer to the currency in circulation, sight deposits, and time deposits with 
unrestricted access. 
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3.4 Findings from regime classification 
3.4.1: Distribution of the de facto monetary policy regimes 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of de facto monetary policy regimes over the period 
1970 to 2012 for 123 countries. Fixed exchange rates seem to be a popular choice over 
the 1970s, covering almost 90% of monetary policy regimes. Apparently, the de jure 
exchange rate regimes for many countries have become flexible since the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system. However, the share of fixed exchange rates started to fall 
gradually over the early 1990s and is taken over by intermediate exchange rate regimes. 
The percentage of hard pegged regimes is reduced by 34% up until 2012. A falling 
share of peg has been taken over by free float and intermediate exchange rate 
regimes.
49
 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, many countries tried to find an 
alternative exchange rate management policy. Eventually, monetary targeting and 
inflation targeting frameworks started to take over. MT had been the choice of 
exchange rate regimes for many industrialised countries over the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, growing instability of the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal 
variables such as inflation or nominal income caused this monetary policy strategy to 
fail in many countries. Some non-industrialised countries still use monetary targeting as 
their official framework.  
By 2005, IT covered almost 24% of monetary policy regimes. However, many 
IT countries changed their priority to cope with the economic turmoil during the most 
recent financial crisis. However, the hard pegged regime still dominates, covering 
almost 40% of all monetary policy regimes. The following sub sections carry out an 
elaborate description of the findings from monetary policy regime classification.  
                                                 
49
 By intermediate regime we refer to the exchange rate band from 2.25 % to < 5 %.  
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of de facto monetary policy regimes: 1970-2012 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents the percentage. 
 
For example, between 1970 and 2012 in the UK and US, monetary policy regimes have 
changed almost 11 times according to our classification. Several decades have been 
concerned with searching for a suitable nominal anchor for the price level and for 
credibility of the government to maintain a low and stable inflationary environment. Up 
to 1973, monetary policy regime in the UK is classified as a fixed exchange rate 
regime, and from 1974 to 1991 the regime is classified as a managed float or flexible 
exchange rate regime. From 1992 to 1996, the monetary policy regime is classified as 
converging towards a stable inflation targeting regime. Since 1997, and until 2007, the 
regime in the UK is classified as inflation targeting. 
 
In the UK, the monetary targeting regime was adopted officially in July 1976. 
However, most of the time, the authority had to overshoot their targets and inflation 
accelerated in the late 1970s. The medium-term financial strategy was introduced under 
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, which proposed a gradual deceleration of M3 growth. 
Unfortunately, the M3 targets ran into problems similar to those of the M1 targets in 
the US as they were not reliable indicators to tighten up monetary policy. After 1983, 
arguing that financial innovation was creating havoc with the relationship between M3 
and national income, the Bank of England began to de-emphasise M3 in favor of a 
narrower monetary aggregate, M0 (the monetary base). The target for M3 was 
temporarily suspended in October 1985 and was completely abandoned in 1987. From 
March 1987 to 1990 the pound was informally linked to Deutsche Mark and from 
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October 1990 to September 1992, the UK was a member of ERM. From October 1992, 
the Bank of England received its operational independence. Since then inflation rates 
started to converge to a lower level and from 1997 the Bank of England has officially 
adopted inflation targeting.  
 
The monetary policy regime in the US has changed seven times, mostly 
between the two alternative regimes: a flexible exchange rate regime and a de facto 
inflation targeting regime. Similar to the UK, since 1991 inflation rates have started to 
converge to a lower rate. Since 1977 the goals of US monetary policy are prescribed as 
the promotion of price stability, and sustainable output and employment. Up until the 
1990s, US monetary policy is mostly classified as a flexible exchange rate regime. The 
regime of the European Central Bank (ECB) is classified as de facto inflation targeting 
as maintaining price stability is one of the primary monetary objective of the ECB. 
 
The monetary policy regime in Guatemala has been changed over eight times. 
Inflation rates started to converge to a lower level since 2005. However, the exchange 
rate was virtually fixed. Bank of Guatemala (BoG) has incorporated exchange rate 
movements into its policy analysis. In 2005, BoG adopted a rule-based mechanism for 
intervening in the foreign exchange markets. BoG officially identifies the exchange rate 
as one of the transmission channels of monetary policy. One of the main reasons is high 
exchange rate pass through, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the monetary 
authority is to pursue an inflation targeting regime. 
 
3.4.2 Exchange rate regimes 
3.4.2.1 Bipolar Hypothesis 
Soft peg and intermediate regimes are widely viewed by many as an unsustainable 
choice. The impossible trinity suggests that in countries with open capital accounts, a 
traditional soft peg has proved to be unsustainable in the long run as it is prone to 
financial crises (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Policymakers involved in dealing with 
crises over the 1980s and 1990s have warned strongly against the adjustable peg or 
other soft peg exchange rate regimes for open economies. As a consequence, many 
countries preferred bipolar or corner solutions. A number of empirical studies try to 
verify the evidence of bipolar solutions opted for by many countries. Notably, Ghosh et 
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al. (2002) tried to verify this by arranging the IMF de jure classifications for 150 
countries into a six-way classification and by placing the hard pegs, currency boards 
and dollarized countries into a single basket. Their findings suggest that the proportion 
of intermediate regimes have declined by 34 percentage points between 1975 and 1999. 
Levy Yeyati et al. (2005) also came up with similar findings. Their de facto 
classification also reveals a hollowing out pattern over the 1990s, but the move to the 
corners was slower and less pronounced.  
Our analysis also suggests a less pronounced move away from the intermediate 
regimes since the late 1990s. Intermediate regimes are found to be dominant in the 
1990s. However, the share of intermediate regimes dropped by 12 percentage points 
(from almost 40% to 28%) over the last decade. Despite the falling share since 1970 
(almost 57 percentage points), pegged regimes still remain a popular choice for many 
countries, covering almost 40% of all regimes in 2012. Figure 3.2 represents the 
distribution of de facto exchange rate regimes between 1970 and 2012.  
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of the de facto exchange rate regimes: 1970 to 2012 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents the percentage. 
Table 3.5 below presents the pair wise correlation of the current study with the 
IMF and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classifications. 30% of the time, our classification 
compares to the IMF official classifications and 45% of the time to Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004).  
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Table 3.5: Pair wise correlation with Reinhart and Rogoff (RR) and IMF de facto 
classifications 
Coding  IMF  RR Current 
Classification 
IMF  1.00   
RR  0.42 1.00  
Current 
Classification  
0.30 0.45 1.00 
 
3.4.2.2 Fear of floating and hidden peg 
The IMF de jure classification overestimated pegged regimes (exchange rate band ≤ 
2%) more than 11% of the time and it overestimated free float regimes around 6 % of 
the time, compared to the current classification. The share of intermediate regimes is 
higher in the current classification, around 8%, compared to the RR and IMF 
classifications. The share of free fall regimes is also 8% more, compared to the RR 
(2004) classification. One of the main reasons for this is that our classification 
categorised regimes as freely falling if a managed float or free float had an inflation 
rate over 20%, whereas RR categorised a regime as freely falling if the inflation rate 
was over 40%. The IMF de facto classification suggest only 0.13% of regimes are 
freely falling. Table 3.6 summarises the discrepancies between the three regime 
classifications. 
Table 3.6: Percentage of regimes in different classifications 
Classification  Pegged  Intermediate  Free Float  Free Fall  
RR 64.41% 25.56% 8.30% 1.73% 
IMF 55.12% 27.10% 17.67% 0.13% 
The current study  44% 34% 12% 10% 
3.4.3 De facto inflation targeting and monetary targeting regimes 
3.4.3.1: Experience with inflation and monetary targeting regimes 
To classify the de facto inflation targeting countries, official inflation targeting 
rates have been used as the reference for de jure inflation targeting countries. During 
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the convergence period, the inflation target could be greater than 7% for de jure 
inflation targeting countries. However, both target rates and ranges drop significantly 
over the course of the inflation targeting period. The official rate of the inflation target 
varies from 1% to 3% for de jure industrialised countries. The inflation targeting range 
varies from ± 2.5%. Republic of Korea has the narrowest target of 3% (within ± 1% 
band). According to the current classification, inflation rates during the convergence 
period for non-industrialised countries started from as high as 23%. The official 
inflation target during the stable periods for both Peru and Czech Republic is 2%. 
Poland has a target of 2.5 %. Chile, Hungary and Mexico all have a 3% target and 
Colombia has a target range of 2% to 4%. Ghana has the highest inflation targeting rate 
of 8.7%. The average targeting horizon is 2 years for most countries.
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Roger (2010) finds that, on average, inflation targeting countries missed their 
target 60% of the time. Similarly, our estimation suggests that over 60% of the time, 
targeting countries missed the targets. However, only about a third of the time has our 
classification criteria categorised the periods as inconsistent with an inflation targeting 
regime, therefore categorising the regime as non-IT. In other words, the finding implies 
that only 22% of the time we have not identified the de jure IT regimes as de facto IT 
regimes.
51
 
Non-industrialised inflation targeting countries missed the target more than their 
industrialised counterparts. 26% of the time, our classification criteria suggests that 
periods of inflation targeting for non-industrialised countries are not consistent with the 
policy. Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that this group has gained most from 
adopting an IT regime, with respect to reducing inflation and enhancing economic 
growth.   
3.4.3.2 The reasons for missing the inflation targets 
Inflation targeting is a constrained discretionary process. The policy makers pursue the 
medium run goal of inflation, with flexibility in the short run to address other economic 
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 Table A3.1 in appendix A3.1 provides the inflation rates and range for the de jure IT countries with the 
date of adoption.  
51
  Not classified as a de facto inflation targeting periods if the targeted inflation rate misses for two or 
more consecutive years.  
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urgencies.
52
 According to Bernanke (2003), inflation targeting is a compromise 
between rules and discretion. This approach of conducting monetary policy is 
increasingly becoming the standard of the new era. During the onset of the current 
financial crisis, some industrialised countries targeting inflation tried to address other 
economic issues. The priority of targeting inflation has been shifted toward some other 
goals. Based on the priority, therefore, it would not be misleading to classify them only 
as de jure rather than de facto inflation targeting countries. For example, the UK is one 
such country. On the inflation briefing, former governor of Bank of England Mervyn 
King iterated that the prospect of a further prolonged period of above-target inflation 
must be considered together with the weakness of the real economy.
53
 He suggested 
that any attempt to reduce inflation back to the target sooner would risk derailing the 
economic recovery and undershooting the target in the medium term. 
3.4.3.3 The case of non-industrialised countries 
Inflation targeting depends on some stringent preconditions, rendering the framework 
particularly unsuitable for many emerging economies. The essential preconditions 
include, for example, the technical capability of the central bank to implement inflation 
targeting, the absence of fiscal dominance, well-functioning financial markets and an 
efficient institutional setup. That is one of the main reasons why emerging countries 
miss their targets. 
Emerging market and developing inflation targeting countries face a number of 
challenges that are different from developed countries. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) 
highlighted five major challenges for non-industrialised inflation targeting countries. 
Such as: 1) weak public sector financial management, 2) weak financial sector 
institutions and markets, 3) low monetary policy credibility, 4) the extensive 
dollarization of financial liabilities, 5) vulnerability to sharp changes in the capital 
flows and international investor sentiment. Moreover, many of these countries face 
greater uncertainty regarding the structure of their economy, monetary transmission 
mechanism and cyclical position of the economy, compared to developed IT countries 
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 Constrained discretionary approach allows monetary policy authorities the flexibility to respond to 
economic shocks, financial upheavals, and other unforeseen economic issues.  
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 The Guardian, 13 February, 2013.  
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(Roger, 2010). That is one of the main reasons why many developing countries 
frequently miss their targets.  
  
We find that Peru, Poland, Mexico, Ghana and South Africa missed their targets 
most frequently among developing countries. Countries such as South Africa, Israel 
and Thailand do not have a point based inflation target, rather these countries use 
ranges for their targets. Klein (2012) finds that in South Africa, this lack of 
transparency gives the monetary authority greater discretionary choice. Using a state 
space approach, Klein (2012) showed that in South Africa, although the official 
inflation range is 3% to 6%, in practice the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has 
mostly aimed at the upper segment of the band, despite the resulting substantial 
variation in the output gap. The study also suggests that the implicit target varies over 
time; in recent years it has shifted toward the upper limit of the inflation target range. 
The findings also suggest that since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, SARB 
has become more tolerant towards higher levels of inflation to better support economic 
activity, in the face of an extremely challenging global environment. 
 
For the case of Ghana, the inflation targeting experience is less than 
satisfactory. Inflation rose above 10% from mid-2007 to above 20% by early 2009. The 
high inflation in Ghana was mainly caused by fiscal and non-monetary issues. Poland 
had some unsuccessful periods of inflation targeting from 1999 to 2002. The lack of 
well organised money markets, depreciation of the zloty and agricultural shocks are 
amongst the main reasons for Poland’s unsuccessful periods.  
 
There is evidence that IT countries with a history of high and unstable inflation 
tend to intervene in nominal exchange rates for conducting monetary policy (Edwards, 
2006). This is pervasive, particularly in Guatemala. The exchange rate regime of 
Guatemala is comparable to a pegged regime. The conventional wisdom has long 
suggested that an inflation targeting central bank should not react directly to exchange 
rate movements, but only so far as they affect the outlook of inflation and output 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). However for many emerging countries, maintaining such 
a benign approach to the exchange rate might not have been feasible. This is 
specifically true for economies with a higher dependency on foreign currencies and 
limited access to international capital markets (Roger, 2010). Financial systems with a 
higher dependence on foreign currency tends to exaggerate the importance of the 
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exchange rate change relative to domestic interest movements in policy transmission. 
In such circumstances, leaning against exchange rate movements has been appropriate 
in order to improve macroeconomic performance under inflation targeting (Moron and 
Winkelried, 2005; Roger et al., 2009; Roger, 2010). The case for Guatemala certainly 
confirms this fact.  
 
3.4.4 Non inflation targeting countries 
We have categorised 74 periods from 1991 to 2012 for 12 non-inflation targeting 
countries and the ECB as de facto inflation targeting regimes. The monetary policy of 
the US, ECB, Germany (pre euro) and Switzerland is consistent with an implicit 
inflation targeting framework.
54
 Goodfriend (2003) argues that the success of US 
monetary policy over the 1980s and 1990s can be attributed, in large part, to inflation-
targeting policy procedures that the Fed has adapted gradually and implicitly over the 
last two decades. Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) argue that the monetary policy of 
Germany and Switzerland is a hybrid of an inflation targeting and a monetary targeting 
framework, with a dominant strategy of inflation targeting. This has been cited as one 
of the key reasons for the success of monetary targeting regimes in both of these 
countries. 
Price stability is the overriding primary goal of the ECB, defined by its targeted 
inflation rates, which should be below and close to 2% (ECB, 2010). The ECB 
governing council utilises short term interest rates to achieve this goal. The ECB’s 
monetary analysis takes into account the growth rate of M3 to a reference value of 
4.5%, merely to facilitate the price stability goal, since money growth provides a signal 
for inflation in the medium to long term horizon. Even though the ECB falls into both 
monetary targeting and inflation targeting ranges, it can justly be characterised as a de 
facto inflation targeting regime based on its attitude toward price stability. 
Some of the de jure as well as non-inflation targeting countries’ regimes are 
classified as both inflation and monetary targeting regimes. Some periods of Canada 
(2002 to 2012), Australia (2007 to 2012), New Zealand (1989 to 2012), Malaysia (2002 
to 2008) and the UK (2001 to 2005, 1991 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012) fall into this 
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category. However, all of these countries essentially target inflation. Therefore, these 
periods are categorised as de facto inflation targeting regimes. Some episodes of the US 
(2002 to 2012) and Switzerland (1992 to 2008) also coincide with both inflation 
targeting and monetary targeting countries. Based on the main underlying principle of 
price stability, those episodes have been classified as de facto inflation targeting 
regimes. 
 
3.5: Monetary policy regimes, Growth and Inflation 
There are debates over the linkage between monetary policy regimes and growth, as the 
direction of the link is not definitive. Monetary policy regimes have a direct impact on 
growth through the effects of the adjustment to shocks and indirectly via facilitating 
important determinants of growth such as investment, international trade, and financial 
sector development (Bailliu et al. 2003). A limited number of studies investigated the 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth (for example, Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2001; Bailliu et al., 2003; Bohm and Funke, 2001; Dubas and Zhu, 
2001). Nominal variables are typically considered to be unrelated to longer term growth 
performances (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001).
55
 Therefore, evaluating this 
relationship is largely an empirical matter. 
However, the findings of empirical studies are often quite diverse. While one 
group of studies finds that pegged exchange rate regimes stimulate growth, another 
suggests otherwise. A third group of studies suggests no effect or inconclusive findings. 
Bailliu et al. (2003) find that regimes with nominal anchors enhance growth. On the 
contrary, there is more or less a consensus that pegged exchange rate regimes work as 
an anti-inflationary device, if accompanied with the appropriate fiscal policy. The 
sections below describe the impact of monetary policy regimes on growth and inflation. 
3.5.1: Monetary policy regimes and growth 
We have followed the general framework of the cross country growth model of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The growth model represents a combination of neoclassical 
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 Regarding the exchange rate policy, nominal exchange rates are not able to keep the unemployment 
rate away from the natural rate in the long run. Hence, attempting to over-stimulate the economy by 
pursing an expansionary monetary policy or by devaluing the currency will result in a higher rate of 
inflation without any increase in real economic growth (Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
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and endogenous growth models.
56
 The empirical framework relates the real per capita 
growth rate to two categories: initial state and policy variables and national 
characteristics. Initial state level variables represent the stock of physical and human 
capital in the form of educational attainment and health. The second group consists of 
policy variables and national characteristics, which depend on policy makers as well as 
on private agents. A detailed description is presented in the sections below. 
3.5.1.1 The general framework for growth 
The contemporary basic empirical growth literature is based on a general framework, 
which specifies that a country’s growth at time t is a function of both state variables 
(SV) and control variables (CV) (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Equation (3.1) 
represents a general specification consistent with both neoclassical and endogenous 
growth model.  
𝐺𝑅𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑆𝑉𝑡; 𝐶𝑉𝑡 )     (3.1) 
 
In a neo classical framework, state variables represent the initial position of the 
economy and control variables represent the differences in the steady state level across 
different countries. The environmental or control variables determine the steady state 
level of output per effective worker. For some given values of state variables, growth 
rates can be affected by a change in the savings rate, government policy instruments or 
the growth rate of the population. A richer economy with a higher level of per capita 
GDP and human capital tends to grow at a slower rate due to the diminishing returns of 
reproducible factors. A change in control or environmental variables affects the steady 
state growth rates in terms of the rate of exogenous technological progress. In contrast, 
the endogenous growth model implies that an economy is always assumed to be in the 
steady state; the explanatory variables represent cross country differences in steady 
state growth rates.
57
 Variables that affect R&D intensity also influence the long-term 
growth rates. 
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Romer (1990),  Barro and Sala-i-Martin ( 1995, Chs.6 and 7).  
98 
 
Utilising the growth model in equation (3.1) for our empirical analysis is 
appealing, given that it provides the theoretical basis and is also broad enough to 
incorporate both types of growth models (Bailliu et al., 2003). This specification does 
not require assumptions on whether or not a country is in its steady state. Typically, 
lagged real GDP per capita and a proxy for human capital are used as state variables. 
However, the theory is not well-defined as to which control variables are most 
important in the growth process. Nevertheless, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) pointed 
out that these variables would typically include preferences for savings and fertility, 
government policies with respect to spending, market distortions and so on. 
3.5.1.2 Direct effects of monetary policy regimes on growth 
The literature on the impacts of different exchange rate regimes emphasized 
how an economy’s adjustment process following a shock can be different for different 
types of regimes. It has been widely argued that flexible exchange rate arrangements 
may foster higher growth, due to their ability to absorb and adapt to economic shocks 
more easily. Friedman (1953) argues that when economies are hit by real shocks, 
countries that are flexible and can change relative prices will be able to adjust more 
smoothly. Broda (2004) tries to verify how the response to negative terms of trade 
shocks differs substantially across different exchange rate regimes for 75 developing 
countries over the period 1973 to 1996. Findings from their panel VAR suggests that 
real GDP responses to real shocks are significantly smoother in floating, compared to 
pegged, regimes over the short-run. In response to a negative terms of trade shock, the 
slow and small real depreciation observed in pegged regime is due to the fall in 
domestic prices. On the other hand, the large and immediate real depreciation in floats 
reflects a large nominal depreciation in exchange rates.  
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) find that the inability of rigid regimes to 
absorb such shocks results in lower growth. Similarly, Calvo (1999) argues that the 
need to maintain the peg in the aftermath of a negative term of trade shock may result 
in high interest rates, stifling the growth process. Rogoff (1999) argues that nominal 
and real exchange rate variability might be detrimental to growth for developing 
countries. However, the finding of Husain et al. (2005) suggests that the performance 
of alternative regimes depends on the economic maturity of the countries. For 
developing countries, fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes deliver lower inflation 
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and higher growth, while for developed countries, flexible regimes may be associated 
with somewhat lower inflation and higher growth. 
The long run impact of monetary policy regimes: In the long run, monetary policy 
has limited capacity to affect any macroeconomic variable.  Baxter and Stockman 
(1989) find that transitions to floating exchange rate regimes leads to a sharp increase 
in nominal and real exchange rate variability, without any corresponding change in the 
distribution of fundamental macroeconomic variables. Monetary policy also cannot 
permanently dictate real interest rates in the long run. For New Zealand, Smith (2004) 
tries to study how interest rates and inflation affects economic growth.
58
 Her finding 
indicates that keeping inflation low and stable is the most effective contribution that 
monetary policy can make to real economic performance over the long run. 
Microeconomic policies that facilitate research and development, acquisition of human 
capital, transmission of information and incentives for labour force participation are 
more likely to have substantial impacts on economic growth than monetary policy 
itself.
59
 Kahn et al. (2002), using a VAR model, find that the impact of a rise in the 
Bank of Israel’s overnight rate on the long term real interest rate is much smaller than 
the impact on short term real interest rates. 
3.5.1.3 Other control variables for growth 
Investment: Empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate regimes 
and growth is mixed (Goldberg, 1993; Huizinga, 1994; Bordo and Schwartz, 1999; and 
Lafrance and Tessier, 2001). Exchange rate regimes can have an impact on economic 
growth through effects on the rate of physical capital accumulation. Many have argued 
that investment tends to be higher in a fixed exchange rate regime due to the reduction 
in policy uncertainty, real interest rates and variability in exchange rates. On the 
contrary, by eliminating an important adjustment mechanism, fixed exchange rates can 
exacerbate protectionist pressures and reduce the efficiency of the stock of capital, 
therefore causing misalignments and distortions in the efficient allocation of 
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 Theoretical models like Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
illustrate the role of microeconomic policies, such as R&D, on growth. The survey by Griliches (1992) 
reported a wide range of estimations of the social return of R&D, with values clustering around the range 
of 20 to 60%, which makes R&D a major source of growth. Therefore, both empirical and theoretical 
evidence on the benefits of this kind of policy is overwhelming. 
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investment. However, Bohm and Funke (2001) argue that exchange rate uncertainty 
plays a very modest role in determining investment spending.  
Openness and international trade: Endogenous growth literature predicts a positive 
relationship between openness, international trade and economic growth. A country 
more open to international trade is likely to grow faster, as it has greater ability to 
absorb technological spillovers and has access to larger market (Edwards, 1998; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). There are also positive spillovers in the non-tradable sector. 
Frankel and Romer (1999), using the instrumental variable method and geographic 
components of trade, find that a rise of one percentage point in the ratio of trade to 
GDP increases per capita income by one and a half percentage points. International 
trade appears to increase per capita income by spurring the accumulation of physical 
and human capital and increasing output for a given level of capital. 
Capital formation: Bailliu (2000) emphasises that international capital flows can 
promote growth by increasing domestic financial intermediation. Dooley (1994) argues 
that a fixed or quasi fixed exchange rate regime, combined with regulatory distortions 
and prudential oversight, can increase speculative capital flows. This was the case with 
capital flows in emerging economies over the 1990s. Capital flows are also less likely 
to enhance growth if allocated into unproductive investments. Krugman (1998) and 
Corsetti et al. (1998) demonstrate that capital is channeled into unproductive 
investments when foreign creditors believe that they will be bailed out by the 
government for lending to local banks. Poorly regulated banks have higher incentives 
to invest in risky projects when they believe that their liabilities are implicitly 
guaranteed by the government.  
Development of financial markets: Long run sustainable growth is related to the 
ability to raise the rates of accumulation of physical and human capital, to utilise the 
resulting assets more efficiently and to ensure accessibility to these assets (FitzGerald, 
2006). Financial development and economic growth are very much related and there is 
an ongoing debate over this issue. The pioneering studies by King and Levine (1993a), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) find that three 
indicators of financial sector development best describe the differences in economic 
growth across countries over long run. These are: bank credit to the private sector, 
stock market activity (proxied by the turnover rate or the ratio of traded value to GDP) 
and legal system features such as the extent of shareholder and creditor protection. 
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They find a significant positive relationship between these indicators and growth. On 
the other hand, De Gregorio & Guidotti (1995) find a negative correlation between 
growth and higher bank credit to GDP ratios in Latin America over the 1970s and 
1980s. They suggest that inadequate regulation and deposit insurance policies resulted 
in an unwarranted over-expansion in credit and subsequently led to the banking crises. 
According to FitzGerald (2006), despite the considerable benefits of financial 
development to economic growth, the benefits cannot be taken for granted. They 
depend on the construction of the appropriate institutional structure. 
3.5.1.4 Methodology for growth 
Studies like Bailliu et al. (2001, 2003) and others used Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) to estimate the impacts of exchange rate regimes on growth. 
However, GMM has some drawbacks. The asymptotic properties of a large number of 
cross sectional (N) and time series observations (T) for dynamic panels are different. 
Small T panel estimation relies on fixed or random effects estimators, or a combination 
of fixed effects (FE) or instrumental variable estimators like Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimations. One of the drawbacks of these estimators is that they only allow the 
intercept to vary, by assuming the homogeneity of the slope coefficients. One of the 
central findings for large N and T panel data is that the assumption of homogeneity in 
slope coefficients is not always appropriate.
60
 
There are several estimation procedures for large N and T. For example, FE 
estimation allows time series data for each group to pool and allows only intercepts to 
differ across groups. Therefore, FE estimation would be misleading if the slope 
coefficients are not identical. On the other hand, the model could be fitted separately 
for each group and a simple arithmetic average of the coefficients could be calculated. 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1997, 1999) have proposed the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimation that combines both pooling and averaging.  
The PMG estimator allows the intercept, short run coefficients and error 
variances to differ across groups, but constraints long run coefficients to be equal 
across the groups. There are some other advantages of the PMG estimation procedure. 
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 This has been pointed out by Pesaran and Smith (1995); Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003); Pesaran et al. 
(1997, 1999); and Phillips and Moon (2000). 
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It is an intermediate estimator. The null hypothesis of long run homogeneity is usually 
compared with the Mean Group (MG) estimation using a Hausman (1978) test.
61
 
3.5.1.5 The PMG specification for Growth model 
Equation (3.2) is the error correction equation, and provides the PMG specification for 
growth 
∆ ln 𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖 [𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑐 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼4 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡]
+  𝛿1𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐷𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                     (3.2) 
 
Here, 𝑖  is the country and 𝑡 is time. The Dependent variable, ∆𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡, is growth 
in real GDP per capita, 𝑔𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 is gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP (used to 
measure domestic investment), 𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the percentage of credit provided by the banking 
sector (used as a proxy of domestic financial sectors), 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡is trade as a percentage of 
GDP, 𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of secondary education enrolment (proxy for human 
capital) and 𝑔𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 is the lag of the per capita GDP (typically used for initial GDP). A 
pegged regime is the reference category for the monetary policy regimes dummies. 
3.5.2 Inflation 
Studies by Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002) suggest that pegged exchange rate regimes, by 
enhancing credibility and discipline in monetary policy, reduce inflation. However, 
they find that the relationship between pegged regimes and inflation is relevant for 
countries in a lower income group. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) find that inflation in 
developed countries has declined with greater exchange rate flexibility but the 
experience of developing countries is exactly the opposite. The subsequent findings by 
Edwards (2001), Ghosh et al. (2000) and Bleany and Francisco (2005) suggest that a 
strong commitment to the pegged regime will reduce average inflation. For inflation 
targeting countries, Vega and Winkelried (2005), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001, 
2007) and many others suggested that inflation has declined in many countries after the 
                                                 
61
 Proposed by Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1995), MG is a heterogeneous panel estimator. The intercepts, 
slope coefficients and error variances are allowed to differ across groups with this estimator.  
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adoption of an inflation targeting regime. Apart from monetary policy regime, inflation 
is likely to be dependent on the following variables.  
GDP growth rates: Higher GDP growth can contribute to higher inflation by raising 
the demand pressure in the economy. 
Openness: Trade openness is defined as 
(𝑋+𝑀)
𝑌
 , which is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP. The variable is included to proxy a variety of effects, especially to 
capture the disciplinary effect imposed by higher costs of monetary expansion in open 
economies and the strength of international arbitrage (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1997). 
Terms of trade growth: Exchange rate response to terms of trade is crucial for 
inflation. Gruen and Dwyer (1996) tried to find the impact of terms of trade on the 
domestic inflation rate in a small open economy framework. Their study suggested that 
the effects of terms of trade depend on the share of importable goods and services in 
consumption. With a reasonable share of importable goods and pass through, they find 
that if the movement of the real exchange rate is about half of the terms of trade, a rise 
in terms of trade will have almost no impact on inflation.
62
 However, if the real 
exchange rate moves almost one for one with the terms of trade, a rise in terms of trade 
puts downward pressure on inflation, at least in the short run.
63
 
3.5.2.1 Econometric specification 
Similar to the growth estimation, we have applied PMG methodology for estimating the 
impact of monetary regime and other control variables on inflation. We have compared 
the results with MG. Hausman (1978) test is used to check heterogeneity in the long 
run slope coefficients. Equation (3.3) provides the specification:  
 
∆ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∅𝑖 [𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡] −  𝛿1𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (3.3) 
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 As estimated by Gruen and Wilkinson 1991.  
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 Blundell-Wignall  et al. (1993).  
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Here, 𝑖𝑛𝑓  is the rate of inflation, 𝑜𝑝𝑛  is openness, 𝑡𝑜𝑡  is term of trade and 𝑔𝑑𝑝  is 
growth rate of per capita GDP.
64
 A hard pegged regime serves as the reference category 
for the regime dummies.  
 
3.6 The impact of monetary policy regime on growth and inflation 
This section explains the findings from the analysis of the impact of monetary policy 
regime on growth and inflation. For analytical purposes, countries are divided between 
industrialised and non-industrialised countries. We have 34 industrialised countries in 
our sample of 123 countries.
65
 To keep the comparison even, we have used 34 non-
industrialised countries for the analysis. Monetary policy regimes have different 
transmission processes in different economies, therefore dividing the countries between 
the two groups will allow us to get a more appropriate outcome. Data availability is 
also another issue here. A wide range of data were simply not available for many of the 
countries in our sample. We begin our analysis by discussing some basic summary 
statistics. The next parts focus on the findings from the PMG estimation. 
3.6.1 Basic Summary statistics for industrialised and non-industrialised countries 
Figure 3.3 (table A3.3 in appendix 3.1) displays basic summary statistics for the 34 
industrialised countries. IT regimes have the lowest inflation rate (2.59%), followed by 
fixed exchange rate regimes (3.48%). However, average growth is the highest in 
pegged and soft pegged regimes (3.88% and 4.88% respectively). Trade is the highest 
in hard pegged regimes (130%), followed by monetary targeting regimes. Gross 
investment (measured by gross capital formation as % of GDP) is highest for the 
monetary targeting converging periods (27.55%). Domestic banking credit to the 
private sector is highest for the free float and monetary targeting regimes (151% and 
158%) followed by inflation targeting regimes (115%). 
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 Openness has been calculated by the share of export and import as a percentage of GDP, terms of trade 
has been calculated by the ratio of dollar value of exports and imports.   
65
 Representing mainly OECD except Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong. 
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Figure: 3.3 Mean of the variables for industrialised countries 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents percentage and the vertical axis represents the monetary policy regimes. 
 
Basic Summary statistics for non-industrialised countries  
Figure 3.4 (and table A3.4 in appendix 3.1) provides the basic summary 
statistics for non-industrialised countries. For this group, inflation is also the lowest in 
IT (3.77%) regimes followed by monetary targeting (5.37%) regimes. Among the 
exchange rate regimes, intermediate regimes like soft peg (converging) has a mean 
inflation rate much lower than the pegged regime (7.84% and 11.19% respectively). 
Unlike the industrialised countries, trade as a percentage of GDP is highest in free float 
(81.66%) followed by IT and soft peg converging (80% and 81% respectively). 
Average gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP is highest during the stable 
soft pegged regime (25.98%). Domestic banking sector credit is the highest in regimes 
with IT and MT (76.81% and 67.69% respectively). 
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Figure: 3.4 Mean of the variables for non-industrialised countries 
 
Note: Horizontal axis represents percentage and the vertical axis represents the monetary policy regimes. 
 
In summary, the simple mean analysis suggests that both for industrialised and 
non-industrialised countries, average inflation is lowest in IT regimes. However, among 
the exchange rate regimes, average inflation for industrialised countries is the lowest 
for hard pegged regimes but for non-industrialised countries, average inflation is lowest 
under the soft pegged regimes. For growth, the performance of IT is not very 
impressive compared to the other regimes. Average GDP growth is highest for the soft 
pegged regimes for both groups.  
3.6.2. Findings from pooled mean group estimation 
3.6.2.1: Growth 
Table 3.7 presents the findings from pooled mean group estimation of growth in 
industrialised countries. Results obtained from the mean group estimation have been 
presented alongside. The Hausman test has been performed to check heterogeneity in 
the long run coefficients. The test could not reject the null of no systematic difference 
for the long run coefficients. The long run coefficient of convergence is negative and 
significant at 1 % level.   
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Table 3.7 Growth and monetary policy regimes for Industrialised countries 
Dependent variable: 
Growth in per capita 
GDP 
Pooled mean group Hausman test Mean Group 
Convergence 
coefficient: 
𝑙𝑌𝑡−1 
-0.054*** 
0.66 
(0.955) 
-0.1593* 
Long run coefficients    
𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.837***  6.214 
𝑙𝑏𝑐 0.004  -0.074 
𝑙𝑠𝑒 0.704***  4.677 
𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 0.1521**  5.547 
    
Short run coefficients    
∆𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.0144***  0.100*** 
∆𝑙𝑏𝑐 0.0021  -0.0555 
∆𝑙𝑠𝑒 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 
-0.0501 
0.0159* 
 
-0.9043 
0.3937 
𝑅2 0.0131  0.0142 
𝑅3 -0.0013  0.0046 
𝑅4 -0.0033  -0.0052 
𝑅5 -0.0071**  -0.0124 
𝑅6 -0.0046**  -0.0051 
𝑅7 0.0012  0.0005 
𝑅8 -0.0012  -0.0005 
𝑅9 -0.0051  -0.0086 
𝑅10 -0.0077*  -0.0002 
𝑅11 0.0002  -0.000 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.274***  3.954* 
No of countries 34  34 
No of observations 1080  1080 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 3282.431  3015.03 
Note: ***1% significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level. 
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  PMG estimation of growth for industrialised countries suggests that, except for 
domestic credit to the private sector (set as a proxy to measure the development of 
financial sectors), all the variables show a significant positive impact on long term 
growth. However, only investment (represented by gross capital formation as % of 
GDP) and trade are found to be significant for growth in the short run. The finding 
indicates that the growth rate is higher during soft pegged regimes (horizontal band ≤ 
2.25%), compared to the base category of hard pegged regimes. The growth rate in 
inflation targeting (𝑅8), monetary targeting (𝑅10), managed float (𝑅5) and free float 
(𝑅6) is lower compared to the base category of hard pegged regimes (𝑅1). 
Table 3.8 represents the results from the PMG estimation of growth for non-
industrialised countries. Estimation of MG has been presented alongside. Homogeneity 
of the long run slope coefficients could not be rejected by the Hausman test. All the 
coefficients are significant in the long run. However, in the short run, only gross capital 
formation (% of GDP) affects growth. Among the regime dummies, IT dummy (𝑅8) 
and Stable soft peg regimes ( 𝑅2 ) facilitate higher growth in non-industrialised 
countries.   
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Table 3.8 Growth and monetary policy regimes for non- industrialised countries 
Dependent. variable: 
Growth in per capita 
GDP 
Pooled mean group Hausman test Mean Group 
Convergence 
coefficient: 
𝑙𝑌𝑡−1 
-0.1507*** 
2.92 
(0.57) 
-0.4962*** 
Long run coefficients    
𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.4289***  0.7324 
𝑙𝑏𝑐 0.1776***  0.0527 
𝑙𝑠𝑒 0.3182***  1.1642** 
𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 0.01291***  -0.0471 
    
Short run coefficients    
∆𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.0428**  -0.0007 
∆𝑙𝑏𝑐 -0.0303  0.0594** 
∆𝑙𝑠𝑒 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 
-0.0028 
-0.0010 
 
-0.0029 
-0.0015** 
𝑅2 0.0144***  -0.005 
𝑅3 -0.002  -0.0123 
𝑅4 -0.105*  0.0265 
𝑅5 -0.005  -0.0221 
𝑅6 0.003  0.0267 
𝑅7 -0.0112**  -0.0101** 
𝑅8 0.0118*  0.0049* 
𝑅9 0.0046  -0.0010 
𝑅10 -0.0042  0.0310 
𝑅11 -0.0063  0.0154 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 1.074***  4.528*** 
No of countries 34  34 
No of observations 980  980 
Log Likelihood 2085.65  2054.42 
Note: ***1%significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level. 
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The next step is to see if there is any specific role for nominal anchors in growth 
over the short run. Table 3.9 reports the findings after rearranging the regime dummies 
according to the monetary policy anchors. Thus, regimes with hard pegged and stable 
soft pegged (where the movement of the exchange rate is within ± 2.25%) and inflation 
and monetary targeting regimes have been categorised as a single dummy. The base 
category represents the various intermediate exchange rate regimes without any form of 
specific nominal anchor. For both industrialised and non-industrialised groups, growth 
performance is better for the regimes with some sort of nominal anchor. 
Table 3.9 Growth and monetary policy regimes with and without anchor 
 Industrialised Non Industrialised 
Dependent. variable: 
Growth in per capita 
GDP 
Pooled mean group Pooled mean group 
Convergence 
coefficient 
𝑙𝑌𝑡−1 
-0.0388*** -0.1879***  
Long run coefficients    
𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.868*** 0.422***  
𝑙𝑏𝑐 -0.295*** 0.004  
𝑙𝑠𝑒 0.541*** 0.153***  
𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 0.4067*** 0.493***  
    
Short run coefficients    
∆𝑙𝑔𝑐𝑓 0.1559*** 0.024  
∆𝑙𝑏𝑐 0.0012 -0.0664**  
∆𝑙𝑠𝑒 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 
0.0097 
0.0082 
-0.018 
-0.059* 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟 0.0043** 0.018*  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.2464*** 1.377***  
No of countries 34 34  
No of observations 1080 980  
Log Likelihood 3100.111 2000.366  
Note: ***1%significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level. 
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Thus, our result supports the evidence presented by Bailliu et al. (2003), that monetary 
policy with an anchor exerts a positive influence on growth, irrespective of the 
economic status of a country.   
3.6.2.2 Inflation 
Tables 3.10 through 3.12 present the PMG estimation of inflation for industrialised and 
non-industrialised countries. The result from MG estimation has been presented 
alongside. Results varied significantly with MG estimation. However, the Hausman test 
could not reject the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference in the long run 
slope coefficient at the 1% level in both cases. 
For the industrialised countries, all the long run slope coefficients are 
significant at 1% level. The long run convergence coefficient is negative and highly 
significant; indicating that almost 70% of the disequilibrium in the short run is 
corrected in the long run. The year dummy is significant and negative, showing a 
negative trend in inflation over the long run. Both openness and GDP growth have a 
positive relationship in the short run and the long run. However, terms of trade growth 
has a negative relationship in the long run, suggesting that the improvement in the 
terms of trade contributes significantly to the reduction of inflation in these countries. 
Typically, inflation is lower in an open economy, because a deterioration in the 
terms of trade increases the cost of expansionary monetary policy. Romer (1993) and 
Lane (1997) show that it is the inability of the government to commit to a more 
discretionary policy that is crucial for determining the inflation rates. However, the 
findings of the current study are in contradiction with the findings of Romer (1993) and 
Lane (1997). Cooke (2010), in a two country dynamic general equilibrium framework, 
showed that the relationship between openness and inflation can also depend on the 
underlying structure of the economy. When the terms of trade are favourable for the 
domestic economy, a one unit gain in output will lead to a relatively large change in 
consumption and the government might have the incentive to create a large surprise 
change in money supply. As the economy becomes more open, it gets more exposed to 
the movements of the terms of trade, therefore inflation rises. 
Regarding, the regime dummies, inflation is lower in inflation targeting and 
monetary targeting regimes for the industrialised countries. However, there is no 
significant relationship with the exchange rate dummies. 
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Table 3.10: For industrialised countries 
Dependent variable: 
Inflation 
Pooled mean 
group 
Hausman 
Test 
Mean 
Group 
Convergence 
coefficient 
𝑒𝑐𝑡−1 
-0.697***  -0.990*** 
Long run coefficients  4.920  
𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.292*** (0.178) 0.465** 
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 -0.186***  -0.380 
𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.076***  0.197 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 -0.0139***  -0.026 
    
Short run coefficients    
∆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.467**  0.523 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 0.567**  1.118* 
∆𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.284**  0.179* 
𝑅2 0.032  0.229 
𝑅3 -0.257  0.019 
𝑅4 0.0391  0.103 
𝑅5 0.222  0.103 
𝑅6 0.019  0.098 
𝑅7 0.001  0.006 
𝑅8 -0.043*  -0.062 
𝑅9 0.013  0.017 
𝑅10 -0.216*  -0.296 
𝑅11 -0.004  0.001 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 17.52***  77.86*** 
No of countries 34   
No of observations 1080   
Log Likelihood 843.30   
Note: ***1%significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level 
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Table 3.11 shows the results for the non-industrialised countries. The long run 
convergence coefficient is negative and significant. There is a negative significant trend 
for inflation in the non-industrialised countries. Openness is positively related to GDP 
growth in both the short and long run. The relationship between terms of trade and 
growth is negative but not statistically significant.  
Table 3.11 for non-industrialised countries 
Dependent variable: 
Inflation  
Pooled mean group Hausman Test  Mean Group 
Convergence coefficient 
𝑒𝑐𝑡−1 
-0.924***  -1.044*** 
Long run coefficients  1.91 
(0.75) 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.1922***  -1.289 
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 -0.004  0.076 
𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.0129***  -0.623 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 -0.0019***  -0.015 
    
Short run coefficients     
∆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.0632  0.904 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 -0.120  -0.222 
∆𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.0642  0.632 
𝑅2 0.079*  0.376 
𝑅3 -0.037  -0.059 
𝑅4 0.013  0.023* 
𝑅5 0.002  -0.299 
𝑅6 0.084  0.074 
𝑅7 0.200  0.169* 
𝑅8 -0.001  -0.009 
𝑅9 0.007  0.001 
𝑅10 -0.056  -0.188 
𝑅11 -0.032  -0.451 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 4.096***  79.75*** 
        No of countries 34   
        No of observations  980   
Log Likelihood 355.668  350.98 
Note: ***1%significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level 
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These countries have typically higher exchange rate pass through from imports 
to consumer prices and they have a larger share of imported goods in consumer baskets. 
This might be one of the primary reasons for positive relationship with openness and 
negative but insignificant relationship between terms of trade and inflation. Inflation 
targeting, monetary targeting and soft peg regimes have lower inflation, but the 
negative relationship is not statistically significant. 
Table 3.12 presents the findings from industrialised and non-industrialised 
countries with and without an anchor. The base categories represent the regimes with 
anchors. Both groups share a negative long run trend in inflation. The long run 
convergence coefficients are highly significant. For the industrialised countries, both 
GDP growth and terms of trade have a significant long term negative impact on 
inflation.  
 
Table: 3.12 Industrialised and Non-Industrialised countries with Anchor 
Dependent variable: 
Inflation 
Industrialised 
Countries 
Non-Industrialised 
Countries 
Pooled mean group Pooled mean group 
Convergence coefficient 
𝑒𝑐𝑡−1 
-0.664*** -0.900*** 
Long run coefficients   
𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.139*** 0.007 
𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 -0.077*** -0.004 
𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ -0.0034 0.006*** 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 -0.0082*** -0.002*** 
   
Short run coefficients   
∆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 0.434** 0.122 
∆𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑡 0.445* 0.030 
∆𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 0.362** 0.195* 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟  0.010 0.0395 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 10.88*** 4.189*** 
No of countries 34 34 
No of observations 1080 980 
Log Likelihood 755.61 307.327 
Note: ***1%significant level, **5% level significant, *10% significant level 
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However, in the short run they are positively related to inflation. In the non-
industrialised countries, GDP growth has a significant positive relationship with 
inflation in both the long and short run. For both groups, inflation is higher compared to 
the base categories of monetary policy regimes with anchors.  
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3.7: Conclusion 
In this study, we have provided an alternative de facto classification of monetary policy 
regimes, and assessed the impact of these regimes on growth and inflation for 124 
countries over the period 1970 to 2013. The literature on the de facto classification of 
exchange rate regimes is quite substantial. However, such an effort in classifying de 
facto monetary policy regimes is lacking. Many of the studies on regime classification 
attempt to evaluate the impact of these regimes on inflation and a relatively lower 
number of studies try to assess the impact on growth. However, performances of 
regimes based only on the de facto exchange rate classifications would be misleading, 
as the regimes could have different underlying monetary policy frameworks. 
  Firstly, we classify monetary policy regimes based on some set criteria. Our de 
facto classification of monetary policy regimes classified eleven categories, including 
seven exchange rate regimes and four inflation and monetary targeting regimes. The 
yearly classification of exchange rate regime has been conducted using monthly data 
and on the basis of volatilities of exchange rates and their changes and relative 
volatility of changes in exchange rates and reserves. Inflation targeting and monetary 
targeting regimes have been classified on the basis of policy rates, changes in inflation 
and monetary growth of both broad and narrow money. 10% of the regimes are 
classified as de facto inflation and monetary targeting regimes, which according to the 
previous de facto classification studies, would have been classified as an exchange rate 
regime. We have also identified some periods as converging inflation and monetary 
targeting regimes. A regime that falls into both monetary and inflation targeting 
categories has been classified as inflation targeting regime, according to the 
classification criteria, as in most of the cases inflation control is the main goal variable.        
Secondly, we try to evaluate the growth and inflation performances of the 
regimes, based on our de facto classification. The evaluation of performance has been 
conducted on 34 industrialised and 34 non-industrialised countries from 1970 to 2013. 
Monetary transmission varies between the developed and developing countries, 
therefore, dividing the countries into these two groups would give us a more accurate 
outcome.  Pooled mean group estimation has been used as a method to evaluate the 
performance of the regimes. Even though GMM estimation has widely been used in the 
literature (for example, Bailliu et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2002), this method has some 
drawbacks. GMM is based on the assumption of homogeneity across groups and allows 
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only intercepts to differ, therefore will not be consistent for the heterogeneous dynamic 
panel with large T and N. PMG estimation combines both pooling and averaging. The 
short run coefficients are allowed to vary across groups but homogeneity of the long 
run coefficients is assumed. Our findings from PMG estimation do not indicate 
overwhelming benefits of flexible exchange rate regimes in industrialised countries. IT 
and MT regimes are associated with lower inflation, whilst a pegged regime is 
associated with the highest growth. We find that flexible regimes are beneficial at 
providing platforms to conduct independent monetary policy. 
For the non-industrialised countries, IT regimes perform well in reducing 
inflation and enhancing growth. A monetary policy with nominal anchors has positive 
consequences for growth and inflation in the short run for both groups of countries.  
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Appendix 3.1 
Table: A3.1 Inflation targeting countries 
Country  Effective IT 
adoption  
 Converging target 
period  
 Inflation 
target period 
Inflation targeting 
level for 2012 
New Zealand  1990Q1 1986-1990  1991-2010 1-3% 
Canada  1991M2 1990-1994 1995-2012  1-3% 
UK 1992M10 1992-1996  1997-2012 2% 
Sweden  1993M1 1992-1995 1996-2012  2 
Finland  1993M2  1990-1992  1993-1998 2-3% 
Australia  1993M4 1990-1991 1992-2012 2-3% 
Spain  1995M1 1991-1996  1997-1998  1-3% 
Czech 
Republic  1997M12 1998-2003 2004-2012 2(+/-1)% 
Israel  1997M6 1991-1998  1999-2012 1-3% 
Poland  1998M10 1996-2002 2003-2012 2.5(+/-1)% 
Brazil  1999M6 1995-2005 2006-2012 4.5(+/-2)% 
Chile  1999M9 1993-2000 2001-2012 3(+/-1)% 
Colombia  1999M9 1997-2004 2005-2012 2-4% 
South Africa  2000M2 1995-1998 1999-2012 3-6% 
Thailand  2000M5  2001-2004 2005-2012 3(+/-1.5)% 
Korea  2001M1  1998-1999 2000-2012 3(+/-1)% 
Mexico  2001M1 1991-2002 2003-2010 3(+/-1)% 
Iceland  2001M3 2000-2003 2004-2010 2.50% 
Norway  2001M3 1990-2000 2001-2012 2(+/-0.5)% 
Hungary  2001M6 2000-2004 2005-2012 3(+/-1)% 
Peru  2002M1  1988-2001 2002-2012 2(+/-1)% 
Philippines 2002M1  1998-2001 2002-2012  4(+/-1)% 
Guatemala  2005M1  2005-2008 2009-2012 4.5(+/-1)% 
Slovakia  2005M1  2001-2006 
  Indonesia  2005M7 2003-2006 2007-2012 4.5(+/-1)% 
Romania  2005M8 2001-2005 2006-2012 3(+/-1)% 
Turkey  2006M1  2003-2008 2009-2012 5(+/-2)% 
Serbia 2006M9  2003-2006 2007-2010 4(+/-1.5)% 
Ghana  2007M5  2001-2007 2008-2012 8.7(+/-2)% 
Note: Inflation targeting level for 2012 has been adopted from Centre for Central Banking Studies, Hand Book No 
29, Bank of England. Converging periods are calculated by the author, based on inflation and policy rates data and 
information from central banks website.    
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Table A3.2 Adoption of inflation targeting 
Country 
 
Inflation 
targeting 
adoption date 
Inflation rate 
at the 
beginning 
Inflation range  
at 2009 
Target 
inflation 
rate in 2009 
Inflation range 
 at 2012 
Inflation at 
2012 
Target horizon 
New Zealand 
 
1990 3.3 0.8 1 – 3 1%–3% 1.07% Medium term 
Canada 1991 6.9 0.3 2 +/– 1 2%  
(mid point of 
 1%–3%) 
1.3% Six-eight quarters; 
current target extends 
of 1%–3%) to  
December 2016 
United Kingdom 1992 4.0 2.2 2 +/– 1 2% 2.7% At all times 
Sweden 1993 1.8 -0.3 2 +/– 1 2% 0.9% Normally two years 
Australia 1993 2.0 1.9 2 - 3 2-3% 2.2 % Medium term 
Czech Republic 1997 6.8 1.0 3 +/– 1 1-3% 3.3% 12-18 months 
Israel 1997 8.1 3.3 2 +/– 1 1-3% 2.4% Within two years 
Poland 1998 10.6 3.8 2.5 +/– 1 2.5% 2.33% Medium term 
Brazil 1999 3.3 4.9 4.5 +/– 2 4.5% ±2 5.84% Yearly target 
Chile 1999 3.2 1.5 3 +/– 1 3% ±1 1.48% Around two years 
Colombia 2000 9.3 4.2 2 – 4 2%–4%  Medium term 
South Africa 2000 2.6 7.1 3 – 6 3%–6% 5.71% On a continuous basis 
Thailand 2000 0.8 –0.9 0.5 – 3 3.0% ±1.5 3.0% Eight quarters 
Korea Rep 2001 2.9 2.8 3 +/– 1 3% ±1 2.2% Three years 
Mexico 2001 9.0 5.3 3 +/– 1 3% ±1 4.1% Medium term 
Iceland 2001 4.1 12.0 2.5 +/– 1.5 2.5% 5.2% On average 
Norway 2001 3.6 2.2 2.5 +/– 1 2.5% 0.7% Medium term 
Hungary 2001 10.8 4.2 3 +/– 1 3% 5.7% Medium term 
Peru 2002 –0.1 2.9 2 +/– 1 2% ±1 3.7% At all times 
Philippines 2002 4.5 1.6 4.5 +/– 1 4.0% ±1 3.2% Medium term 
(from 2012–2014) 
Guatemala 2005 9.2 1.8 5 +/– 1 4.5% ±1 3.8% End of year 
Indonesia 2005 7.4 4.6 4 – 6 4.5% ±1 4.3% On average 
Romania 2005 9.3 5.6 3.5 +/– 1 3% ±1 3.3% Medium-term target from 2013 
Turkey 2006 7.7 6.3 6.5 +/– 1 5.0% ±2 8.9% Multi year (Three years) 
Serbia 2006 10.8 7.8 4 – 8 4.0% ±1.5 7.3% Medium term 
Ghana 2007 10.5 19.3 14.5 +/– 1 8.7% ±2 9.3% 18-24 months 
Armenia 2006 5.20 3.40 3+/-1 4% ±1.5 2.5% Medium term 
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Table A3.3: Summary statistics of variables for industrialised countries 
Regime Inflation 
GDP 
growth 
Trade as 
a %of 
GDP 
FDI 
Gross capital 
formation% of 
GDP 
% Banking 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector 
 
Hard peg/ 
fixed 
3.48 
(3.48) 
 
3.66 
(3.17) 
130.00 
(109.24) 
6.19 
(26.35) 
23.37 
(4.88) 
97.11 
(54.55) 
Soft peg 
stable 
 
6.34 
(5.35) 
3.88 
(7.01) 
75.82 
(25.00) 
0.88 
(1.66) 
23.34 
(6.46) 
73.55 
(34.07) 
Soft peg 
converging 
 
8.51 
(5.99) 
4.88 
(6.19) 
75.37 
(37.30) 
0.96 
(1.27) 
25.23 
(5.78) 
70.12 
(32.99) 
Soft peg 
converging 
in 
a wider band 
 
8.62 
(5.24) 
3.60 
(5.22) 
67.37 
(27.02) 
0.862 
(1.81) 
25.19 
(5.29) 
64.74 
(28.56) 
Managed 
exchange 
rate 
(with no pre-
specific 
bands) 
 
8.28 
(8.47) 
3.37 
(2.77) 
70.36 
(30.07) 
1.73 
(2.28) 
23.88 
(5.17) 
75.24 
(48.01) 
Free Float 
 
5.099 
(4.61) 
2.56 
(2.65) 
41.58 
(30.85) 
0.92 
(1.13) 
22.88 
(4.81) 
151.25 
(89.83) 
Free Fall 
 
66.96 
(62.47) 
2.80 
(3.96) 
56.58 
(29.14) 
0.99 
(1.73) 
21.17 
(3.39) 
51.97 
(43.04) 
IT 
2.59 
(2.12) 
2.97 
(2.37) 
77.69 
(33.19) 
4.40 
(6.27) 
21.24 
(4.49) 
115.22 
(45.88) 
IT 
converging 
7.18 
(6.32) 
3.02 
(2.99) 
70.02 
(32.05) 
3.19 
(3.27) 
22.59 
(3.90) 
78.40 
(39.75) 
MT 
6.29 
(14.99) 
0.91 
(3.48) 
78.71 
(45.97) 
4.27 
(7.81) 
19.75 
(6.36) 
153.88 
(76.62) 
MT 
converging 
5.31 
(3.84) 
3.56 
(1.88) 
30.17 
(2.67) 
1.38 
(0.13) 
27.55 
(1.37) 
54.69 
(11.77) 
Note: mean of the variables, standard deviations in the parentheses 
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Table A3.4: Summary statistics of variables for non-industrialised countries 
Regimes Inflation 
GDP 
growth 
Openness FDI 
Gross capital 
formation% of 
GDP 
% Banking 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector 
 
Hard peg/ fixed  
11.19 
(22.01) 
4.63 
(6.49) 
71.15 
(44.43) 
1.85 
(4.74) 
22.20 
(9.27) 
34.24 
(31.85) 
Soft peg stable 
 
8.50 
(11.87) 
5.90 
(6.84) 
69.12 
(38.13) 
3.41 
(8.64) 
25.98 
(11.93) 
50.79 
(36.93) 
Soft peg 
converging 
 
13.07 
(24.29) 
5.54 
(5.68) 
80.96 
(40.91) 
2.31 
(3.49) 
24.37 
(8.07) 
44.47 
(29.48) 
Soft peg 
converging in 
a wider band 
 
7.84 
(6.06) 
5.03 
(4.84) 
67.73 
(37.84) 
4.27 
(8.52) 
23.84 
(7.79) 
39.47 
(26.35) 
Managed 
exchange rate 
(with no pre-
specific bands) 
 
11.86 
(15.39) 
4.29 
(5.42) 
78.96 
(42.46) 
4.59 
(11.99) 
23.93 
(11.33) 
34.84 
(26.95) 
Free Float 
 
13.55 
(19.77) 
4.24 
(4.64) 
81.66 
(41.00) 
4.51 
(8.59) 
22.62 
(6.95) 
40.40 
(55.26) 
Free Fall 
 
377.06 
(1984.00) 
1.74 
(5.80) 
49.39 
(30.00) 
1.53 
(2.12) 
18.95 
(7.46) 
42.82 
(29.32) 
IT 3.77 
(2.79) 
4.56 
(2.62) 
80.41 
(50.28) 
4.32 
(7.92) 
22.49 
(4.73) 
76.81 
(52.62) 
IT converging 23.33 
(79.00) 
3.57 
(3.79) 
67.77 
(41.23) 
4.44 
(7.78) 
22.39 
(6.07) 
64.48 
(58.14) 
MT 5.37 
(4.68) 
4.45 
(3.68) 
64.82 
(35.01) 
3.35 
(5.39) 
24.40 
(9.66) 
67.69 
(62.69) 
MT converging 6.24 
(6.46) 
4.03 
(4.99) 
62.11 
(38.77) 
2.48 
(3.25) 
23.61 
(7.71) 
55.48 
(27.21) 
Note: *mean of the variables, standard deviations in the parentheses 
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Appendix 3.2 
 
Table A3. 5The Monetary Policy Regimes Classifications Code 
 
Classification codes 
1 No separate legal tender 
1 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
1 
Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-1% 
1 De facto peg with horizontal band +/-1% 
2 Crawling band that is >1% but +/-2.5% 
3 Crawling band that is greater than 2.5% but +/-3% 
4 Crawling band that is greater than 3% but  +/-5% 
5 Managed Float  
6 Freely  Floating   
7 Freely Falling  
8 De facto Inflation targeting regime  
9 De facto Inflation target -converging regime  
10 De facto monetary targeting regime  
11 De facto monetary target-converging regime  
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
 
  
Year  Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain Bangladesh Belgium 
1970  1  7  1 2 1  1 
1971  1  7  1 2 1  1 
1972  2  1  1 2 1  1 
1973  4  1  3 4 1  1 
1974  4  1  4 4 1 1 1 
1975  5  7  11 4 1 7 6 
1976  2  7  11 2 1 7 4 
1977  2  7  10 2 1 2 2 
1978  3  7  10 4 1 4 2 
1979  2  7  10 4 1 5 3 
1980  5  7  2 4 1 5 2 
1981  5  7  2 4 1 5 3 
1982  5  7  4 4 1 5 2 
1983  4  7  4 4 1 2 4 
1984  4  7  4 4 1 4 5 
1985  5  7  5 5 1 4 4 
1986  4  7  5 5 1 2 2 
1987  5  7  4 4 1 2 2 
1988  5  7  5 4 1 3 2 
1989  5  7  5 4 1 1 2 
1990  5  7  9 4 1 1 9 
1991 7 5  7  9 9 1 5 9 
1992 7 5  1  8 9 1 5 9 
1993 7 5  1  8 9 1 2 9 
1994 7 9  1 7 8 9 1 1 9 
1995 7 9  1 3 8 8 1 2 8 
1996 7 9  1 3 8 8 1 4 8 
1997 5 9  1 3 8 8 1 5 8 
1998 5 9 6 1 4 8 8 1 4 8 
1999 6 9 6 1 4 8 8 1 4 8 
2000 6 9 6 1 4 8 8 1 1 8 
2001 4 9 6 1 4 8 8 1 1 8 
2002 6 9 6 6 4 8 8 1 1 8 
2003 6 9 5 6 4 8 8 1 1 8 
2004 11 8 5 6 5 8 8 1 3 8 
2005 11 8 5 2 5 8 8 1 4 8 
2006 11 2 1 2 6 8 8 1 4 8 
2007 11 5 1 2 5 8 10 1 1 10 
2008 10 5 1 5 4 5 10 1 1 10 
2009 10 5 1 5 4 5 10 1 1 10 
2010 10 4 1 5 4 5 10 1 2 10 
2011 10 4 2 5 4 5 10 1 5 10 
2012 10 5 1 5 4 4 10 1 5 10 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
 
Year Benin Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria 
Burkina 
Faso 
Burundi Cameroon Canada 
1970  1  5 1 1 1 1 1 5 
1971  1  5 4 1 1 1 1 2 
1972  7  5 3 1 1 1 2 3 
1973  7  5 5 1 1 1 5 1 
1974  1  5 4 1 1 1 3 3 
1975  1  5 4 1 1 1 3 4 
1976  1  5 3  1 1 2 4 
1977  1  5 2  1 1 1 5 
1978  1 1 5 2  1 1 4 5 
1979  7 4 5 2  1 1 3 3 
1980  7 4 5 5  1 1 4 3 
1981  7 6 7 5  1 1 4 2 
1982  7 5 7 2  1 1 4 4 
1983  7 6 7 2  1 7 3 1 
1984  7 6 7 4  1 7 4 5 
1985  7 6 7 5  1 5 4 3 
1986  7 5 7 5  1 5 4 2 
1987  5 5 7 4  1 5 4 2 
1988  5 6 7 5  1 5 3 4 
1989  5 6 7 4  1 5 4 3 
1990  5 6 7 2  1 5 3 9 
1991  5 6 7 5  1 5 4 9 
1992  5 6 7 4 7 1 5 4 9 
1993  4 6 7 4 7 1 5 4 9 
1994  4 6 7 4 7 1 5 3 9 
1995  4 6 9 4 7 1 5 4 8 
1996  4 6 9 2 7 1 7 3 8 
1997  4 6 9 5 7 1 7 4 8 
1998  4 6 9 5 1 1 6 2 8 
1999 5 4 6 9 3 1 1 6 2 5 
2000 5 4 6 9 3 1 1 5 2 5 
2001 5 4 6 9 4 1 1 5 2 8 
2002 6 4 6 9 4 1 1 5 2 8 
2003 6 2 6 9 4 1 1 3 2 8 
2004 5 2 6 9 2 1 1 1 2 8 
2005 5 1 6 9 4 1 1 5 2 8 
2006 5 1 6 8 2 1 1 6 2 8 
2007 5 1 6 8 2 1 1 5 2 8 
2008 5 1 6 8 2 1 1 5 2 8 
2009 5 1 6 8 2 1 1 1 2 8 
2010 5 1 6 6 5 1 1 1 2 8 
2011 5 1 6 6 4 1 1 5 2 8 
2012 5 1 1 6 4 1 1 5 2 8 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year 
Cape 
Verde 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Chile China Colombia Croatia 
Czech 
republic 
Cyprus Denmark Dijabuti 
1970 1 1 7  4   1 1 1 
1971 4 2 1  4   1 1 1 
1972 2 2 6  4   1 2 1 
1973 5 2 6  4   4 5 1 
1974 4 1 6  7   4 4 1 
1975 5 1 6  7   5 3 1 
1976 5 1 4  7   5 4 1 
1977 5 1 4  4   5 5 1 
1978 5 1 4  4   5 2 1 
1979 5 1 4  4   5 5 1 
1980 5 1 4  7   5 2 1 
1981 5 1 1  7   6 3 1 
1982 5 1 4 5 7   6 5 1 
1983 5 1 4 2 7   6 2 1 
1984 5 1 4 7 7   6 2 1 
1985 2 1 4 7 7   6 2 1 
1986 2 1 4 7 7   6 2 1 
1987 2 1 4 7 7   6 3 1 
1988 4 1 4 1 7   6 2 1 
1989 3 1 4 1 7   5 1 1 
1990 2 1 4 5 7   5 2 1 
1991 5 1 4 1 7 7  5 2 1 
1992 5 1 4 5 7 7  6 2 1 
1993 5 1 9 2 7 7  6 5 1 
1994 4 1 9 2 7 3  6 1 1 
1995 2 1 9 2 7 4 2 9 1 1 
1996 4 1 9 1 7 4 4 9 1 1 
1997 4 1 9 1 9 4 6 9 1 1 
1998 4 1 9 1 9 4 9 9 1 1 
1999 5 6 9 1 9 4 9 9 1 1 
2000 5 6 9 1 9 4 9 9 1 1 
2001 4 6 8 1 9 2 9 9 1 1 
2002 5 6 8 1 9 2 9 9 1 1 
2003 5 5 8 1 9 2 9 9 1 1 
2004 11 11 8 1 9 4 8 9 1 1 
2005 11 11 8 2 8 4 8 8 1 1 
2006 11 10 8 2 8 2 8 8 1 1 
2007 10 10 5 2 8 2 6 4 1 1 
2008 10 10 5 2 8 2 5 10 1 1 
2009 10 10 5 1 8 2 8 10 1 1 
2010 10 10 8 2 8 2 8 10 1 1 
2011 10 4 8 2 8 2 4 10 1 1 
2012 4 5 8 1 8 2 4 10 1 1 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Ecuador Egypt 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Finland France Gabon Gambia 
1970 1 1 1   1 1 1 1  
1971 1 1 1   1 1 1 1  
1972 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 4 
1973 1 1 1   1 5 5 1 3 
1974 1 1 1   1 5 6 1 3 
1975 1 1 1   1 4 4 1 2 
1976 1 1 1   1 2 5 1 2 
1977 1 1 1   1 5 5 1 4 
1978 1 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1979 1 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1980 1 1 1   1 2 5 1 4 
1981 1 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1982 6 1 1   1 1 6 1 4 
1983 6 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1984 6 1 1   1 5 6 1 7 
1985 6 1 1   1 5 6 1 7 
1986 6 1 1   1 3 4 1 4 
1987 6 1 1   1 3 2 1 4 
1988 6 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1989 6 1 1   1 4 5 1 4 
1990 5 1 1   1 9 4 1 4 
1991 5 7 5   1 9 5 1 4 
1992 5 1 1   1 9 6 1 4 
1993 5 1 5  4 1 8 6 1 4 
1994 5 1 7  4 1 8 5 1 4 
1995 5 1 2  4 1 8 6 1 4 
1996 5 1 5  4 2 8 5 1 4 
1997 5 1 5 6 4 2 8 6 1 3 
1998 5 1 5 5 2 2 8 5 1 3 
1999 5 1 1 5 2 2 8 8 1 3 
2000 5 2 5 5 1 2 8 8 1 3 
2001 1 2 2 4 1 2 8 8 1 3 
2002 1 2 3 4 1 1 8 8 1 3 
2003 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 8 1 3 
2004 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 8 1 3 
2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 8 1 3 
2006 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 8 1 3 
2007 1 4 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 3 
2008 1 10 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 11 
2009 1 10 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 11 
2010 1 10 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 10 
2011 1 10 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 10 
2012 1 10 1 1 1 2 10 10 1 10 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala 
Guinea 
Bissau 
Guyana 
Hong 
Kong 
Hungary Iceland India 
1970 2 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 
1971 2 1 1 1 1 3   1 1 
1972 2 1 1 1 1 5   1 1 
1973 6 1 1 1 1 5   5 1 
1974 6 1 1 1 1 5   5 1 
1975 6 1 6 1 1 5   5 5 
1976 6 1 6 1 1 5   5 4 
1977 5 1 4 1 1 1   5 11 
1978 6 7 4 1 1 1   5 11 
1979 6 1 4 1 1 1   5 10 
1980 6 1 6 1 1 1   5 10 
1981 5 1 6 1 1 5   7 10 
1982 5 1 6 1 1 5   7 4 
1983 5 7 6 1 1 1   7 4 
1984 5 7 6 1 1 5   7 6 
1985 5 7 6 1 1 5   7 6 
1986 5 1 6 1 1 5   7 6 
1987 4 7 6 1 1 5   7 6 
1988 5 7 6 5 2 5   7 6 
1989 5 7 6 5 2 6   7 5 
1990 4 7 4 6 2 6   5 5 
1991 5 6 5 3 2 6   5 5 
1992 9 5 5 4 2 2   5 11 
1993 9 5 5 5 6 2   5 11 
1994 9 5 4 4 6 2   5 11 
1995 8 5 3 4 6 1   5 11 
1996 8 5 3 3 6 1  7 4 11 
1997 8 5 3 4 6 1 1 7 4 10 
1998 8 5 6 4 2 6 1 7 4 10 
1999 8 5 8 5 2 6 1 5 4 10 
2000 8 7 8 2 1 6 1 9 9 10 
2001 8 9 8 4 1 2 1 9 9 10 
2002 8 9 8 4 1 1 1 9 9 10 
2003 8 9 8 4 1 2 1 9 8 10 
2004 8 9 8 4 1 2 1 9 8 10 
2005 8 9 8 9 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2006 8 9 8 9 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2007 10 9 10 9 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2008 10 8 10 9 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2009 10 5 10 8 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2010 10 2 10 8 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2011 10 3 10 8 1 1 1 8 4 10 
2012 10 3 10 8 1 1 1 5 4 10 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Japan Jordan Kenya Kuwait 
1970 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1971 5 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 
1972 1 1 1 6 1 6 2 3 1 1 
1973 1 1 1 6 1 6 5 2 1 2 
1974 1 1 1 4 1 4 5 1 1 2 
1975 1 2 1 6 7 5 4 1 7 3 
1976 1 2 1 6 7 3 4 1 2 2 
1977 1 1 1 6 7 3 5 1 2 2 
1978 1 1 1 5 7 5 5 1 5 2 
1979 1 1 1 4 7 3 5 1 4 2 
1980 1 4 1 5 7 2 6 1 4 2 
1981 2 4 1 5 7 2 6 1 7 4 
1982 6 4 1 5 7 4 6 1 6 2 
1983 6 4 1 5 7 5 6 1 5 1 
1984 6 5 1 5 7 2 6 1 5 4 
1985 3 5 1 5 7 2 6 1 4 5 
1986 6 5 1 5 7 5 5 1 3 3 
1987 6 5 1 5 4 1 5 3 5 4 
1988 4 10 1 5 4 1 10 3 5 4 
1989 4 10 1 5 5 1 10 3 5 4 
1990 4 10 1 5 4 1 10 3 5 2 
1991 4 10 1 5 9 1 10 3 5 3 
1992 2 10 1 5 9 2 10 3 5 3 
1993 2 7 1 5 9 5 6 3 4 2 
1994 2 7 1 5 9 3 6 3 5 1 
1995 4 10 1 4 9 3 10 1 5 2 
1996 2 10 1 5 9 5 10 1 5 1 
1997 6 10 1 5 9 4 10 1 5 1 
1998 6 1 1 5 9 2 6 1 5 2 
1999 6 1 1 8 8 1 6 1 6 1 
2000 6 11 1 8 8 1 6 1 6 1 
2001 6 11 7 8 8 1 6 1 2 1 
2002 6 11 7 8 8 1 6 1 2 2 
2003 9 10 3 8 8 1 6 1 5 2 
2004 9 10 3 8 8 1 10 1 5 1 
2005 9 10 3 8 8 1 10 1 4 1 
2006 8 10 4 8 8 1 10 1 4 1 
2007 8 10 1 10 5 1 10 1 5 5 
2008 8 10 1 10 5 1 10 1 7 4 
2009 8 10 1 10 5 1 10 1 6 2 
2010 8 10 1 10 8 1 10 1 5 4 
2011 8 4 1 10 8 1 10 1 6 2 
2012 8 4  10 8 1 6 1 6 2 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Lithuania Luxembourg Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali 
1970  4 1 1   1 1  1 
1971  4 1 1   1 2  2 
1972  5 4 1   5 2  2 
1973  5 4 1   5 5  2 
1974  5 4 1   3 5  1 
1975  6 5 1   1 5  1 
1976  6 1 1   1 2  1 
1977  4 1 1   1 3  1 
1978  6 1 1   1 3  1 
1979  5 2 1   1 3  1 
1980  6 5 1   1 3  1 
1981  7 5 1   1 3  1 
1982  7 5 1   1 3 5 1 
1983  7 5 1   5 3 1 1 
1984  6 5 1   5 3 1 1 
1985  6 5 1   5 3 2 1 
1986  6 5 1   5 3 2 1 
1987  6 5 1   5 2 6 1 
1988  6 5 1   5 2 5 1 
1989  6 5 1   5 2 5 1 
1990  6 4 1   5 2 6 1 
1991  6 5 1   5 2 6 1 
1992  6 5 1 7  4 2 5 1 
1993  3 5 1 7 6 4 9 5 1 
1994 1 2 4 1 3 6 7 9 5 1 
1995 1 2 2 1 1 6 1 9 1 1 
1996 1 2 5 1 1 6 1 9 1 1 
1997 1 1 5 1 1 6 7 9 1 1 
1998 1 1 5 1 1 6 7 9 1 1 
1999 1 1 3 5 1 8 7 8 1 5 
2000 1 1 5 4 1 8 7 8 1 5 
2001 1 1 5 5 1 8 7 8 6 5 
2002 1 1 5 5 2 8 5 8 1 5 
2003 2 1 5 5 2 8 5 8 1 5 
2004 1 1 5 5 2 8 1 8 1 10 
2005 4 1 5 5 2 8 1 4 1 10 
2006 4 1 5 4 2 8 5 3 1 10 
2007 4 1 5 4 2 10 1 4 1 10 
2008 5 1 5 2 2 10 1 5 1 10 
2009 4 1 5 5 2 10 1 8 1 5 
2010 5 1 5 2 2 10 1 8 1 5 
2011 4 1 5 1 2 10 5 8 6 1 
2012 4 1 5 3 2 10 5 8 1 1 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Malta Mauritania Mexico Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
Nicaragua 
1970 1 5 1 1   1 2 1  
1971 1 5 1 1   1 3 1  
1972 1 2 1 2   1 2 1  
1973 5 2 1 4   1 2 2  
1974 4 5 1 4   1 2 5  
1975 4 4 1 2   6 2 6  
1976 4 3 1 4   1 2 6  
1977 3 4 1 3   1 2 4  
1978 4 5 1 3   4 2 4  
1979 4 5 1 2   1 3 5  
1980 5 4 2 2   1 2 3  
1981 5 3 5 2   6 2 5  
1982 5 4 7 5   4 2 4  
1983 5 2 7 5   4 2 5  
1984 5 2 7 5   5 1 5  
1985 5 5 7 4   6 1 5  
1986 5 5 7 4   4 1 5  
1987 3 5 7 4   2 1 9  
1988 3 5 7 4   5 1 9  
1989 5 3 7 4   5 1 9  
1990 3 5 7 5   5 1 9  
1991 4 3 9 3   6 1 8  
1992 5 3 9 4   6 1 8 5 
1993 4 4 9 9  5 6 1 8 5 
1994 4 6 9 9  4 9 1 8 5 
1995 4 5 9 9  2 9 1 8 5 
1996 4 5 9 8  5 9 1 8 5 
1997 4 5 9 8  5 9 1 8 5 
1998 4 5 9 8 5 5 9 1 8 5 
1999 3 5 9 8 5 5 9 8 8 5 
2000 3 4 9 8 6 5 8 8 8 5 
2001 3 5 9 8 6 6 8 8 8 5 
2002 3 4 9 8 6 6 8 8 8 5 
2003 3 3 8 8 6 6 5 8 8 5 
2004 3 1 8 8 6 5 4 8 8 6 
2005 3 2 8 8 6 5 4 8 8 6 
2006 3 3 8 5 6 5 4 8 8 5 
2007 3 1 8 5 5 5 5 10 5 5 
2008 10 5 6 5 5 6 5 10 6 5 
2009 10 5 6 5 5 6 5 10 8 5 
2010 10 3 4 5 5 5 4 10 8 5 
2011 10 5 6 5 5 6 5 10 8 5 
2012 10 5 6 5 5 6 1 10 8 5 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Paraguay PERU Philippines Poland Portugal 
1970 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 
1971 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
1972 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
1973 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
1974 5 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 6 
1975 3 2 1 1 1 7 4 1 6 
1976 2 2 1 1 1 7 1 1 5 
1977 4 5 1 1 1 7 1 1 6 
1978 4 4 1 1 1 7 1 1 5 
1979 5 4 1 1 1 7 1 1 4 
1980 5 5 1 1 1 7 2 1 5 
1981 5 4 1 1 1 7 5 4 6 
1982 5 5 1 5 1 7 5 4 6 
1983 5 5 1 5 1 7 6 5 5 
1984 5 2 1 5 7 7 6 5 5 
1985 5 4 1 2 7 7 2 5 5 
1986 11 5 1 5 7 7 2 3 5 
1987 11 6 1 2 7 7 2 5 4 
1988 11 4 1 5 7 9 2 5 2 
1989 10 5 1 5 7 9 4 5 2 
1990 10 9 1 5 7 9 5 5 2 
1991 10 9 1 5 2 9 5 7 4 
1992 10 9 1 3 7 9 5 7 5 
1993 10 9 1 5 7 9 5 7 5 
1994 10 9 1 1 2 9 5 7 5 
1995 1 9 1 5 1 9 5 5 6 
1996 1 9 1 5 1 9 5 9 6 
1997 1 9 1 5 1 9 6 9 6 
1998 1 9 1 4 1 9 9 9 6 
1999 7 9 1 5 5 9 9 9 8 
2000 4 9 1 6 5 9 9 9 8 
2001 4 8 1 5 6 9 9 9 8 
2002 5 8 1 2 6 8 8 9 8 
2003 7 8 1 2 6 8 8 8 8 
2004 2 8 1 4 6 8 8 8 8 
2005 3 8 1 2 6 8 8 8 8 
2006 1 8 1 2 6 8 8 8 8 
2007 5 8 1 1 6 5 8 5 10 
2008 9 8 1 7 6 5 8 5 10 
2009 9 8 1 4 6 5 8 5 10 
2010 8 8 1 2 6 4 8 5 10 
2011 8 8 1 3 6 4 8 6 10 
2012 8 8 1 3 6 4 8 6 10 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Romania Russia Rwanda 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Senegal Serbia Seychelles 
Sierra 
Leon 
1970   1  1   1 
1971   1 1 2   3 
1972   1 1 2   5 
1973   1 1 5   6 
1974   1 1 5   4 
1975   1 1 5   5 
1976   1 1 5   5 
1977   1 4 5   4 
1978   1 1 5   5 
1979   1 2 4   1 
1980 1  1 2 11   1 
1981 1  1 1 11  1 1 
1982 1  1 2 11  1 1 
1983 7  1 2 10  1 6 
1984 7  1 2 10  1 5 
1985 1  1 3 10  1 7 
1986 1  1 1 4  1 7 
1987 1  1 1 2  1 7 
1988 1  1 1 10  1 7 
1989 6  1 1 10  1 7 
1990 6  1 1 10  1 7 
1991 6  1 1 10  1 7 
1992 6 7 1 1 10  1 7 
1993 6 7 1 1 10  1 4 
1994 6 7 1 1 5  1 4 
1995 5 7 1 1 5  1 4 
1996 5 7 1 1 2  1 4 
1997 5 3 1 1 5  1 5 
1998 5 7 1 1 5  2 7 
1999 6 7 1 1 5  2 7 
2000 5 7 1 1 5  2 7 
2001 9 5 1 1 4  5 7 
2002 9 5 1 1 5  5 5 
2003 9 4 1 1 5 9 5 5 
2004 9 4 1 1 4 9 1 5 
2005 9 4 1 1 4 9 1 2 
2006 8 2 1 1 4 9 1 2 
2007 5 2 1 1 5 5 5 1 
2008 6 5 1 1 5 6 6 2 
2009 1 6 1 1 5 6 6 5 
2010 8 6 1 1 5 6 5 5 
2011 8 6 1 1 4 6 5 4 
2012 8 6 1 1 4 6 5 4 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Singapore 
Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia 
South 
Korea 
Spain 
Sri 
Lanka 
Surinam Swaziland 
South 
Africa 
1970     1 1   1 
1971 1   1 2 1   1 
1972 3   1 4 6   4 
1973 5   1 4 5   4 
1974 5   1 4 4   4 
1975 5   1 6 5  1 4 
1976 4   1 6 5  1 1 
1977 4   1 6 6  1 1 
1978 4   1 6 4  1 1 
1979 4   1 6 1  2 1 
1980 4   3 6 5  7 5 
1981 4   3 6 5  7 5 
1982 4   4 6 5  5 5 
1983 2   4 5 5  5 5 
1984 2   4 5 4  6 6 
1985 2   5 5 3 1 6 6 
1986 2   3 5 4 1 6 6 
1987 3   5 4 5 1 5 6 
1988 3   5 5 5 1 5 6 
1989 3   2 6 5 1 5 6 
1990 3   3 6 5 1 5 5 
1991 4  7 4 9 4 1 5 5 
1992 2  7 2 9 4 1 5 5 
1993 4  7 2 9 5 1 5 5 
1994 9 3 7 2 9 1 1 4 5 
1995 8 3 5 4 9 6 1 2 2 
1996 8 3 5 5 9 4 1 5 9 
1997 8 3 5 5 8 4 1 5 9 
1998 8 5 5 9 8 6 1 5 9 
1999 8 5 5 9 8 4 1 5 9 
2000 8 4 5 8 8 5 1 6 9 
2001 8 9 5 8 8 5 1 6 8 
2002 8 9 5 8 8 3 1 6 8 
2003 8 9 5 8 8 2 1 5 8 
2004 8 9 1 8 8 5 1 5 8 
2005 8 9 1 8 8 3 1 5 8 
2006 8 3 1 8 8 4 1 5 8 
2007 2 3 1 8 10 4 1 5 8 
2008 2 6 1 8 10 2 1 5 6 
2009 2 1 1 8 10 1 1 5 6 
2010 4 1 1 8 10 3 1 5 6 
2011 4 1 1 8 10 4 1 6 6 
2012 4 1 1 8 10 4 1 6 6 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Sweden Syria Switzerland Tanzania Thailand Togo Tunisia Turkey 
1970 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
1971 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1972 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
1973 5 2 1 4 1 6 5 1 
1974 5 3 1 1 1 6 5 4 
1975 5 1 1 5 1 5 5 7 
1976 5 1 1 2 1 5 2 7 
1977 5 1 1 3 1 3 2 7 
1978 5 1 1 5 1 5 2 7 
1979 4 1 1 1 1 5 2 7 
1980 4 1 1 1 1 5 2 7 
1981 6 1 10 2 2 5 5 7 
1982 6 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1983 6 1 10 5 1 5 5 7 
1984 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1985 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1986 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1987 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1988 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1989 4 1 10 5 2 5 3 7 
1990 5 1 10 5 2 5 2 7 
1991 5 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1992 9 1 10 5 2 5 5 7 
1993 9 1 9 5 2 7 5 7 
1994 9 1 8 5 2 7 2 7 
1995 9 1 8 5 2 5 4 7 
1996 8 1 8 5 2 4 2 7 
1997 8 1 8 4 6 5 4 7 
1998 8 1 8 2 6 5 4 7 
1999 8 5 8 5 6 5 4 7 
2000 8 1 8 1 6 5 4 7 
2001 8 1 8 5 9 5 4 7 
2002 8 1 8 4 9 5 2 7 
2003 8 1 8 4 9 5 1 9 
2004 8 1 8 5 9 5 2 9 
2005 8 1 8 6 8 5 4 9 
2006 8 1 8 6 8 5 1 9 
2007 2 1 8 5 8 5 2 9 
2008 2 1 8 6 8 5 6 9 
2009 8 1 8 5 8 5 4 8 
2010 8 1 8 5 8 5 4 8 
2011 8 1 5 6 6 5 5 8 
2012 8 1 5 6 6 5 5 8 
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Table A3. 6 Monetary Policy Regimes (continued) 
 
Year Uganda UAE UK Uruguay US Venezuela 
Yemen 
Republic 
Zambia Zimbabwe ECB 
1970 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1  
1971 1 1 1 1 6 1  1 1  
1972 1 1 1 7 2 1  1 1  
1973 4 1 1 7 6 1  1 1  
1974 2 1 5 7 6 1  1 5  
1975 5 1 4 7 6 1  1 5  
1976 1 1 5 7 6 1  5 1  
1977 1 1 6 7 6 1  5 1  
1978 1 2 5 7 6 1  5 5  
1979 1 2 5 7 5 1  4 2  
1980 1 1 5 7 6 1  4 5  
1981 6 1 5 7 6 1  4 5  
1982 5 1 6 7 6 1  4 5  
1983 5 1 6 7 6 1  5 5  
1984 5 1 6 7 6 1  5 5  
1985 6 1 6 7 6 1  6 5  
1986 6 1 6 7 6 1  7 5  
1987 6 1 3 7 6 1  7 4  
1988 6 1 3 7 6 1  7 5  
1989 6 1 3 7 5 7  7 5  
1990 5 1 3 7 5 7  7 5  
1991 5 1 6 7 9 7 1 7 7  
1992 5 1 9 7 9 7 1 7 7  
1993 4 1 9 7 9 7 1 7 7  
1994 5 1 9 7 9 7 1 7 7  
1995 5 1 9 7 9 7 1 7 7  
1996 5 1 9 7 9 7 1 7 5  
1997 6 1 8 7 8 7 1 7 7  
1998 6 1 8 7 8 7 1 7 7  
1999 6 1 8 7 8 7 1 7 1 8 
2000 6 1 8 6 8 7 1 7 7 8 
2001 5 1 8 6 8 7 1 7 1 8 
2002 5 1 8 6 8 7 1 7 1 8 
2003 4 1 8 5 8 1 1 7 7 8 
2004 6 1 8 5 6 1 1 7 7 8 
2005 6 1 8 5 6 1 1 7 7 8 
2006 3 1 8 5 6 1 1 7 7 8 
2007 3 1 8 6 6 1 1 7 7 10 
2008 5 1 5 6 8 1 1 6 7 10 
2009 5 1 6 6 8 1 1 6 7 10 
2010 5 1 6 6 8 1 1 6 7 10 
2011 5 1 6 5 6 1 1 6 7 10 
2012 5 1 6 5 6 1 1 6 7 10 
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Chapter Four: Financial Development and Growth: The Effects of 
Quality and Quantity 
4.1 Introduction 
The last few decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the nature of the 
relationship between financial development and growth. Levine (2005) suggests that 
financial institutions and markets can foster economic growth through several channels, 
e.g., by (i) easing the exchange of goods and services and through the provision of 
payment services, (ii) mobilising and pooling savings from a large number of investors, 
(iii) acquiring and processing information about enterprises and possible investment 
projects, thus allocating savings to their most productive use, (iv) monitoring 
investment and carrying out corporate governance and (v) diversifying liquidity and 
reducing intertemporal risk. 
However, there is widespread debate over the finance-growth nexus and the 
outcome is inconclusive. Nearly three decades earlier, Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon 
(1973), Shaw (1973) and subsequently many others produced considerable evidence of 
correlation between financial development and growth. Nevertheless, Robinson (1952) 
argues that financial development follows economic development and not vice versa. 
Aghion et al. (2005) find that financial development exerts an effect on convergence 
only up to a certain threshold and that there is no significant impact of financial 
development once a country reaches that threshold. Obtaining satisfactory empirical 
measures of financial development is also one of the most important and contentious 
issues in assessing the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. Some argue that the quality of financial institutions is as important as the 
quantity (for example, Levine, 1997; Hasan et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there is a lack 
of suitable proxies to measure financial quality.  
The pioneering study by King and Levine (1993) and subsequent work by 
Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine (2000), Levine et al. (2000) and Beck and Levine 
(2001) identified three indicators of financial development that are best at explaining 
the differences in economic growth over the long run. They are bank credit to the 
private sector, stock market activity (proxied by the turnover rate or the ratio of traded 
value to GDP) and features of the legal system, such as the extent of shareholder and 
creditor protection. 
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Most of the studies examining the relationship between finance and growth utilised 
traditional measures of the volume of credit such as (i) financial depth, measured by 
liquid liabilities of the financial system divided by GDP, (ii) ratio of commercial bank 
credit to that of central bank credit, which measures the degree to which commercial 
banks, compared to the central bank, allocate society's savings, (iii) private credit, 
which equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP and (iv) various proxies of the legal system. However, these traditional 
measures of financial development have some shortcomings. For example, the 
commonly used financial depth measure may not accurately gauge the effectiveness of 
the financial sector in ameliorating informational asymmetries and easing transaction 
costs (Levine, 2000). The ratio of commercial to central bank measure also has limited 
ability to measure the effectiveness of banks in mobilising savings, easing transactions, 
offering efficient risk management facilities to the clients, exerting corporate controls 
and innovations.  Furthermore, a mere expansion of credit or liquid liabilities does not 
always indicate a qualitative improvement of financial intermediaries’ ability to 
channel scarce funds from savers to borrowers (Romero-Avila, 2007). These variables 
also depend on the business cycle. The stock market variables used in studies such as 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Beck and Levine 
(2003) find strong correlation with stock market development and growth.
66
 However, 
banks provide different services to those provided by stock markets. The bank based 
view of financial development suggests that bank based systems at early stages of 
economic development foster economic growth to a greater degree than the market 
based financial system. 
 
Although there is substantial evidence regarding the role of financial systems in 
enhancing economic growth, there are shortcomings associated with measuring the 
quality of the financial development under consideration. There is a lack of cross-
country measures of the degree to which financial systems enhance the quality of 
services and hence the efficiency of resource allocation. The quality of financial 
institutions can enhance the quality of information about firms and the efficiency of 
resource allocation, exert sound corporate governance on firms to funnel resources, 
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Usually represented by capitalisation, turnover, and international integrations. 
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provide effective mechanisms for managing, pooling and diversifying risk, mobilise 
savings to the most efficient projects and facilitate trade (Čihák et al., 2012).   
In a simple endogenous two input ‘AK’ growth model, Pagano (1993) shows 
how the quality of financial developments can potentially affect growth. Financial 
intermediaries absorb resources during the process of transforming savings into 
investments. Thus, a dollar saved generates less than a dollar worth of investment by a 
certain fraction. Pagano (1993) shows that by increasing the efficiency of services, 
financial development can reduce the absorption of resources and turn more savings 
into productive resources. Financial development also enhances growth by increasing 
the efficient allocation of funds to those projects with a higher marginal productivity of 
capital.  
A number of other studies such as Caporale et al. (2009) and Ayadi et al. (2009) 
used some indirect measure of financial quality. Caporale et al. (2009) used the spread 
between the borrowing and lending rates of interest as a measure of quality, finding a 
significant relationship between per capita growth and the quality of 10 new 
transitional European countries. Ayadi et al. (2013) used meta-efficiency in order to 
calculate bank efficiency.
67
 Their findings suggest that financial sector development is 
positively associated with growth. However, they find that improvements in banking 
sector efficiency are not sufficient to improve growth in southern Mediterranean 
countries, additional conditions such as better quality institutions, regulations and 
supervision are also important.  
Hasan et al. (2009) suggests a more direct measure of the quality of financial 
institutions, thereby addressing the issue of the suboptimal empirical proxies for 
theoretical counterparts raised by Levine (2005). They test whether better bank 
efficiency (estimated with bank level data) significantly spurs economic growth in the 
147 NUTS2 regions of eleven European countries over the period 1996 to 2004.
68
 As a 
direct measure of financial quality, they calculated profit and cost efficiencies for 
approximately 7000 banks and also examined the spatial effects of banking sector 
growth in this region. Quantity was measured by the volume of bank credit, relative to 
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Meta-efficiency is the distance of a bank from the meta-frontier, which is defined by the product of a 
country’s cost efficiency and technical rate of growth (TRG).  
68
 NUTS: Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques. 
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GDP. The findings from their GMM estimations suggest that quality rules over 
quantity. They find that volume of credit is not significant for growth in GDP per 
worker in these economically developed regions. On the contrary, the interaction of 
quality, measured by profit and cost-efficiencies, is significant for economic growth. 
An improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more regional growth compared to 
an identical increase in credit volume. Hence, their findings suggest that any future 
research should take into account the quality of financial services rather than a volume 
or quantity measurement. A general extension of Hasan et al. (2009) would be to see if 
similar effects hold for developing economies. Unlike developed countries, most 
developing countries are yet to achieve their steady state growth rates.  
One of the key contributions of this study is also to address these sub-optimal 
empirical proxies, in order to gauge the effect of the quality of financial institutions on 
economic growth. We examine the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth for 8 South and South-East Asian developing countries. These 
countries are emerging economies and share, to some extent, a similar kind of financial 
background compared to countries like Singapore or Hong Kong in these regions. Due 
to the lack of available data, we could not incorporate Bangladesh, one of the South 
Asian countries in our analysis. We adopt a similar approach to Hasan et al. (2009) and 
measure financial quality by profit and cost efficiency of the banks for these countries, 
in order to observe the impact of quality and quantity of financial development. 
However, access to bank level data is quite a challenge for these developing countries. 
In some of these countries, a sufficient amount of data was not available for a number 
of banks to conduct a valid analysis.  
We calculate quality for 191 banks of the 8 countries, over the period 2003 to 
2012. Limited data availability is one of the main reasons for this sample choice. The 
profit and cost efficiencies are calculated by a fixed effects version of Schmidt and 
Sickles’ (1984) panel data stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The volume of financial 
development has been measured by bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP, as well as broad money to GDP ratios. Real GDP per worker has been used for 
the dependent variable. Other control variables are the percentage of secondary school 
enrolment, inflation and openness. The model has been estimated by two-step system 
GMM in order to control for the endogeneity of the dynamic panel. Partially 
contrasting the findings of Hasan et al. (2009), our findings suggest that both quality 
and quantity measures of the financial sectors matter for these developing countries. 
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The interaction term is also found to be significant. Therefore, our findings also 
highlight the importance of specifying three distinct channels through which banks may 
foster productivity growth: by channeling more credit, developing more efficient 
intermediaries and the interaction of two. The findings also imply that the quality and 
volume of financial developments are complimentary to each other in these regions. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the empirical 
evidence of the financial development-growth nexus. Section 4.3 discusses the 
methodology of the studies. Section 4.4 discusses the findings and section 4.5 
concludes the chapter.   
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4.2 Literature review 
It has been argued that long term sustainable economic growth depends on the ability to 
raise the rate of accumulation of physical and human capital, to use the resulting 
productive assets more efficiently and to enable access to these assets for the 
population (FitzGerald, 2006). Financial intermediation can affect economic growth in 
several ways. For example, it can enhance economic growth by acting on the savings 
rate, on the fraction of savings channeled to investment or through the social marginal 
productivity of investment (Pagano, 1993).   
Starting from Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), this 
subject has been extensively studied for several decades. One of the pioneers, 
Goldsmith (1969), suggests that differences in a country’s financial organization, and 
its financial habits and attitudes influences the direction of economic development and 
affects the speed of economic growth. Goldsmith (1969) used the ratio of financial 
intermediaries’ assets to GNP to estimate the depth of financial development and also 
to observe if there is a positive correlation between the size of the financial system and 
the provision and quality of financial services. Goldsmith (1969), for 35 countries over 
the period 1860 to 1963, observed a rough parallelism between economic and financial 
development. His finding provides the indication that for a few countries, faster 
economic growth has been accompanied by an above-average rate of financial 
development. Even though Goldsmith (1969) provided the basis for subsequent 
research in this area, his study has several weaknesses. The study does not 
systematically control for other factors influencing economic growth (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992) nor does it examine whether financial development is associated with 
productivity growth and capital accumulation. Levine and Renelt (1992) argue that the 
size of financial intermediaries might not be a proper measure of the functioning of 
financial system. The high correlation between the size of the financial system and 
economic growth does not clearly identify the direction of causality. 
Subsequent studies by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) on 80 countries over the 
period 1960 to 1989, addressed the issues of Goldsmith (1969). By systematically 
controlling for other factors affecting long run growth, their study examined the impact 
of capital accumulation and productivity growth channels on economic growth. They 
utilised four alternative measures of the level of financial development and analyse if 
the level of financial development predicts long-run economic growth, capital 
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accumulation, and productivity growth. The first measure, DEPTH, represents the size 
of financial intermediaries and liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus 
demand and interest bearing liabilities of bank and non bank financial intermediaries) 
divided by GDP. They find a strong positive correlation between real per capita GDP 
and DEPTH. The second measure, BANK, represents the degree to which the central 
banks versus commercial banks are allocating credit. BANK equals the ratio of bank 
credit to bank credit plus central bank domestic assets. The underlying reason is that the 
commercial banks are more likely to generate financial activities than the central banks. 
The remainder of the two measures are partially concerned with the allocation of credit. 
The third measure, PRIVATE, equals the ratio of credit allocation to private enterprises 
to that of total domestic credit (excluding credit to the banks). The fourth measure, 
PRIVY, equals the ratio of credit to private enterprises and GDP. The main 
assumptions underlying these measures are that financial systems that allocate more 
credit to private firms are more engaged in researching firms, exerting corporate 
control, providing risk management services, mobilising savings and facilitating 
transactions than financial systems that simply funnel credit to the government or state 
owned enterprises. The three growth indicators used are: the average rate of real per 
capita GDP growth, the average rate of growth in the capital stock per person and total 
productivity growth.69 They assessed the strength of the empirical relationship between 
each of these four indicators of financial development and three growth indicators, all 
averaged over the period 1960 to 1989. The findings from the cross section studies 
suggest a strong positive relationship between each of the four financial development 
indicators and the three growth indicators.70 
Furthermore, to examine the causal relationship between financial development 
and growth, King and Levine (1993b) examine whether the value of financial depth in 
1960 predicts the rate of economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity 
growth over the next 30 years. Their findings suggest that the initial level of financial 
development predicts subsequent rates of economic growth as well as physical capital 
accumulation and economic efficiency over the next 30 years, even after controlling for 
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 Defined by a ‘Solow residual' defined as real per capita GDP growth minus (0.3) times the growth rate 
of the capital stock per person.  
70
 The other conditioning variables are income per capita, education, political stability, indicators of 
exchange rate, trade, fiscal and monetary policy.  
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income, education, political stability, and measures of monetary, trade and fiscal 
policy. 
  Levine and Zervos (1998) extends Levine (1993a) by using a measure of 
deposit money bank credits to the private sector and stock market liquidity over the 
period 1976 to1993, for 47 countries. They try to evaluate if banking and stock market 
indicators are both robustly correlated with the current and future rates of economic 
growth, capital accumulation, productivity growth and private savings. Their findings 
suggest that stock market liquidity and banking development both positively predict 
growth, capital accumulation and productivity improvements, even after controlling for 
economic and political factors. Their findings also suggest that the functioning of the 
banking sector is different to the functioning of stock markets in the growth process. 
Overall, the study suggests that financial factors are an integral part of growth and there 
is a strong positive link between financial development and economic growth. 
Despite the finding of many studies, that there are beneficial effects of financial 
development on economic growth, there still exists extensive debate on the issue. Many 
have argued that the impact of financial development on growth is limited, once an 
economy reaches to a certain level of development. Contrary to some previous studies, 
Aghion et al. (2005) claims that financial development can only explain the 
convergence to steady state growth, but it does not exert a direct impact on growth once 
a country reaches steady state. The study explores the hypothesis that financial 
constraints prevent poor countries from taking full advantage of technology transfers 
and this is the reason that some countries diverge from the growth rate of the world 
frontier. The paper developed and tested a Schumpeterian model of cross country 
convergence with financial constraints. The model implies that all countries above 
some critical level of financial development should achieve convergence in growth 
rates, and financial development has an initial positive but eventually vanishing effect 
on steady state growth. The implications of their model have been tested on 71 
countries, with a split sample of cross section growth regression from 1960 to 1995. 
The samples are split according to their level of financial intermediation.
71
 They find 
that within the bottom half of the countries, the convergence parameter is not 
significantly different from zero and the coefficient of private credit is significantly 
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 The US serves as a benchmark. The average growth rates and log per capita GDP of each country have 
been subtracted from that of the US at the frontier.  
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positive, whilst in the top half of countries, the convergence parameter is negative and 
the significance of private credit is substantially lower than in the bottom half. As an 
alternative to the split sample regression (which might be inflicted with small sample 
bias), they perform the tests with an interaction analysis using a standard growth model, 
instrumental variable and GMM approach. They use private credit as a measurement of 
financial intermediation, with an interaction term between financial intermediation and 
the country’s initial relative output.72 The findings suggest that convergence depends 
positively on financial development. A country can converge as long as the level of 
private credit exceeds the critical value, which, according to their estimate, is 25%. 
Those countries with extremely low financial intermediation will fail to join 
convergence. Their result implies that a lack of financial development accounts for the 
failure of some countries to converge to the global technology frontier, but that 
financial development certainly has limited impact on mature and steady state 
economies.   
Arcand et al. (2012) also study whether there is a threshold, above which any 
financial development stops contributing to economic growth. Their finding suggests 
that the relationship between financial depth and economic growth disappears in 
countries with a very large financial sector. Credit to the private sector above 80 to 
100% of GDP has a negative impact on economic growth. The study suggests two 
possible reasons for this negative impact: i) excessive credit growth, which could lead 
to high economic volatility and probability of financial crisis, and ii) high credit 
volume, which is generally related to potential resource misallocation. Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) examine the impact of size and growth of the financial system on 
productivity growth and economic level, using a sample of 50 countries over the period 
1980 to 2009. The study also suggests that financial sector size has an inverted U-
shaped effect on productivity growth. A further increase in the size of financial system 
contributes negatively to total factor productivity growth. Thus, the finding implies that 
more finance is not always necessarily better.  
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 They used few other alternative measures of financial intermediation for robustness. The first one is 
liquid liabilities, which is currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and non bank 
financial intermediaries divided by GDP. The second alternative measure is bank assets, the value of all 
credits by banks (excluding other financial intermediaries). The third is the same as Levine et al. (1993), 
the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets. The results are 
robust to all of these measurements.  
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There are controversies over the indicators of financial development. For 
example, the widely used ratio of liquid liabilities raises some issues. FitzGerald (2006) 
shows that the widely used 
𝑀2
𝑌⁄  is not a reliable indicator of financial depth as it 
varies enormously over time as well as across countries and responds to changing 
monetary policy stances. It is also highly likely to be related to the asset bubble. Some 
interpretative problems also emerged from earlier studies (Pagano, 1993). Most of the 
studies are not very clear about the way financial development enhances growth. There 
is no clear suggestion as to whether the growth has been achieved by increasing 
investment or by enhancing the efficiency of investment. Moreover, empirical analysis 
at the aggregate level is unlikely to capture the complexity of financial structures in 
industrial countries and their growth process. A mere expansion of credit does not 
necessarily reflect a qualitative improvement of the financial intermediaries to channel 
funds in the economy and gives only a partial picture of the extent of financial 
development. The degree of financial development is assumed to be exogenous in most 
of the studies. According to Pagano (1993), financial development is too generic a 
term. Therefore, to gauge its impact on growth, one must specify the particular 
financial market concerned. As such, the quality of banking sectors can be a candidate 
for a more direct measure of economic growth. Few studies try to find suitable proxies 
for qualitative assessment of financial development.  
A distinctive study by Hasan et al. (2009), attempted to investigate regional 
significance of both financial quality and quantity for eleven European countries.
73
 
They explicitly measure the financial quality by cost and profit efficiencies of financial 
intermediaries, using a translog production function. The translog production function 
is calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The true fixed effects model 
developed by Greene (2002) is used for this SFA.
74
 Financial volume is measured by 
the bank credit volume relative to GDP.
75
 Their finding suggests the relative 
importance of financial quality over volume, for 11 industrialised countries. A 1% 
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 They allocate the financial quality and quantity indicators around 147NUTS 2 regions across 11 
European countries.  
74
 They use unconsolidated financial data for approximately 7000 banks in 11 EU countries, between 
1996 and 2004 
75
 The dependent variable is gross domestic product per worker. Regional controls are the growth rate of 
the working population and spatial lags of financial volume and quality. They have also used a direct and 
a square time trend to control for time specific effects. 
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increase in banks’ ability to convert inputs into financial services spurs regional 
growth, by almost 0.06%. However, the quantity effect on its own is found to be 
insignificant, despite the significance of interaction between quality and quantity. Their 
results highlight the importance of specifying three distinct channels through which 
banks may foster productivity growth. That is, more credit, more quality and, above all, 
more interaction between quantity and quality. Studies such as Caporale et al. (2009) 
and Ayadi and Arbak (2013) also try to assess financial quality in different ways.  
Caporale et al. (2009) examines the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth for 10 new EU countries, by estimating a dynamic panel model 
over the period 1994 to 2007. Three financial indicators have been used to analyse the 
link between financial sector development and economic growth. The indicators are: 
the ratio of private credit to GDP, liquid liabilities and stock market capitalisation. 
Additionally, they have measured the efficiency of the financial sector by interest 
margin, which measures the difference between deposits and lending rates in the 
banking sector. The EBRD index of institutional development, which measures the 
progress in reforming the financial sector, has also been used as a financial 
development indicator.
76
 Their finding from the dynamic panel estimation suggests that 
the effects of credit to the private sector are insignificant, possibly due to numerous 
banking crises, which resulted in a large proportion of the non performing loans in 
these transition economies. The stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio has a positive 
but minor effect on economic growth. The ratio of liquid liabilities to real GDP has a 
positive and significant effect, thus consistent with the idea that money supply helps 
growth by facilitating economic activities. Both of the efficiency measurements have a 
significant impact on growth. The findings suggest that shrinking the interest margin 
enhances economic growth and efficiency. Banking and financial sector reform has the 
same positive impact on growth.  
Ayadi and Arbak (2013) find that better institutions and low inflation are key 
factors for economic growth in the region of northern and southern Mediterranean 
countries over the period 1985 to 2009. However, private sector credit and bank 
deposits have a negative impact. Five measures of financial development (bank credit 
                                                 
76
 The spread between the deposit and the lending rate measures the transaction costs within the sector 
but also reflects an improvement in the quality of borrowers in the economy. If the margin declines due 
to a decrease in transaction costs, the share of savings going to investment increases and economic 
growth accelerates. 
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to the private sector (as % of GDP), share of bank deposits (as % of GDP), meta-
efficiency of banks, Stock market capitalisation (as % of GDP), total value traded in 
stock market (as % of GDP) and stock market turnover) are used in their study. 
77,78
 
Their findings suggest that both the size and liquidity of stock market bears a 
significant role in economic growth in this region, compared to banking credit and 
efficiency. The quality of the institution has an insignificant role. Investment, whether 
domestic or FDI, contributes significantly to economic growth. 
The above analysis of some previous studies suggest that despite a significant 
amount of research having been conducted in this area, there still remains a great 
amount of controversy regarding the role of efficiency in the financial sector. 
Moreover, the literature reports a wide range efficiency measures. However, measuring 
banking sector efficiency as a proxy for the efficiency of financial intermediation is 
important, particularly in the context of developing countries. Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) 
argue that banks are a crucial device for the selection of entrepreneurs and the 
allocation of financial resources. Therefore, banking sector efficiency is essential to 
economic development. Banks also ensure the quality of the borrowers. We try to 
provide an insight into this argument by directly measuring banking efficiencies and 
comparing them with other measures of financial development for economic growth. 
However, before proceeding further, the first important issue is to define how the 
quality of financial intermediation can be linked to economic growth as the traditional 
growth literature does not recognise a direct impact of the quality of financial 
intermediation on economic growth. The following section provides a theoretical 
approach linking the quality of financial intermediation to growth.      
 
4.2.1 The relevance of quality of financial institutions: a theoretical approach 
In traditional growth theory, instead of exerting a direct effect on growth, financial 
intermediation is assumed to be related to the level of capital stock per worker or to the 
level of productivity. The latter was ascribed to exogenous technical progress. The 
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 Meta-efficiency is the distance of a bank from the meta-frontier, which is defined by the product of 
country cost efficiency and technical rate of growth (TRG) 
78
 Other control variables are financial openness and inflation. A composite index on legal quality and 
democratic accountability is constructed, using four indicators from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), published by the PRS Group. Capital flow variables, controlling for net foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and portfolio investments are also included. 
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endogenous growth model provides the vital theoretical link between growth and 
financial development. This model suggests that growth can be self sustaining without 
exogenous technical progress. Growth rate can be related to preferences, technology, 
income distribution and institutional arrangements. This provides the theoretical basis, 
which early contributions lacked, suggesting that financial intermediation can have not 
only level, but also growth effects.  
In a simple endogenous ‘AK’ growth model, Pagano (1993) shows how 
financial development can potentially effect growth.  Equation (4.1) depicts the model, 
where aggregate output is a linear function of the aggregate capital stock: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾(𝐾, 𝐿) =  𝐴𝐾𝑡    (4.1) 
Here, A is an exogenous constant and K is, broadly defined, aggregate capital. 
Therefore, K can include not just physical, but also human capital, as well as the stock 
of knowledge and financial capital. This is a reduced form production function, 
resulting from one of two underlying frameworks. One represents a competitive 
economy with external economies, as in Romer (1989), where the firm faces constant 
returns to scale, but productivity is an increasing function of aggregate capital stock. 
For simplicity, it has been assumed that the population is stationary and the 
economy produces a single good, which can either be invested or consumed. 
𝛿 represents the depreciation rate per period, if product is invested. Then the gross 
investment 𝐼𝑡 equals: 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡    (4. 2) 
In a closed economy, with no government, capital market equilibrium requires 
that gross saving 𝑆𝑡 equals gross investment 𝐼𝑡. A proportion 1-∅ of the flow of saving 
is lost in the presence of financial intermediation. Therefore, gross investment can be 
expressed as:  
∅𝑆𝑡 =  𝐼𝑡               (4.3) 
From equation (4.1), the growth rate at time t+1 can be expressed as  𝑔𝑡+1 =
𝑌𝑡+1
𝑌𝑡
⁄ = 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
⁄ .  By using equation (4.2) and dropping the steady state time indices, the steady 
state growth rate can be written as: 
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𝑔 = 𝐴
I
𝑌
− 𝛿 = 𝐴∅𝑠 − 𝛿     (4.4) 
Here, the capital market equilibrium equation (3) has been used and s represents 
the gross saving rate 𝑆 𝑌 ⁄ .  Equation (4.4) depicts how financial development can affect 
growth. It can increase ∅, the proportion of saving funnelled to investment, it may 
increase 𝐴, the social marginal productivity of capital and it can influence 𝑠, the private 
saving rates.  
Financial intermediaries absorb resources during the process of transforming 
saving into investment. A dollar saved generates less than a dollar worth of investment, 
by a fraction ∅. The remaining fraction 1 − ∅ goes to banks as the spread between 
lending and borrowing rates, and to securities brokers and dealers as commissions, fees 
etc. This absorption of resources by the financial sector is primarily a reward for 
services supplied; however, it may also reflect the inefficiency of the intermediaries 
and their market power (Pagano, 1993).  Moreover, activities of financial institutions 
are often subjected to legislation in the form of taxation (high reserve requirements, 
transaction taxes, etc.) and by restrictive regulations, translating into higher margins 
(Roubini and Sala-i-Martin; 1991).
79
 Therefore, financial development increases the 
growth rate, 𝑔, by reducing these leakages of resources, i.e. by raising ∅ in equation 
(4.4) (Pagano, 1993).  
Financial development also enhances growth, by increasing the efficient 
allocation of funds to projects with a higher marginal productivity of capital. Financial 
intermediaries increase the productivity of capital, ‘A’, in two ways: (i) by collecting 
information to evaluate alternative investment projects and (ii) by inducing individuals 
to invest in riskier but more productive technologies, thus by providing better risk 
sharing (Pagano, 1993). Therefore, the development of financial institutions channels 
savings more efficiently and enhances higher productivity of capital. A higher 
productivity of capital enhances growth.  
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 The implicit assumption here is that the quasi-rents earned by financial intermediaries and the tax 
revenue extracted from them are entirely spent on private and public consumption respectively. Their 
detrimental effect on growth is tempered if they are partly spent on investment.  
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4.3 Methodology 
Our panel analysis, exploring the linkage between financial development and economic 
growth, consists of annual data for eight developing countries from 2003 to 2012. The 
time period has been guided by the availability of data. We try to focus on the 
developing countries of South and South-East Asia. The selected countries share 
similar financial backgrounds and growth. Those included in the sample are: India, 
Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. All data for 
the panel analysis have been obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI). We have estimated profit and cost efficiencies for 191 banks of the 
eight countries, to substitute for a measurement of financial quality. The number of 
banks are also selected on the basis of data availability for these countries. Some of 
these countries do not have bank level data sufficient enough to conduct the analysis 
for a longer period of time. Yearly bank level data are obtained from the Bankscope 
database.   
4.3.1 Methodology for the panel estimation  
We attempt to gauge the relationship between financial development and 
growth by estimating an augmented Barro growth regression model, which takes into 
account financial development. We specify a reduced form growth model as a dynamic 
panel model of the form of equation (4.5): 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1+𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  ϻ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (4.5) 
Here, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is real GDP growth per worker. In traditional growth theory the role 
of financial intermediation is related to the level of capital stock per worker or to the 
level of productivity. However, as we have discussed earlier, traditional growth theory 
does not recognize any direct relationship between the capital stock and the growth rate 
of labour productivity. Levine (2000) shows that the impact of financial developments 
on growth works mainly by enhancing total factor productivity rather than through 
capital accumulation or saving rates. 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1  is initial real GDP per worker, included to 
control for convergence predicted by Solow-Swan growth models. i represents a 
country and t represents the time period. ϻ𝑖  and  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  are two error terms. ϻ𝑖 is an 
unobserved country specific component of the error term, that does not necessarily 
have a zero mean, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a white noise error term, with zero mean. Time invariant 
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country characteristics, such as geography and demographics are usually correlated 
with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects take the account of the unobserved 
country specific effects. 𝛽1and 𝛽2 are the coefficients that capture the finance-growth 
relationship.  
Financial development is measured in terms of quality and quantity. 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑉𝑖,𝑡 measures the volume of financial development. Two alternative indicators have 
been used for volume: i) domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks as a 
percentage of GDP and ii) broad money as a percentage of GDP. 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑄𝑖,𝑡 measures the 
quality of bank efficiency, which has been calculated separately through profit and cost 
efficiencies for the 191 banks. 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖,𝑡  represents other control variables, generally 
proxies for human capital, trade and degrees of uncertainty in the future markets. 
Secondary school enrolment has widely been used for the measure of human capital. 
We have used the percentage of gross secondary school enrolment to represent human 
capital. Additionally, we have included trade openness and inflation. Some empirical 
evidence suggests that in the long run, more outward-oriented countries experience 
higher economic growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Frankel and 
Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2004). Uncertainty in financial sectors has been 
measured by inflation.  
The model is dynamic in nature. Apart from the country specific characteristics, 
the estimation of 𝛽𝑖 can be biased in many different ways. The quality and quantity of 
the financial sectors can be endogenous, meaning the more developed a country is, the 
more would be the quality and quantity of the financial sector. The panel data set has a 
short time dimension ( 𝑡 = 10) . Measurement error, reverse causality and omitted 
variable bias can be common in this model. The presence of lagged initial GDP per 
worker is also susceptible to autocorrelation. Therefore, a suitable estimation method is 
required in order to obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient estimators of the dynamic 
model in equation (4.5). Estimation of dynamic panel regression models with lagged 
values of the endogenous variables as instruments can be a suitable estimation 
procedure ((Beck et al. (2000), Rioja and Valev (2004), Hasan et al. (2009)). Unlike 
the normal pooled cross section models, they control for endogeneity and measurement 
errors, not only in the financial development variables but also other explanatory 
variables in the model. 
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Equation (4.5) has been estimated using system GMM. The Arellano-Bover and 
Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano and Bond (1991), by making an additional 
assumption that the first difference of the instrumented variables are uncorrelated with 
the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments and can dramatically 
improve efficiency. It builds a system of two equations, the original equation and the 
transformed one, hence known as system GMM (Roodman, 2009). Blundell and Bond 
(1998) present Monte Carlo evidence to show that the inclusion of the level regression 
in the estimation reduces the potential bias in finite samples and the asymptotic 
inaccuracy associated with the difference estimator. In two step estimation, the standard 
covariance matrix is robust to panel specific autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the 
instruments. To address this issue we consider two specification tests suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The first one is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall 
validity of the instruments, by analyzing the sample analogous of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process.
80
 The second test, Arellano-Bond test for AR 
(2), tests for serial correlation in the error term 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . The Sargan test has a null 
hypothesis of, ‘the instruments as a group are exogenous’. Therefore, higher probability 
value of the 𝑆𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛 statistic indicates exogeneity of the instruments. The Arellano-
Bond  (𝐴𝑅2) test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is 
applied to the differenced residuals. It detects autocorrelations in levels.  
4.3.2 Methodology for bank efficiency 
The bank level data, which is used to calculate the profit and cost efficiencies of 
191 Banks across 8 South and South East Asian countries, has been collected from the 
Bankscope data base. The sample period covers 2003 to 2014.  The necessary bank 
level data for many banks is not available for a valid analysis prior to the sample 
period. The data for suitable analysis has been found for only 191 banks of the eight 
countries over this period.  
The standard profit function for bank efficiency can be augmented and written 
in logarithmic form as: 
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 Sargan, J.D.(1958). ‘The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental Variables’, 
Econometrica, 26, 393-415.  
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ln(𝜋𝑏𝑡+θ) =𝑓𝜋(𝑃𝑡,𝑤𝑡,𝑧𝑏𝑡, 𝑣𝑡 )+ 𝑙𝑛𝑢𝜋𝑏𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝜋𝑏𝑡  (4.6) 
Equation (4.6) represents a profit function. The function 𝑓𝜋  represents 
optimising behaviour and relates the log of variable profits ,𝜋𝑏𝑡, of bank b at time t 
(plus a constant θ) to a vector of input prices, 𝑃𝑡  , a vector of variable inputs, 𝑤𝑡, a 
vector of semi fixed netputs 𝑧𝑏𝑡, and some environmental and structural variables 𝑣𝑡. 
The term, 𝜖𝜋𝑏𝑡, represents a random error that varies from period to period. The fixed 
effects are captured by 𝑢𝜋𝑏𝑡 . Profit can be negative, so the constant θ is needed to 
ensure that the argument remains positive. The cost function can be estimated, 
similarly, as the profit function. The cost function can be written in the following form:  
ln(𝐶𝑏𝑡) =𝑓𝑐(𝑦𝑏𝑡,𝑤𝑡,𝑧𝑏𝑡, 𝑣𝑡 )+ 𝑙𝑛𝑢𝑐𝑏𝑡 + 𝑙𝑛𝜖𝑏𝑡   (4.7) 
Here, 𝑦𝑏𝑡 is the output of bank b at time t. We have used stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) to calculate the efficiencies.  
Frontier analysis has been used extensively to measure the performance of 
financial institutions. There are four main frontier approaches, each differing in the 
assumptions made about the shape of the frontier, the treatment of the random error and 
the distributions assumed for inefficiency and the random error. The methods of 
calculating efficiency often differ in terms of the underlying concept of efficiency, 
either technological or economical. Nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
usually focuses on technological efficiency and parametric approaches like stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA), thick frontier approach (TFA) and distribution free approach 
(DFA) are used for measuring economic efficiency.
81,82
 
Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of 
using parametric methods over the nonparametric method is that they allow for random 
errors. The DEA usually does not allow for random errors due to measurement 
problems associated with using accounting data, the factors that cause ups and downs 
in inputs and outputs or error specification (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier and Humphrey, 
1998). Therefore, parametric methods are less likely to misidentify measurement error, 
                                                 
81
 The early nonparametric frontier models include Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and parametric 
model includes Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). They mainly focus on technological inefficiency.  
82
 Technical or cost efficiency requires only input and output data, but economic efficiency requires also 
price data. Technological efficiency scores will also tend to be higher than economic efficiency scores on 
average due to the higher standards of allocative efficiency.   
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transitory differences in cost or specification error as inefficiency. One of the main 
challenges in implementing the parametric method is determining how best to separate 
unobserved random errors from the equally unobserved inefficiency (Bauer, Berger, 
Ferrier and Humphrey, 1998). However, the parametric methods have a disadvantage 
relative to nonparametric methods in that it imposes more restrictions on the shape of 
the frontier by specifying a functional form.  
We have used stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to analyse bank efficiency. 
The SF model is motivated by the theoretical idea that no economic agent can exceed 
the ideal frontier and the deviations from this extreme represent individual 
inefficiencies (Belotti et al., 2012). From a statistical point of view, this idea has been 
implemented by specifying a regression model characterised by a composite error term, 
in which the classical idiosyncratic disturbance trying to capture measurement error and 
any other classical noise, is included together with a one sided disturbance term to 
represent inefficiency in the production process. SFA employs a composed error model 
in which inefficiencies are assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution.
83
 This means 
that the error terms from the cost function, given by 𝑢𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜖𝑖 , represent inefficiency 
and follow some statistical distribution, and also represent random errors and behave 
according to a normal distribution. The reason behind this is that inefficiencies cannot 
subtract from costs and so must be drawn from a truncated distribution, whereas 
random errors can both add and subtract costs and so may be drawn from a symmetric 
distribution. Both the inefficiencies and the random errors are assumed to be orthogonal 
to the regressors specified by the underlying function. The following equations are 
specifying the SF model. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖,       𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁                                      (4.8) 
𝜖𝑖 =  𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 ,                                                                          (4.9) 
𝑣𝑖 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                      (4.10) 
𝑢𝑖 ∼ 𝐹                                                                                        (4.11) 
Here, 𝑦𝑖  represents the logarithm of the output (or cost, if we estimate the cost 
function) of the ith productive unit, 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of inputs.  𝛽  is the vector of 
technology parameters. The composite error term,𝜖𝑖 , is the sum (or the difference, if it 
is a cost function) of a normally distributed disturbance, 𝑣𝑖. 
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  𝑣𝑖 represents measurement and specification error. 𝑢𝑖, a one sided disturbance, 
represents inefficiency. The sign of the term  𝑢𝑖  could be positive or negative 
depending on whether the frontier describes a cost or production function respectively. 
The parameters 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be independent of each other and orthogonal 
across observations. To make the model estimable, assumptions about the distribution, 
which is denoted by 𝐹, of 𝑢𝑖  are needed. Aigner et al. (1977) assumed half normal 
distribution, i.e. 𝑢𝑖 ∼ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) . Meeusen and Broeck (1977) advocated for an 
exponential distribution where 𝑢𝑖 ∼ (𝜎𝑢). Other frequently adopted distributions are 
the Truncated Normal (Stevenson, 1980) and the Gamma distributions (Greene, 1980a, 
1980b, 2003). The distribution assumption required for the identification of the 
inefficiency term implies that the model is usually estimated by maximum likelihood 
(ML), even if modified least squares or generalised method of moments estimators are 
possible.  
Pitt and Lee (1981) is the first to extend the original cross section model of SF 
to longitudinal data. They proposed the ML estimation of the following normal-half 
normal SF model. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,       𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁𝑡 = 2 … , 𝑇𝑖                                    (4.12) 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡,                                                                                         (4.13) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                           (4.14) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)                                                                                        (4.15) 
 
The generalization of this model to the Normal-Truncated Normal case has been 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988). Schmidt and Sickles (1984) pointed out that the 
estimation of a SF model with time variant inefficiency can also be performed by 
adapting conventional fixed effects estimation techniques, allowing inefficiencies to be 
correlated with the frontier regressors and avoiding distributional assumptions about 
𝑢𝑖 .  However, the time invariant nature of the error term has been questioned, especially 
in the presence of empirical applications based on long panel data sets. The approach 
by Cornwall et al. (1990) proposed a SF model with individual specific slope 
parameters. Lee and Schmidt (1993) proposed a specific model, where 𝑢𝑖𝑡is specified 
with time dummies. Battese and Coelli’s (1992) ‘time decay’ model is another 
approach. Nevertheless, we have adopted Schmidt and Sickles (1984) time-invariant 
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inefficiency models for the analysis, because of our small data set, consisting of only 
ten years. The fixed effects version of this model has been estimated using STATA.  
The standard profit and the cost function for the full sample is taken in the form of 
following translog production function.
84
 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) + 𝛽2ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)
2 + 𝛽3 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) + 𝛽4ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)
2 +
𝛽5 ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) + 𝛽6ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)
2 + 𝛽7 ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) + 𝛽9 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) +
𝛽10 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) + 𝛽11 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ln( 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) + 𝛽12 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) +
𝛽13 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) + 𝛽14 ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                 (4.16)
     
For a simplistic representation, we have omitted the subscripts. The description 
of the variables is provided in table 4.1. To estimate the cost function, 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  is 
replaced by 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 and  𝑙𝑛(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) is replaced by 𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃).  
Equation (4.16) includes one output price, INTR, two input prices: INTC and 
OTHC, one netput, CPRS, and all the cross products. Table 4.1 describes the variables 
used for calculating bank efficiency.  
Table 4.1: Variable definitions 
Prof (per unit) 
Cost (per unit )  
OUTP 
INTR 
OTHC  
CPRS  
Pre tax profit / total assets   
Total costs / total assets  
Total earning assets / total assets  
Interest receipts / earning liabilities   
Other costs / earning liabilities   
Capital and reserves / total assets  
 
Here, total variable costs are the sum of interest costs and fees and other non 
interest costs. All bank specific variables, except prices, are divided by total assets to 
normalise the difference in size between institutions. The bank’s output (OUTP) is 
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 One of the main advantages of the translog production function is that unlike Cobb Douglas 
production functions, it does not assume rigid premises such as perfect or smooth substitution between 
production factors, nor does it require perfect competition (J.Klacek et al., 2007). Also, this production 
function permits to pass from a liner relationship between the output and the production factors to a non 
linear one. Due to these properties, the translog production function can be used for second order 
approximation of a liner homogeneous production estimation of a production frontier, the Allen 
elasticises of substitution or the measurement of total factor productivity dynamics. 
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represented by total interest and dividend earnings. The unit price of bank’s output 
(denoted by INTR) is defined as total income from interest receipts and dividends, 
divided by total earning assets. The unit price of borrowed funds (INTC) is defined as 
total interest expenses and fees, divided by funding liabilities. Data on the number of 
employees was missing for many banks, so it was not possible to measure the labour 
cost per employee. However, non interest unit costs are estimated as wage costs, rent, 
depreciation, directors and auditors fees and sundry operating expenses, divided by 
payable liabilities. Other costs are denoted as OTHC. The only netput included is the 
sum of each banks capital and reserves (CPRS), which provide an alternative to 
deposits and interbank borrowing in the financing of the bank’s operations.    
4.3.4 The Estimation Results 
4.3.4.1 Data summary and estimation results from bank efficiency: 
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used for the panel analysis. The 
mean GDP growth rate across the sample is 3.15%. The average bank credit to the 
private sector is 50.76% of GDP. Average inflation is 6.61%. Average broad growth as 
a percentage of GDP is 70.99%. Average trade to GDP ratio is 81.28%.  
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables   Mean  St. Dev Min  Max  
GDP growth per worker  3.15 2.71 -3.65 11.67 
Debt to the private sector by the banking sector  50.76 32.66 16.80 118.59 
Inflation   6.61 4.22 -0.84 22.56 
Secondary Education  68.01 19.12 27.75 99.33 
Broad money  70.99 33.39 34.55 141.17 
Labour force growth  1.27 1.50 -2.62 6.79 
Openness  81.28 51.25 30.06 210.37 
Note: GDP per worker is the per capita real GDP per person employed (constant at 1999 US$), Bank credit is the 
domestic bank credit to the private sector as a % of GDP, broad money growth is expressed as a percentage of GDP, 
secondary education is measured by gross secondary school enrolment as a % of GDP and Openness is measured by 
the ratio of trade to GDP.  
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Table 4.3 provides a synopsis of the variables across countries. Malaysia has the 
highest per capita GDP per worker (13976.15 Dollars) followed by Thailand and Sri 
Lanka. However, the growth rate of GDP per employee is highest in India followed by 
Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The average bank credit to the private sector is also highest in 
Malaysia followed by Thailand and India. These three countries (respectively) also 
have the highest average rate of broad money growth. Secondary education rate is 
highest in Sri Lanka followed by the Philippines and Thailand. 
  Nepal, Pakistan and India, the three South Asian countries, respectively, have 
the lowest GDP per worker. Nevertheless, India and Sri Lanka scores the fastest growth 
across the eight countries. Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka have the lowest average 
bank credit to the private sector, respectively. The same countries have the lowest 
broad money growth rate amongst the eight countries. The trade to GDP ratio is highest 
in Malaysia and Thailand.  
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: GDP per worker is the per capita real GDP per person employed (constant 1999 US$), Bank credit is the 
domestic bank credit to the private sector as a % of GDP, ratio of M2/Y is the ratio of M2 to GDP, secondary 
education is measured by gross secondary school enrolment as a % of GDP and Openness is measured by the ratio of 
trade to GDP.  
 
Table 4.4 summarises profit and cost efficiency, estimated using data from 191 
banks across eight countries. We have used Schmidt and Sickles (1984) fixed effect 
SFA analysis. Profit can be negative. Therefore, we have added 1 with profit data, in 
order to avoid negative values. We have not distinguished between private and public 
banks, due to the small sample size. Malaysia has the highest profit efficiency followed 
by Philippines. These two countries also have the highest cost efficiency. The lowest 
profit efficiency is recorded for India, followed by Indonesia and Nepal. Indonesian 
banks are found to be the least cost efficient. 
85
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  Tables A4.1 to A4.8 in appendix 4.1 provide the estimation results for profit and cost efficiencies.  
Country GDP (per worker) Growth 
rate  
 Bank 
credit 
Broad money/Y  Secondary 
education 
Openness 
 Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
India 2216.54 458.38 5.69 1.19 44.03 6.70 71.02 6.11 59.85 6.31 45.33 7.77 
Indonesia 3010.06 372.47 3.59 1.17 25.72 2.66 41.26 3.17 71.19 7.99 54.17 5.76 
Malaysia 13,976.15 1105.59 2.32 2.70 108.91 6.98 131.50 6.90 67.89 2.17 184.15 18.53 
Pakistan 2144.26 61.49 1.06 2.91 24.38 4.50 43.83 4.01 32.44 2.68 33.31 1.71 
Sri Lanka 3482.64 594.26 5.06  3.76 30.13 2.95 38.86 2.15 97.62 0.845 65.38 9.94 
Thailand 5039.69 399.73 2.53 3.01 100.18 7.26 116.22 8.17 76.78 8.09 140.14 9.55 
Nepal 669.44 49.82 2.39 0.90 42.17 13.35 66.09 11.29 55.58 7.77 44.79 1.60 
Philippines 3143.16 269.19 2.55 1.82 30.51 1.91 59.09 2.45 82.79 2.05 82.96 15.52 
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Table 4.4: Estimation of bank efficiency 
 
Profit 
efficiency 
 
Cost 
Efficiency 
 Mean St. dev Mean St. dev 
India 57% 0.10 59% 0.13 
Indonesia 53% 0.21 55% 0.24 
Malaysia 90% 0.04 92% 0.03 
Nepal 59% 0.12 62% 0.77 
Pakistan 60% 0.10 60% 0.12 
Philippines 89% 0.19 92% 0.52 
Sri Lanka 70% 0.01 85% 0.07 
Thailand 68% 0.09 82% 0.45 
Note: the profit and cost efficiencies have been calculated using equation 4.17 
 
4.3.4.2 Estimation results from dynamic panel for Bank credit and broad money  
Results from the growth model estimation of equation (4.5) are represented in 
the following tables. We assumed GDP per worker and the profit and cost efficiency as 
endogenous variables. Table 4.5 presents the estimation results, using both of the 
measures of financial volume. The results from the two-step system GMM suggest the 
relevance of both of the financial volume measurements for growth rate of GDP per 
worker. Both of the variables for our volume measurement are significant at the 10% 
level. However, the human capital (measured by gross secondary school enrolment) 
and openness (proportion of trade to GDP) variables are only significant for the 
estimation with the bank credit volume.    
The next level of analysis considers the effects of financial development on 
economic growth in terms of the quality of financial development, which is measured 
by bank profit and cost efficiencies for the 8 countries of the sample. In this case, we 
have only used bank credit to compare the volume with the quality of financial 
developments.   
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Table 4.5: Financial volume effects on economic growth 
Variable 
Quantity (bank credit to the private 
sector) 
Broad money 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 
0.052** 
(0.92) 
0.521** 
(1.79) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
0.297* 
(0.10) 
- 
𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦   
0.471* 
(0.10) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 
-0.003 
(0.10) 
-0.003 
(0.13) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 
-0.005 
(0.29) 
0.003 
(0.67) 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
1.387*** 
(0.024) 
0.437 
(0.42) 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 
0.173* 
(0.091) 
0.019 
(0.83) 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 64 64 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 8 8 
𝐴𝑅2 1.60 -0.70 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑍 0.110 0.95 
𝑆𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝜒2 66.47 70.54 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.12 0.12 
Note: p statistics in the parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1% 
 
Table 4.6 presents the effects of the profit efficiency and interaction of profit 
efficiency with bank credit volume. The profit efficiency effect on regional growth is 
positive and significant. Marquez (2002) theoretically demonstrates that increasing 
competition can induce banks to lend excessively to borrowers with low credit ratings, 
thereby causing inefficiencies, which can be detrimental to growth. Therefore, in 
column two of the table we specify the quantity of bank credit and profit efficiency 
simultaneously. The measure of both quality and quantity is positive and significant. 
The result is slightly contradictory to Hasan et al. (2009), where they find significance 
of bank efficiency over the volume, for 11 European countries. Our result is more 
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plausible due to the fact that the 8 countries in our sample are developing, not mature 
economies and are yet to achieve their steady state growth rate. Therefore, both the 
volume and quality can be complementary to each other for economic growth. 
 
We also verify if the interaction between bank quality and the volume of bank 
credit is significant in column three of table 4.6. The interaction term is also positive 
and significant. Secondary education and openness are also found to be significant for 
this analysis. Therefore, our findings suggest that both the volume and quality of 
financial development are important for these regions and they complement each other.   
Table 4.7 summarises the results from the analysis of cost efficiency. The 
findings are similar to that of profit efficiency and growth. Cost efficiency on its own, 
as well as with bank credit, is important for economic growth. The interaction term is 
also highly significant. Our estimation suggests that better banking combined with the 
volume of bank credit to the private sector enhance economic growth.  
However, in contrast to Hasan et al. (2009), we have not found any significant 
difference between the quality and volume effects of bank credit, cost and profit 
efficiency. Both of the measures of quality and volume are equally important for our 
estimation. Our results indicate that for the financial sector of developing countries, 
both efficiency and volume is important. One of the reasons for the contrast of the 
findings with Hasan et al. (2009) is that their analysis is based on 11 European 
countries and these are mature economies close to achieving their steady state growth 
rate. In this case, financial quality, rather than quantity, is more important for growth. 
However, from the perspective of developing economies, financial volume is still 
significant to ensure basic access of the population, and quality complements volume. 
Therefore, developments of both are important for emerging economies. 
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Table 4.6: Financial volume and financial quality effects on growth 
Variable  Profit 
efficiency 
Quantity 
+quality   
Interaction  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.576 
(0.00)*** 
-0.031 
(0.95) 
0.39 
(0.207) 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  0.988** 
(0.07) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 2.099* 
(0.08) 
0.953* 
(0.081) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 
0.015* 
(0.06) 
0.100* 
(0.09) 
0.01* 
(0.10) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.013** 
(0.023) 
 
0.01** 
(0.035) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 -0.287 
(0.13) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
0.575* 
(0.094) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 -0.115 
(0.42) 
0.081 
(0.56) 
0.335** 
(0.05) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 - 0.058* 
(0.12) 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 64 64 64 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 8 8 8 
𝐴𝑅2 -0.51 0.180 0.66 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑍 0.60 0.857 0.51 
𝑆𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝜒2 62.49 60.00 72.82 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.04 0.05 0.60 
Note: p statistics in the parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1% 
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Table 4.7: Financial volume and financial quality (cost efficiency) 
effects on growth 
Variable  Cost 
efficiency 
Quantity 
+quality   
Interaction  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 0.492 
(0.05) 
0.072 
(0.87) 
0.183 
(0.62) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 3.17* 
(0.09) 
1.055** 
(0.05) 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  0.691** 
(0.07) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 
0.01* 
(0.08) 
0.010* 
(0.07) 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−2 
.001 
(0.16) 
0.012** 
(0.01) 
 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.19** 
(0.03) 
 
0.003 
(0.89) 
0.980 
(0.02) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 -0.000 
(1.00) 
0.098 
(0.50) 
0.203* 
(0.07) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∗ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 
  0.100** 
(0.02) 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  64 64 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠  8 8 
𝐴𝑅2 
-0.34 0.50 
 
1.13 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑍 0.734 0.62 0.26 
𝑆𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝜒2 67.28 60.74 70.15 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 0.10 0.05 0.082 
Note: p statistics in the parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1% 
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4.4 Conclusion 
The role of financial development in resource allocation and hence on sustainable 
economic growth, has long been a subject of interest amongst economists and 
policymakers. The hypothesis that financial development facilitates the efficient 
allocation of resources dates back to at least Schumpeter (1912), who presumed that 
banks identify entrepreneurs with good growth prospects and therefore help to 
reallocate resources to their most productive use. Starting from Goldsmith (1969), a 
large body of studies including McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), Levine and 
Zervos (1998), Levine (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Beck and Levine (2001), Hasan et 
al. (2009) and many others provided evidence in favour of the role of financial 
development and growth.  
Nevertheless, there is a debate over the importance of the financial sector. Some 
find a limited ability of financial development to stimulate growth. Robert Lucas 
(1988) asserts that economists 'badly over-stress' the role of financial factors in 
economic growth. Aghion et al. (2005) find the direct effect of financial intermediation 
is not significantly different from zero once a country achieves the steady state growth 
rate. It can only enhance the convergence to steady state growth.   
Many studies have pooled developed and developing countries together in order 
to examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
However, it is quite plausible that the impact of financial development depends on the 
stage of development of a country. The level of financial intermediation may be an 
important factor for economic growth at initial stages of development. However, for 
developed countries, the efficiency and composition of financial intermediation may be 
more important determinants for economic growth (Fitzgerald, 2006). Despite 
substantial and varied evidence, there are shortcomings associated with measuring the 
central concept under consideration, the functioning of the financial system (Čihák et 
al., 2012).  
Much research is based on a measure of the volume of financial intermediation, 
traditionally represented by monetary aggregates or the size of the banking industry. 
However, size is not always a good indication of quality, efficiency or stability. The 
traditional quantity proxies used to measure the financial development do not fully 
reflect the ability of the financial systems to enhance economic growth. Therefore, 
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some studies, such as Hasan et al. (2009) try to find an alternative measure. They 
estimated a more direct measure of the quality of financial institutions, by estimating 
profit and cost efficiency for approximately 7000 banks of 147 NUTS 2 regions, across 
eleven European countries. Their findings suggest that the efficiency effect is 
approximately three times as large as the quantity effects in the eleven European 
countries. The importance of quality over quantity has been emphasised for these 
mature economies, even though the interaction between them is also highly significant. 
This current study also tries to gauge the impact of financial development, in 
terms of both quality and quantity, on eight South and South-East Asian developing 
countries over the period 2003 to 2012. The volume of financial development has been 
measured by bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP and broad money 
growth as a percentage of GDP. The profit and cost efficiency of the banking sectors 
assessed the quality of financial intermediaries. The efficiencies are measured by 
stochastic frontier analysis using Schmidt and Sickles (1984) fixed effects model. Our 
findings from the profit and cost efficiency of banks suggests that there still remains 
substantial room for improvement of banking efficiency for most of these emerging 
countries.  
The finding from the two-step system GMM estimation suggests that both 
financial volume and quality matters for the growth rate for these eight developing 
countries. We find that both measures of the volume of financial developments are 
important for growth, therefore, contrasting the findings of Hasan et al. (2009), where 
they find volume is insignificant for growth. Our results draw attention to the 
importance of specifying three distinct channels through which banks may enhance 
productivity and therefore, economic growth. They are: more efficient financial 
intermediaries, more private sector credit and, most importantly, the interaction 
between financial quality and quantity. The findings also imply that some of the fastest 
growing countries like India and Sri Lanka in our sample can enhance growth rates 
further by improving financial quality and quantity.  
There are various aspects of financial intermediation. One of the shortcomings 
of our study is that we have not taken into account the stock and bond markets. Rather, 
the study concentrates largely on the development of the banking sector. The 
development of the stock and the bond market is much more relevant for developed 
than for developing countries. Developed countries have experienced significant non-
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bank financial development, whilst financial development has mostly occurred within 
the banking system in developing countries (Khan and Senhadji, 2000).   
However, efficiency of the financial institutions should not be taken for granted, 
especially as gathering information is one of their key functions (FitzGerald, 2006). 
Asymmetric information, externalities in financial markets (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992) 
and imperfect competition can lead to sub-optimal levels of financing and investment, 
inefficient allocation of capital, or have other undesirable consequences such as bank 
runs, fraud or illiquidity which are detrimental for growth, particularly in the context of 
developing countries. The recent financial crisis is one such example. When financial 
institutions create complex financial instruments and sell them to unsophisticated 
investors, this might boost the bonuses of the financial engineers and executives 
associated with marketing the new-fangled instruments, while simultaneously distorting 
the allocation of society’s savings and impeding economic prosperity. Improvements in 
risk sharing and household credit markets might also decrease saving as well as growth 
rates (Pagano, 1993). Therefore, appropriate regulations and oversight by public bodies 
with legal and institutional background is crucial in order to enhance the efficiency of 
financial markets and promote economic growth. Future research should incorporate 
the overall quality of financial intermediaries for evaluating its impacts on economic 
growth.  
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Profit and cost efficiencies for eight countries 
Table A4.1 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for India 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 0.03** * 1.10*** 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 0.00*** -0.07*** 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.10*** 0.98*** 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 0.01** -0.09*** 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.12*** -0.49*** 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 0.01*** -0.07*** 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.03*** -0.41*** 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.00**  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.003*  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.006**  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.03*** 0.09 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.02*** 0.02 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.02*** 0.02 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.11 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  0.14* 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  0.04 
Constant 0.12*** 0.45*** 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.2 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Indonesia 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 𝑜𝑟 ln (𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) 0.013* -0.51* 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.01 -0.07 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.01 0.17 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 0.00 0.02 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.00 -0.27 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 -0.00 -0.02 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.02 -0.27 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.01  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.00  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.00 -0.23 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.00 -0.03 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.01 0.18 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.36 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  -0.56 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  -0.23 
Constant 0.01*** 1.90** 
No of Observation 499 499 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
 and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.3 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Malaysia 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅)  𝑜𝑟 ln(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) 0.03** 0.87** 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.01 0.08** 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.07* 0.45* 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 0.010 0.14 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.017** 0.63** 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 -0.00 0.06 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01 0.75* 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.01  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.035***  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.012  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.01 -0.25* 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.02 0.096** 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01 -0.06 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.12 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  0.21 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  0.03 
Constant -0.04** 1.73* 
No of Observation 121 121 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.4 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Nepal 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 𝑜𝑟 ln (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) 0.04** -0.53** 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.05 0.13 * 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.07** 1.48 * 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 -0.02  * 0.12 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.03 *** 1.19 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 -0.00 1.65 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.40 * -0.82 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.05  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.00  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.00  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.07 -0.00 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.00 -0.08 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.10 0.08 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) 0.05 2.21 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  -0.04 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  -0.04 
Constant -0.24*** 3.13*** 
No of Observation 135 135 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.5 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Pakistan 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 0.06 ** -0.37* 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.05* 0.12 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.19*** 0.93 *** 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 -0.03 -0.01 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.00 -0.13 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 0.00 -0.08 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.03 -0.53 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) 0.03  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.08  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.0* -0.12 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.005 -0.00 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.020 0.054 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.031* 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  -0.09 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  0.00 
Constant -0.22 -0.68 
No of Observation 85 85 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.6 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Philippines 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 𝑜𝑟 ln (𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) -0.08    1.18* 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 0.02    0.04    
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) 0.17** 0.08* 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 0.01    -0.08    
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.05 ** -0.49    
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 -0.00   0.03     
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.00    0.53    
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.02*  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.06      
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.00    
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.04   -0.05   
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.01    0.10 *** 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01     0.39    
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.80    
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  -0.57    
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  -0.06* 
Constant  0.13*** -0.56** * 
No of Observation  240 240 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.7 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Sri Lanka 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) 𝑜𝑟 ln (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) -0.19 ** -0.16 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.11 -0.01 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) 0. 02* 0.56* 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 -0.04 0.00 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.04 -0.12 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 0.009 -0.00* 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.011* -0.18 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) 0.11  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.02  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.00  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.01 -0.37 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.00 0.01 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.00 0.58 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  -0.06 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  0.18 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  0.09 
Constant -0.06 -0.94** 
No of Observation 129 129 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Table A4.8 Estimated coefficients of efficiency frontiers for Thailand 
Variables 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑡 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) -0.03    1.15*** 
ln (𝑁𝑇𝑅)2 -0.00    0.11 *** 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.06    -0.86 *** 
ln (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)2 0.007    -0.01    
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.008    -0.24*** 
ln (𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)2 0.007    -0.04** 
ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.023    -0.11    
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) -0.02***  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) 0.012**  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) 0.01*  
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) -0.02*** -0.13 *** 
ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.00    0.06 * 
ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶) ∗ ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑆) -0.01 0.14** 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶)  0.18* 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐶)  0.05 ** 
ln(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡) ∗ ln(𝑂𝑂𝐶)  0.01    
Constant  0.84*** -0.92*** 
No of Observation  326 326 
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level 
 and * indicates significant at 10% level 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the thesis 
In this thesis, three separate research questions have been addressed. The chapters are 
mutually exclusive, but linked to each other by sharing different areas of applied 
macroeconomics. The thesis deals with empirical issues relating to exchange rate pass 
through, classification of monetary policy regimes and the role of financial 
development on economic growth.  
There has been a resurgence of interest in the issue of the importance of 
monetary policy. Two main factors motivate this. First of all, a stream of empirical 
research beginning in the late 1980s has, successfully, demonstrated that monetary 
policy can significantly influence the short term course of the real economy (e.g., 
Romer and Romer, 1988; Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Secondly, considerable 
improvements in the underlying theoretical framework used for policy analysis have 
contributed greatly to the success of modern monetary policy. Institutional support is 
designed to anchor inflation expectations in order to secure the credibility of a central 
bank’s commitment to reducing inflation (Gurkaynak et al., 2007). There now seems to 
be broad agreement that the choice of how to conduct monetary policy has important 
consequences for aggregate activities. Therefore, it is no longer an issue to downplay. 
The success of central banks in reducing inflation over the last three decades 
has contributed to economic growth and many other positive outcomes in both 
developed and developing countries. There has also been a decline in the pricing power 
of firms. Even though some have argued that the decline in pricing power has helped to 
keep inflation low, Taylor (2000) and many others have suggested vice versa. They 
argue that the decline in pass through or pricing power is due to the low inflation 
environment that has recently been achieved by many countries. In a microeconomic 
price setting model, Taylor (2000) demonstrated that lower pass through is a 
consequence of a lower perceived persistence of cost changes. Evidence is then 
presented showing that low inflation has, itself, caused low pass through. With the aid 
of an economy-wide model consistent with the micro model, he attempts to illustrate 
how changes in pricing power affect output and inflation dynamics in a favourable 
way. However, the benefits can disappear quickly if there are changes in monetary 
policy preferences or expectations.  
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Over recent decades, many leading economists have proposed specific policy 
rules, or have at least staked out a position on the general course of what monetary 
policy should be. A few of them have advocated for monetary policy regimes with 
some kind of nominal anchors, deeming them to be more appropriate for growth and 
inflation. Both growth theory and the literature on monetary policy regimes suggest that 
the type of regime could have consequences for short and medium-term growth, either 
directly through its impacts on shock adjustment, or indirectly through its impacts on 
other important determinants of growth (e.g., investment, international trade, and 
financial sector development). However, there is no clear indication provided by 
economic theory as to what kind of regimes are more likely to promote growth. 
Therefore, the issue is largely empirical. The chapters of the thesis have addressed 
some of these ongoing issues, where monetary policy has a great deal of influence.  
The 2nd chapter of the thesis examines exchange rate pass through. Firstly, we 
have estimated exchange rate pass through for 39 countries over the period 1981 to 
2010, as well as across different monetary policy regimes, to account for structural 
changes based on inflation. Pass through elasticities are not constant over time. 
Therefore, it is crucial to take account of structural changes when estimating pass 
through elasticities. Independent break tests, such as CUSUM tests, have been used to 
select the structural breaks. We have also constructed a trade weighted exchange rate 
index and foreign producers’ price index to replace the nominal effective exchange rate 
and foreign producers cost, in order to estimate pass through elasticities. In the second 
step, we have examined the macroeconomic factors behind the pass through elasticities. 
Our findings suggest a decline in pass through elasticities for many countries 
over the last decade. However, over the period of financial crisis, some countries 
experienced an upward shift in pass through elasticities (e.g., India, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Singapore, and the UK). Findings from the second stage analysis suggest that both 
average inflation and inflation volatility have a strong negative impact on pass through 
elasticities. Inflation targeting regimes and greater central bank autonomy reduce pass 
through elasticities. 
We have conducted a de facto classification of monetary policy regimes for 123 
countries from 1970 to 2013 in the 3rd chapter. We try to separate the exchange rate 
regimes from other monetary policy regimes, such as inflation or monetary targeting 
regimes. We have specified some criteria to classify 7 exchange rate regimes and 4 
178 
 
inflation and monetary targeting regimes. The yearly classification of exchange rate 
regimes has been carried out by using monthly data, and on the basis of volatilities of 
exchange rates and their changes, and the relative volatilities of changes in exchange 
rates and reserves. Inflation targeting and monetary targeting regimes have been 
classified on the basis of policy interest rates, changes in inflation and monetary growth 
of both broad and narrow money. Overall, 10% of regimes have been classified as 
either some kind of inflation and monetary targeting regime. There is evidence of a less 
pronounced move away from the intermediate regimes since the late 1990s. 22% of the 
time, inflation targeting regimes are not identified as de facto inflation targeting 
regimes. 74 periods of 12 non-inflation targeting countries are found to be consistent 
with de facto inflation targeting regimes. The regime classification has a 33% 
correlation with that of the IMF and a 45% correlation with Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
(2002) exchange rate regime classification.  
We also examine the impact of our estimated de facto regimes on growth and 
inflation. We find that regimes with nominal anchors perform better than others for 
growth and inflation. Inflation is significantly lower in inflation targeting and monetary 
targeting regimes, particularly for non-industrialised countries. Regimes characterised 
as fixed exchange rates also have lower inflation, compared to the rest of the exchange 
rate regimes. Overall, our findings suggest that monetary policy regimes with nominal 
anchors are beneficial for growth.  
The impact of financial development on growth is analysed in the 4th chapter. 
We examine the relationship between financial development and growth for eight 
South and South East Asian developing countries over the period 2003 to 2012. Unlike 
most previous studies, we attempt to measure financial development in terms of both 
quality and quantity. We measure the quality of financial intermediation, for the first 
time in these countries, by the cost and profit efficiencies of 191 banks, covering the 
period 2003 to 2012. The quantity of financial intermediaries has been measured by the 
broad money growth and credit to the private sector provided by the banking industry, 
both as a percentage of GDP. The findings from two-step system GMM estimations 
suggest that both financial volume and quality matters for growth in these eight 
developing countries. Therefore, an interaction between quantity and quality is 
desirable for growth enhancement.  
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5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis has examined some key questions in applied macroeconomics by 
constructing and analysing new datasets and regime classifications, and has arrived at a 
number of important, policy relevant, conclusions. Overall, our findings suggest that 
the design of monetary policy has significant implications for macroeconomic 
performance. We conclude with some limitations of the study and discussing some 
avenues of future research.  
In chapter 2, we tried to assess the effect of exchange rate pass through on the 
consumer price index. One of the limitations of our study is that there are asymmetries 
in exchange rate pass through. An exchange rate appreciation might not have the same 
pass through elasticity, compared to a depreciation. Business cycles could exert 
significant impacts on pass through. For example, Correa and Minella (2010) find the 
presence of nonlinear mechanisms of pass through from the exchange rate to inflation 
in Brazil over the period 1995 to 2005. Their findings suggest that short run pass 
through is higher during periods of faster growth and when exchange rate depreciations 
are above some threshold value and volatility of the exchange rate is relatively lower. A 
future improvement of the current study would be to incorporate these factors into our 
understanding of pass through for the countries studied. Another limitation here relates 
to the constituents of aggregate CPI. A substantial proportion of the components of the 
CPI index consist of domestics services (for example, housing costs and expenditure on 
domestic services). This might, to some extent, account for the lower exchange rate 
pass through in CPI inflation compared to import price inflation, but possibly not to a 
large extent. Any future research should take account of this issue.  
In chapter 3, we have classified de facto monetary policy regimes. The 
classification has been done on the basis of observable data. There is, sometimes, a lack 
of transparency regarding the exact targets among countries which actively adopted 
monetary targets, specifically during the monetary targeting era of the 1970s and 
1980s. Often, monetary targets were not as explicit and transparent compared to 
inflation targets. Another extension of the current research could be with regard to the 
endogeneity of monetary policy regimes. The literature on the endogeneity of monetary 
policy is largely concerned with exchange rate regimes, not on other monetary policy 
regimes like inflation targeting or monetary targeting.  
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In chapter 4, we have measured the quality and quantity of financial 
development in terms of banking sector development. Clearly, there are other measures 
of financial development one can consider, however we tried to restrict our analysis to 
the banking sectors. Levine and Zervos (1996) find that banks provide different 
financial services to those of stock markets and both sectors are important for growth in 
developing countries. A well organized and deeply spread banking sector is a clear 
indicator of a well-developed financial sector of a country. The banking sector 
constitutes the largest component of the financial system in most developing countries. 
For instance, in India, about 49 per cent of external funds for small and medium firms 
come from banks and term-lending institutions (NSSO, 2008).
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Nevertheless, there are distinctions between domestic and foreign banks in 
terms of their impacts on economic growth. We have not segregated the impacts of 
domestic banks from foreign banks into our analysis. A study by Detragiache et al. 
(2006) finds evidence that in poor countries, a stronger foreign bank presence has been 
associated with slower credit growth, accompanied by less access to credit. An article 
by Winkler (2009) on rapid financial deepening in south-eastern Europe suggests that 
the impact of foreign banks on financial sector development has been far from uniform. 
The strategy of fostering financial development, based on strong foreign banks, does 
not automatically provide a guarantee for financial stability. On the contrary, advocates 
of foreign banks claim that these banks can achieve better economies of scale and risk 
diversification then domestic banks. Moreover, foreign banks generally have access to 
advanced technology, better supervision, regulations and enhanced competition in the 
domestic financial sector. A natural extension of the current study will certainly be to 
segregate the analysis on the basis of domestic and foreign banks in developing 
countries. Another problem, particularly with developing countries is the data 
limitations. For many developing countries, bank level data needed for conducting 
valid analyses are not available. The rapid development of databanks will obviously 
help to reduce such limitations and will certainly pave the way for new and interesting 
research in the future.   
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